Chris Blattman: War and Violence
嘉宾：Chris Blattman
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What are your thoughts on the ongoing war in Ukraine?
How do you analyze it within your framework about war?
- How far would they go to hang on to power
when push came to shove is I think the thing
that worries me the most and is plainly
what worries most people about the risk of nuclear war.
Like at what point does that unchecked leadership
decide that this is worth it?
Especially if they can emerge from the rubble still on top.
(air whooshing)
- The following is a conversation with Chris Blattman,
professor at the University of Chicago,
studying the causes and consequences of violence and war.
This he explores in his new book called,
"Why We Fight, The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace."
The book comes out on April 19th,
so you should pre-order it to support Chris and his work.
This is the Lex Friedman Podcast.
To support it, please check out our sponsors
in the description.
And now, dear friends, here's Chris Blattman.
In your new book titled, "Why We Fight, The Roots of War
and the Paths for Peace," you write, quote,
"Let me be clear what I mean when I say war.
I don't just mean countries duking it out.
I mean any kind of prolonged violence struggle
between groups that includes villages, clans, gangs,
ethnic groups, religious sects,
political factions and nations.
Wildly different as these may be,
their origins have much in common.
We'll see that the Northern Irish zealots,
Colombian cartels, European tyrants,
Liberian rebels, Greek oligarchs, Chicago gangs,
Indian mobs, Rwandan genocide dares,"
a new word I learned, thank you to you.
Those are people who administer genocide.
English soccer hooligans and American invaders.
So first, let me ask, what is war?
In saying that war is a prolonged violence struggle
between groups, what do the words prolonged,
groups and violent mean?
- I sit at the sort of intersection of economics
and political science and I also dwell a little bit
in psychology, but that's partly because I'm married
to a psychologist, sometimes do research with her.
All these things are really different.
So if you're a political scientist,
you spend a lot of time just classifying
a really narrow kind of conflict and studying that.
And that's an important way to make progress
as a social scientist.
But I'm not trying to make progress,
I'm trying to sort of help everybody step back
and say, you know what, there's like some common things
that we know from these disciplines
that relate to a really wide range of phenomena.
Basically, we can talk about them in a very similar way
and we can get really similar insights.
So I wanted to actually bring them together,
but I still had to like say,
let's hold out individual violence,
which has a lot in common, but individuals choose
to engage in violence for more
and sometimes different reasons.
So let's just put that aside so that we can focus a bit.
And let's really put aside short incidents of violence
because those might have the same kind
of things explaining them, but actually there's a lot
of other things that can explain short violence.
Short violence can be really demonstrative.
Like you can just, I can use it to communicate information.
The thing that all of it has in common
is that it doesn't generally make sense.
It's not your best option most of the time.
And so I wanted to say, let's take this thing
that should be puzzling.
We kind of think it's normal.
We kind of think this is what all humans do,
but let's point out that it's not normal
and then figure out why and let's talk about why.
And so that's, so I was trying to throw out
the short violence, I was trying to throw out
the individual violence.
I was also trying to throw out all the competition
that happens that's not violent.
That's the normal, normal competition.
I was trying to say, let's talk about violent competition
'cause that's kind of the puzzle.
- So that's really interesting.
So you said, usually people try to find
a narrow definition and you said progress.
So you make progress by finding a narrow definition,
for example, of military conflict in a particular context
and progress means, all right, well,
how do we prevent this particular kind of military conflict
or maybe if it's already happening,
how do we deescalate it and how do we solve it?
So from a geopolitics perspective,
from an economics perspective,
and you're looking for a definition of war
that is as broad as possible, but not so broad
that you cannot achieve a deep level of understanding
of why it happens and how it can be avoided.
- Right, and a common, basically like recognize
that common principles govern some kinds of behavior
that look pretty different.
Like an Indian ethnic riot is obviously pretty different
than invading a neighboring country, right?
But, and that's pretty different than two villages
or two gangs.
A lot of what I work on is studying organized criminals
and gangs, two gangs going to where you'd think
is really different and of course it is,
but there are some like common principles.
You can just think about conflict and the use of violence
and not learn everything, but just get a lot,
just get really, really far by sort of seeing
the commonalities rather than just focusing
on the differences.
- So again, those words are prolonged, groups, and violent.
Can you maybe linger on each of those words?
What does prolonged mean?
Where's the line between short and long?
What does groups mean and what does violent mean?
- So let me, you know, I have a friend who,
someone who's become a friend through the process
of my work and writing this book also,
who was 20, 30 years ago was a gang leader in Chicago.
So this guy named Napoleon English or Nap.
And I remember one time he was saying,
well, you know, when I was young, I used to,
I was 15, 16 and he'd go to the neighboring gangs territory.
He says, I'd go gang banging.
And I said, well, I didn't know what that meant.
I said, what does that mean?
And he said, oh, that just meant I'd shoot him up.
Like I'd shoot at buildings, I might shoot at people.
I wasn't trying to kill, he wasn't trying to kill them.
He was just trying to sort of send a signal
that he was a tough guy and he was fearless
and he was someone who they should be careful with.
And so I didn't want to call that war, right?
That was, that was, that's something different.
That was, it was short, it was kind of sporadic.
And he wasn't, and he was basically trying
to send them information.
And this is what countries do all the time, right?
We have military parades and we might have border skirmishes.
And I wanted to sort of, so is it, what's short?
Is it three month border skirmish, a war?
I mean, I don't try to get into those things.
I don't want to, but I want to point out that like
these long grueling months and years of violence
are like part of the problem and the puzzle.
And I just, I didn't want to spend a lot of time
talking about the international version of gangbanging.
It's a different phenomenon.
- So what is it about Napoleon that doesn't nap,
let's call him, not to add confusion,
that doesn't qualify for war?
Is it the individual aspect?
Is it that violence is not the thing that is sought
but the communication of information is what is sought?
Or is it the shortness of it?
Is it all of those combined?
- It's a little bit, I mean, he was the head of a group
or he was becoming the head of a group at that point.
And that group eventually did go to war
with those neighboring gangs, which is to say
it was just long drawn out conflict
over months and months and months.
But I think one of the big insights from my fields
is that you're constantly negotiating over something, right?
Whether you're officially negotiating
or you're all posturing,
like you're bargaining over something
and you should be able to figure out a way
to split that pie.
And you could use violence,
but violence is, everybody's miserable.
Like if you're nap, like if you start a war,
one, there's lots of risks.
You could get killed, that's not good.
You could kill somebody else and go to jail,
which is what happened to him, that's not good.
Your soldiers get killed.
No one's buying your drugs in the middle of a gunfight
so it interrupts your business.
And so on and on, it's like, it's really miserable.
This is what we're seeing right now.
As we're recording, the Russian invasion of Ukraine
is now in its fourth or fifth week.
Everybody's, if it didn't dawn on them before,
it's dawned on them now just how brutal and costly this is.
- As you described, for everybody.
So everybody is losing in this war.
- Yeah, I mean, that's maybe the insight.
Everybody loses something from war.
And there was usually, not always,
§02Transcript · 08:58–18:02
but the point is there was usually a way
to get what you wanted or be better off
without having to fight over it.
So there's this, it's just,
fighting is just politics by other means.
And it's just inefficient, costly, brutal,
devastating means.
And so that's like the deep insight.
And so I kind of wanted to say,
so I guess, like, what's not war?
I mean, I don't try to belabor the definitions
'cause some, you know, there's reams and reams
of political science papers written on like,
what's a war, what's not a war?
People disagree.
I just wanted to say,
war is the thing that we shouldn't be doing.
Or war is the violence that doesn't make sense.
There's a whole bunch of other violence,
including gangbanging and skirmishes
and things that might make sense,
precisely because they're cheap ways of communicating
or they're not particularly costly.
War is the thing that's just so costly
we should be trying to avoid
is maybe like the meta way I think about it.
- Right, nevertheless, definitions are interesting.
So outside of the academic bickering,
every time you try to define something,
I'm a big fan of it, the process illuminates.
So the destination doesn't matter
'cause the moment you arrive at the definition,
you lose the power.
- Yeah, one of the interesting things,
I mean, so people, you know, if you wanna do,
you know, some of what I do
is just quantitative analysis of conflict.
And if you wanna do that,
if you wanna sort of run statistics on war,
then you have to code it all up.
And then lots of people have done that.
There's four or five major datasets
where people or teams of people have over time said,
we're gonna code years of war
between these groups or within a country.
And what's interesting is how difficult,
these datasets don't often agree.
You have to make all of these,
the decision gets really complicated.
Like when does the war begin, right?
Does it begin when a certain number
of people have been killed?
Did it begin, what if there's like lots of skirmishing
and sort of little terror attacks
or a couple bombs lobbed,
and then eventually turns into war,
do we call that, do we backdate it
to like when the first act of violence started?
And then what do we do with all the times
when there was like that low scale,
low intensity violence or bombs lobbed?
And do we call those wars,
but only or maybe only if they eventually get worse?
Like, so you get, it actually is really tricky.
- And the defensive and the offensive aspect.
So everybody, Hitler in World War II,
it seems like he never attacked anybody.
He's always defending against the unjust attack
of everybody else as he's taken over the world.
So that's like information propaganda
that every side is trying to communicate to the world.
So you can't listen to necessarily information
like self-report data.
You have to kind of look past that somehow,
maybe look, especially in the modern world,
as much as possible at the data.
How many bombs dropped?
How many people killed?
How the number of, the estimates of the number of troops
moved from one location to another and that kind of thing.
And the other interesting thing
is there's a quantitative analysis of war.
So for example, I was looking at just war index
or people trying to measure,
trying to put a number on what wars are seen as just and not.
- Oh really, I've never seen that.
- It's, there's numbers behind it.
It's great.
So it's great because again,
as you do an extensive quantification of justice,
you start to think what actually contributes to our thought
that for example, World War II is a just war
and other wars are not.
A lot of it is about intent
and some of the other factors that you look at,
which is prolonged, the degree of violence
that is necessary versus not necessary,
given the greater good,
some measure of the greater good of people,
all those kinds of things.
Then there's reasons for war,
looking to free people or to stop a genocide
versus conquering land, all those kinds of things.
And people try to put a number behind it.
And a lot of-- - And it's based on,
I mean, what I'm trying to imagine is,
I mean, suppose I wake up and, or whatever,
suppose I think my God tells me to do something
or my God thinks that, or my moral sense thinks
that something that another group is doing is repugnant.
I'm curious, like are they evaluating
like the validity of that claim
or just the idea that like,
well, you said it was repugnant,
you deeply believe that, therefore it's just?
- I think, now it could be corrected on a lot of this,
but I think this is always looking at wars
after they happened.
So it's, and trying to take a global perspective
from all sort of a general survey of how people perceive.
So you're not weighing disproportionately
the opinions of the people who waged the war.
- Yeah, I mean, I kind of ended up dodging that
because, I mean, one is to just point out that wars,
actually most wars aren't necessary.
And so in the sense that there's another way
to get what you wanted.
And so on one level, there's no just war.
Now that's not true because take an example
like the US invasion of Afghanistan,
the United States has been attacked.
There's a culpable agent, reliable evidence
that this is Al-Qaeda, they're being sheltered
in Afghanistan by the Taliban.
And then the Taliban, this is a bit murky.
It seems that there was an attempt to say,
hand him over or else, and they said, no way.
Now you can make an argument that invading
and attacking is strategically the right thing to do
in terms of sending signals to your future enemies.
Or you just, if you think it's important
to bring someone to justice, in this case, Al-Qaeda,
then maybe that's just war or that's a just invasion.
But it hinges on the fact that the other side
just didn't do the seemingly sensible thing,
which is say, okay, we'll give him up.
And so it was completely avoidable in one sense.
But if you believe, and I think it's probably true,
if you believe that for their own ideological
and other reasons, Mullah Omar in particular
and Taliban in general decided we're not going to do this,
then now you're not left with very many good choices.
And now, I didn't want to talk about is that a just war,
is that, what's justice or not?
I just wanted to point out that like,
one side's intransigence, if that's indeed what happened,
one side's intransigence sort of maybe compels you
to basically eliminates all of the reasonable bargains
that you could be satisfied with.
And now you're left with really no other strategic option
but to invade.
I think that's a slight oversimplification,
but I think that's like one way to describe what happened.
- So your book is fascinating,
your perspective on this is fascinating.
I'll try to sort of play devil's advocate at times
to try to get a clarity.
But the thesis is that war is costly,
usually costly for everybody.
So that's what you mean when you say nobody wants war,
because you're going to,
from a game theoretic perspective, nobody wins.
And so war is essentially a breakdown of reason,
a breakdown of negotiation, of healthy communication,
or healthy operation of the world, some kind of breakdown.
You list all kinds of ways in which it breaks down.
But there's also human beings in this mix.
And there is ideas of justice.
So for example, I don't want to,
my memory doesn't serve me well,
on which wars were seen as justice,
very, very few in the 20th century
of the many that have been there.
The wars that were seen as just,
first of all, the most just war
is seen as World War II by far.
It's actually the only one that goes above a threshold
as seen as just, everything is seen as unjust.
It's less, it's like degrees of unjustness.
And I think the ones that are seen as more just
are the ones that are fast,
that you have a very specific purpose,
you communicate that purpose honestly
with the global community,
and you strike hard, fast, and you pull out.
To do sort of, it's like rescue missions.
It's almost like policing work.
If there's somebody suffering,
you go in and stop that suffering directly, and that's it.
I think World War II is seen in that way,
§03Transcript · 18:05–26:14
that there's an obvious aggressor
that is causing a lot of suffering in the world
and looking to expand the scale of that suffering,
and so you strike, I mean, given the scale,
you strike as hard and as fast as possible
to stop the expansion of the suffering.
And so that's kind of how they see.
I don't know if you can kind of look
with this framework that you've presented
and look at Hitler and think,
well, it's not in his interest to attack Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Britain, France, Russia, the Soviet Union,
America, the United States of America,
same with Japan, is it in their long-term interest?
I don't know.
It's for me, who cares about alleviating
human suffering in the world, yes, it's not.
It seems like almost no war is just,
but it also seems somehow deeply human to fight,
and I think your book makes the case, no, it's not.
Can you try to get at that?
'Cause it seems that war, there is some,
that drum of war seems to beat in all human hearts.
It's in there somewhere.
Maybe it's, maybe there's a relic of the past
and we need to get rid of it.
It's deeply irrational.
- Okay, so obviously we go to war,
and obviously there's a lot of violence,
and so we have to explain something,
and some of that's going to be aspects of our humanness.
So I guess what I wanted us to sort of start with,
I think it was just useful to sort of start
and point out, actually,
there's really, really, really, really strong incentives
not to go to war, because it's gonna be really costly.
And so all of these other human or strategic things,
all these things, the circumstantial things
that will eventually lead us to go to war
have to be pretty powerful before we go there,
and most of the time--
- Sorry to interrupt, and that's why you also describe,
very importantly, that war throughout human history
is actually rare.
We usually avoid it.
- You know, most people don't know about
the US invasion of Haiti in 1994.
I mean, a lot of people know about it,
but people just don't pay attention to it.
We don't, we're gonna, you know,
the history books and school kids are gonna learn
about the invasion of Afghanistan for decades and decades,
and nobody's going to put this one in the history books,
and it's because it didn't actually happen,
because before the troops could land,
the person who'd taken power in a coup
basically said, "Fine."
There's this famous story where Colin Powell goes to Haiti,
to this new dictator who's refused
to let a democratic president take power,
and tries to convince him to step down or else,
and he says, "No, no, no," and then he shows him a video,
and it's basically troop planes
and all these things taking off,
and he's like, "This is not live.
"This is two hours ago."
So it's a, and basically, he basically gives up right there.
So that was--
- That's a powerful move.
- Yeah. (laughs)
I think Powell might've been one of his teachers
in like a US military college,
'cause a lot of these military dictators
were trained at some point,
so they had some, there was some personal relationships,
at least between people in the US government and this guy,
that they were trying to use.
The point is, and that's like what should've happened.
Like, that makes sense, right?
Like, yeah, maybe I can mount an insurgency,
and yeah, I'm not gonna bear a lot of the costs of war
'cause I'm the dictator, and maybe he's human,
and he just wants to fight or gets angry,
or it's just in his mind whatever he's doing,
but at the end of the day, he's like,
"This does not make sense."
And that's what happens most of the time,
but we don't write so many books about it.
And now some political scientists go,
and they count up all of the nations that could fight
'cause they have some dispute,
and they're right next to one another,
or they look at the ethnic groups
that could fight with one another
'cause they have, there's some tension,
and they're right next to one another,
and then whatever, some number,
like 900, 900, 900, 1,000 don't fight
because they just find some other way.
They don't like each other, but they just loathe in peace
because that's the sensible thing to do.
And that's what we all do.
We loathe in peace, and we loathed the Soviet Union
in relative peace for decades,
and India loathes Pakistan in peace.
I mean, two weeks into the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
again, it was in the newspapers,
but most people didn't, I think, take note,
India accidentally launched a cruise missile at Pakistan
and calm ensued.
So they were like, yeah, this is,
we do not wanna go to war.
This will be bad.
We'll be angry, but we'll accept your explanation
that this was an accident.
And so these things finder the radar.
And so we overestimate, I think,
how likely it is sides are gonna fight.
But then, of course, things do happen.
Like Russia did invade the Ukraine
and didn't find some negotiated deal.
And so then the book is sort of about,
half the book is just sort of laying out,
actually, like, there's just different ways this breaks down
and some of them are human.
Some of them are this,
I actually don't think war beats in our heart.
It does a little bit, but we're actually very cooperative.
As a species, we're deeply, deeply cooperative.
We're really, really good.
So the thing we're not, we're okay at violence,
and we're okay at getting angry and vengeant.
And we have principles that will sometimes lead us,
but we're actually really, really,
really good at cooperation.
And so that's, again, I'm not trying to write
some big optimistic book where everything's gonna be great
and we're all happy and we don't really fight.
It's more just to say, let's start,
let's be like a doctor.
As a doctor, we're gonna focus on the sick, right?
I'm gonna try, I know there's sick people,
but I'm gonna recognize that the normal state is health
and that most people are healthy.
And that's gonna make me a better doctor.
And I'm kind of saying the same thing.
Let's be better doctors of politics in the world
by recognizing that the normal state is health,
and then we're gonna identify what are the diseases
that are causing this warfare.
- So yeah, the natural state of the human body
with the immune system and all the different parts
wants to be healthy and is really damn good at being healthy,
but sometimes it breaks down.
Let's understand how it breaks down.
So what are the five ways that you list
that are the roots of war?
- Yeah, so I mean, they're kind of like buckets.
They're sort of things that rhyme, right?
'Cause it's not all the same.
There's like lots of reasons to go to war.
There's this great line,
"There's a reason for every war and a war for every reason."
And that's true.
And it's kind of overwhelming, right?
And it's overwhelming for a lot of people.
It was overwhelming for me for a lot of time.
And I think one of the gifts of social science
is actually people have started to organize this for us.
And I just tried to organize it like a tiny bit better.
- Buckets that rhyme.
- Buckets, yeah, the terrible metaphor, right?
(laughing)
I got it, metaphors.
So the idea was that like that basic incentive,
like something overrides these incentives.
And I guess I was saying there's five ways
that they get overrided.
And three are I'd call strategic.
Like they're kind of logical.
They're circumstances that,
and this is, they're sort of,
where strategic is, strategy is like the game theory.
You could use those two things interchangeably,
but game theory is sort of making it sound
more complicated, I think, than it is.
It's basically saying that there's times
when this is like the optimal choice
because of circumstances.
And one of them is when the people
who are deciding don't bear those costs.
Or maybe even have a private incentive that's gonna,
that's, if they're ignoring the cost,
then maybe the costs of war are not so material.
That's a contributing factor.
Another is just there's uncertainty.
And we could talk about that,
but there's just the absence of information
means that it actually,
there's circumstances where it's your best choice to attack.
§04Transcript · 26:17–35:06
There's this thing that political economists
call commitment problems,
which are basically saying there's some big power shift
that you can avoid by attacking now.
So it's like a dynamic incentive.
It's sort of saying, well,
in order to keep something from happening in the future,
I can attack now.
And because of the structure of incentives,
it actually makes sense for me.
Even though war is in theory really costly,
or it is really costly nonetheless.
And then there's these sort of human things.
One's a little bit like just war.
One sort of thing, there's like ideologies or principles
or things we value that weigh against those costs.
Like exterminating the heretical idea
or standing up for a principle
might be so valuable to me that I'm willing to use violence,
even if it's costly.
And there's nothing irrational about that.
And then the fifth bucket is all of the irrationalities,
all the passions and all of the most importantly,
I think, like misperceptions, the way we get.
Like we basically make wrong calculations
about whether or not war is the right decision we get.
We misunderstand or misjudge our enemy
or misjudge ourselves.
- So if you put all those things into buckets,
how much can it be modeled in a simple game theoretic way
and how much of it is a giant human mess?
- So four of those five are really, on some level,
easy to think strategically and model in a simple way
in the sense that any of us can do it.
We do this all the time.
Think of like bargaining in a market
for a carpet or something or whatever you bargained for.
You're thinking a few steps ahead
about what your opponent's going to do
and you stake out a high, like a low price
and the seller stakes out a high price.
And you might both say, oh, I refuse to,
I could never accept that.
And there's all this sort of cheap talk,
but you kind of understand where you're going
and it's efficient to like find a deal
and buy the market, buy the carpet eventually.
So we all understand this like game theory
and the strategy, I think intuitively.
Or maybe even a closer example is like,
suppose, I don't know, you have a tenant you need to evict
or any normal like kind of legal,
it's not yet a legal dispute, right?
Like we just have a dispute with a neighbor
or somebody else.
Most of us don't end up going to court.
Going to court is like the war option.
That's the costly thing that we just ought to be able to,
we ought to be able to find something between ourselves
that doesn't require this hiring lawyers
and a long drawn out trial.
And most of the time we do, right?
And so we all understand that incentive.
And then for those five buckets,
so everything except all the irrational
and the misperceptions are really easy to model.
Then from a technical standpoint,
it's actually pretty tricky to model the misperceptions.
And I'm not a game theorist.
And so I'm more channeling my colleagues who do this
and what I know.
But it's not rocket science.
I mean, I think that's what I try to lay out in the book
is like there's all these ideas out there
that can actually help us just make sense of all these wars
and just bring some order to the morass of reasons.
- Well, to push back a lot of things in one sentence.
So first of all, rocket science is actually pretty simple.
(Dave laughing)
People like they--
- I'll defer to you actually.
- Well, I think it's 'cause unfortunately,
it's very like engineering.
It's very well defined.
The problem is well defined.
The problem with humanity is it's actually complicated.
So it is true it's not rocket science,
but it is not true it's easy
because it's not rocket science.
But the problem, the downside of game theory
is not that it helps us make sense of the world.
It projects a simple model of the world
that brings us comfort in thinking we understand.
And sometimes that simplification
is actually getting at the core first principles
on understanding of something.
And sometimes it fools us into thinking we understand.
So for example, I mean, mutually assured destruction
is a very simple model and people argue all the time
whether that's actually a good model or not.
But there's empirical fact
that we're still alive as a human civilization.
And also in the game theoretic sense,
do we model individual leaders and their relationships?
Do we, the staff, the generals,
or do we also have to model the culture, the people,
the suffering of the people, the economic frustration
or the anger, the distrust?
Do you have to model all those things?
Do they come into play?
And sometimes, I mean, again,
we could be romanticizing those things
from a historical perspective.
But when you look at history
and you look at the way wars start,
it sometimes feels like a little bit of a misunderstanding
escalates, escalates, escalates,
and just builds on top of itself.
And all of a sudden it's an all out war.
It's the escalation with nobody hitting the brakes.
- So, I mean, you're absolutely right
like in the sense that it's totally possible
to oversimplify these things
and take the game theory too seriously.
And some, and people who study those things
and write those models and people like me who use them
can sometimes make that mistake.
I think that's not the mistake
that most people make most often.
And what's actually true is I think most people,
we're actually really quick,
whether it's the US invasion of Afghanistan or Iraq,
we're really quick to blame that on the humanness
and the culture.
So we're really quick to say, oh, this was George W. Bush's
either desire for revenge and vengeance
or some private agenda or blood for oil.
So we're really quick to blame it on these things.
And then we're really,
we tend to overlook the strategic incentives to attack,
which I think we're probably dominant.
I think those things might've been true to a degree,
but I don't think they were enough to ever
bring those wars about.
Just like, I think people are very quick to sort of
in this current invasion to sort of talk about Putin's
grand visions of being the next Catherine the Great
or nationalist ideals and the mistakes
and the miscalculations are really quick to sort of say,
oh, that must be, and then kind of pause or not pause,
but maybe even stop there
and not see some of the strategic incentives.
And so I guess we have to do both,
but the strategic, I guess I would say like the war
is just such a big problem.
It's just so costly that the strategic incentives
and the things that game theory has given us
are like really important in understanding
why there was so little room for negotiation in a bargain
that things like a leader's mistakes start to matter
or a leader's nationalist ideals or delusions
or vengeance actually matters.
'Cause those do matter,
but they only matter when the capacity to find a deal
is so narrow because of the circumstances.
And so let's not, it's sort of like saying
like an elderly person who dies of pneumonia, right?
Pneumonia killed them, obviously,
but that's not the reason pneumonia was able to kill them.
All of the fundamentals and the circumstances
were like made them very fragile.
And that's how I think all the strategic forces
make that situation fragile.
And then the miscalculations and all of these things
you just said, which are so important
are kind of like the pneumonia.
And let's pay attention to both.
- And you're saying that people don't disproportionately
pay attention to the--
- It's hard.
I mean, it wasn't-- - To the leaders.
- It took me a long time to learn to recognize them.
And it takes many people.
And it took generations of social scientists
years and years to figure some of this out
and to sort of help people understand it
and clarify concepts.
So it's not, it's just not that easy.
No, it's not hard.
I think it's possible to,
just as I was taught a lot of the stuff I write in the book
in graduate school or from reading,
and it's possible to communicate and learn this stuff,
but it's still really hard.
And so that's kind of what I was trying to do
is like close that gap and just make it,
help people recognize these things in the wild.
- Before we zoom back out, let me,
at a high level first ask,
what are your thoughts on the ongoing war in Ukraine?
§05Transcript · 35:09–45:41
How do you analyze it within your framework about war?
- A Russian colleague of mine, Konstantin Sonin,
tells this story about a visiting Ukrainian professor
who's at the university.
And one night he's walking down the street
and he's talking on two cell phones at once for some reason.
And a mugger stops him and demands the phones.
And it's sort of like deadpan way, Konstantin says,
and because he was Ukrainian, he decided to fight.
And I think that's a little bit like what happened.
Most of us in that situation would hand over our cell phones.
And so in this situation, Putin's like the mugger
and the Ukrainian people are being asked
to hand over this thing.
And they're saying, no, we're not gonna hand this over.
And the fact is, most people do.
Most people faced with a superpower or a tyrant
or an autocrat or a murderous warlord who says,
hand this over, they hand it over.
And that's why there are so many unequal
imperial relationships in the world.
That's what empire is.
Empire is successive people saying, fine,
we'll give up some degree of freedom or sovereignty
'cause you're too powerful.
And the Ukrainian said, no way, this is just too precious.
And so I said, one of those buckets
where that there's a set of values.
There's sometimes there's something that we value
that is so valuable to us and important.
Sometimes it's terrible.
Sometimes it's the extermination of another people,
but sometimes it's something noble like liberty
or refusal to part with sovereignty.
And in those circumstances, people will decide,
I will endure the costs.
They probably, I mean, I think they knew
what they were probably risking.
And so to me, that's not to blame the Ukrainians
any more than I would blame Americans
for the American Revolution.
It's actually a very similar story.
You had a tyrannical, militarily superior,
pretty non-democratic entity come and say,
you're gonna have partial sovereignty.
And Americans for ideological reasons said, no way.
And that, people like Bernard Bailin and other historians,
that's like the dominant story of the American Revolution.
It was in the ideological origins,
this attachment, this idea of liberty.
And so I start, now there's lots of other reasons,
I think, why this happened.
But I think for me, it starts with Ukrainians
failing to make that sensible, quote unquote,
rational deal that says we should relinquish
some of our sovereignty because Russia
is more powerful than we are.
- So that's a very clinical look at the war.
Meaning there is a man and a country, Vladimir Putin,
that makes a claim on a land, builds up troops, and invades.
The way to avoid suffering there,
and the way to avoid death, and the way to avoid war
is to back down and basically let,
there's a list of interests he provides,
and you go along with that.
That's when the goal is to avoid war.
Let's do some other calculus.
Let's think about Britain.
So France fought Hitler, but did not fight very hard.
Portugal, there's a lot of stories of countries like this.
And there is Winston motherfucking Churchill.
He's one of the rare humans in history
who had that we shall fight on the beaches.
It made no sense.
Hitler did not say he's going to destroy Britain.
He seemed to show respect for Britain.
He wanted to keep the British Empire.
It made total sense.
It was obvious that Britain was going to lose
if Hitler goes all in on Britain
as he seemed like he was going to.
And yet Winston Churchill said a big F you.
Similar thing, Zelensky and the Ukrainian people
said F you in that same kind of way.
- So I think we're saying the same things.
I'm being more clinical about it.
- Well, I'm trying to understand, and we won't know this,
but which path minimizes human suffering in the long term?
- Well, on the eve of the war, Ukraine was poor
in a per person terms than it was in 1990.
The economy's just completely stagnated.
And Russia, meanwhile, like many other parts of the region,
sort of has boomed to a degree.
I mean, certainly because of oil and gas,
but also for a variety of other reasons.
And Putin's consolidated political control.
And from a very cold-blooded and calculated point of view,
I think one way Putin and Russia could look at this
is as, look, we were temporarily weak
after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
And the rest, and the West basically took advantage of that.
Like, bravo, you pulled it off.
You basically crept democracy and capitalism,
all these things right up to our border.
And now we have regained some of our strength.
We've consolidated political control.
We've killed our people.
We have a stronger economy.
And we somehow got Germany and other European nations
to give up energy independence.
And actually just, we've got an enormous amount
of leverage over you.
And now we wanna roll back some of your success
because we're powerful enough to demand it.
And you've been taking advantage of the situation,
which is maybe a fair, impartial analysis.
And the West, but more specifically Ukraine,
said, but that's a price too high, which I totally respect.
Maybe I'd like to think I'd make that same decision.
But that's the answer.
If the answer is why would they fight if it's so costly,
why not find a deal?
It's because they weren't willing to give Russia
the thing that their power said they quote unquote deserve.
Just like Americans said to the Britain,
yeah, of course, we ought to accept semi-sovereignty.
But we refuse.
And we'd rather endure a bloody fight that we might lose
than take this.
And so you need some of these other five buckets,
you need them to understand the situation.
You need to sort of, there are other things going on,
but I do think it's fundamental that there's just,
that this noble intransigence is a big part of it.
- Well, let me just say a few things if it's okay.
So your analysis is clear and objective.
- My analysis is neither clear nor objective.
First, I've been going through a lot.
I'm a different man over the past four or five weeks
than I was before.
I, in general, have come to,
there's anger, I've come to despise leaders in general.
Because leaders wage war
and the people pay the price for that war.
Let me just say on this point of standing up to an invader,
that I am half Ukrainian, half Russian,
that I'm proud of the Ukrainian people.
Whatever the sacrifices, whatever the scale of pain,
standing up, there's something in me that's proud.
Maybe that's, maybe that's, whatever the fuck that is,
maybe that blood runs in me.
I love the Ukrainian people, I love the Russian people.
And whatever that fight is, whatever that suffering is,
the millions of refugees, whatever this war is,
the dictators come to power and their power falls,
I just love that that spirit burns bright still.
And I do, maybe I'm wrong in this,
do see Ukrainian and Russian people as one people
in a way that's not just cultural, geopolitical,
but just given the history.
I think about the same kind of fighting
when Hitler, with all of his forces,
chose to invade the Soviet Union, Operation Barbarossa.
When he went in that Russian winter,
and a lot of people, and that pisses me off,
because if you know your history,
it's not the winter that stopped Hitler.
It's the Red Army, it's the people
that refused to back down, they fought proudly.
That pride, that's something.
That's the human spirit.
That's in war, you know, war is hell,
but it really pushes people to stand
for the things they believe in.
It's the William Wallace speech from Braveheart,
I think about this a lot.
That does not fit into your framework.
- No, no, no, I'm gonna disagree.
I think it totally fits in, and it's this,
there's nothing irrational about what we believe,
especially those principles which we hold the most dear.
I'm merely trying to say that there's a calculus,
there's one calculus over here that says
Russia's more powerful than it was 20 years ago,
and even 10 years ago, and Ukraine is not,
and it's asking for something,
and there's an incentive to give that up.
That's obvious, like there's an incentive to comply.
But my understanding is many of these
post-Soviet republics have appeased, right,
which is what we call compromise when we disagree with it.
They've, all of these other peoples
in the Russian sphere of influence have not stood up.
And Russians, many Russians have tried to stand up,
and they've been beaten down.
And now people have, we'll see,
but people have not been standing up very much.
And so lots of people are cowed,
and lots of people have appeased,
and lots of people hear that speech
§06Transcript · 45:43–55:02
and think I would like to do that, but don't.
And so, and my point is that sadly,
we live in a world where a lot of people
get stepped on by tyrants and empire and whatnot,
and don't rise up.
And so I think we could admire, especially
when they stand up for these reasons.
And I think we can admire Churchill for that reason.
I think we could, that's why we admire
the leaders of the American revolution and so on.
But it doesn't always happen,
and I don't actually know why.
But I don't think it's irrational.
I think it's just, it's something,
it's about a set of values, and it's hard to predict.
And it was hard for, Putin might not have been
out of line in thinking just like everybody else
in my sphere of influence, they're gonna roll over too.
- And I should mention, because we haven't,
that a lot of this calculation,
from an objective point of view,
you have to include United States and NATO
into the pressure they apply into the region.
- Yeah.
- That said, I care little about leaders
that do cruel things onto the world.
They lead to a lot of suffering.
But I still believe that the Russian people
and the Ukrainian people are great people that stand up,
and I admire people that stand up
and are willing to give their life.
And I think Russian people are very much that too,
especially when the enemy is coming
for your home over the hill.
Sometimes standing up to an authoritarian regime
is difficult because you don't know,
it's not a monster that's attacking your home directly.
It's kind of like the boiling of a lobster
or something like that.
It's a slow control of your mind and the population.
And our minds get controlled even in the West
by the media, by the narratives.
It's very difficult to wake up one day
and to realize sort of what people call red-pilled,
is to see that they're,
maybe the thing I've been told all my life is not true.
And at every level, that's a thing very difficult
to do in North Korea.
The more authoritarian the regime,
the more difficult it is to see.
Maybe this idea that I believe
that I was willing to die for is actually evil.
It's very difficult to do for Americans,
for Russians, for Ukrainians, for Chinese,
for Indians, for Pakistanis, for everybody.
I think thinking about this Ukrainian,
whether you want to call it nobility or intransigence
or whatever is key.
I think the authoritarianness of Russia
and Putin's control or the control of his cabal
is the other thing I would really point to
is what's going on here.
And if you ask me like big picture,
what do I think is the fundamental cause
of most violence in the world?
I think it's unaccountable power.
I think, in fact, for me, an unaccountable power
is the source of underdevelopment.
It's the source of pain and suffering.
It's the source of warfare.
It's basically the root source of most of our problems.
And in this particular case,
it's also one of our buckets in the sense that,
like why, what is it that,
why did Russia ask these things?
Like, well, was democracy in Ukraine
a threat to an average Russian?
No.
Was capitalism, is NATO, is whatever,
is this a threat to average Russians?
No, it's a threat to the apparatus of political control
and economic control that Putin and cronies
and the sort of group of people that rule,
this elite in Russia, it was a threat to them.
And so they had to ask the Ukraine to be neutral
or to give up NATO or to have a puppet government
or whatever they were seeking to achieve
and have been trying to achieve through other means
for decades, right?
They've been trying to undermine these things
without invasion.
And they've been doing that
because it threatens their interests.
And that's like one of these other logics of war.
It's not just that there's something that I value so much
that I'm willing to endure the cost.
It's that there are people,
not only does this oligarchy or whatever elite group
that you wanna talk about in Russia,
not, first of all, they're not bearing,
they're bearing some costs of war, right?
They're very, and they're certainly
bearing costs of sanctions.
But they don't bear all the costs of war, obviously.
And so they're quick to use it.
But more importantly, in some sense,
I think there's a strong argument
that they had a political incentive to invade
or at least to ask Ukraine this sort of
impossible to give up thing,
and then invade despite Ukrainian nobility and transigence
because they were threatened.
And so that's extremely important, I think.
And so that's, those two things in concert
make this a very fragile situation.
That's I think why we ended up,
is go not all the way, but a long way to understanding.
Now you could layer onto that,
these intangible incentives,
these other things that are valued,
that are valued on Putin's side.
Maybe there's a nationalist ideal.
Maybe he seeks status and glory.
Like maybe those things are all true,
and I'm sure they're true to an extent.
And that'll weigh against his costs of war as well.
But fundamentally, I think he just saw
his regime as threatened.
That's what he cares about.
And so he asked, he made this cruelest of demands.
- I mean, I would say I'm just one human,
who the hell am I?
But I just have a lot of anger
towards the elites in general,
towards leaders in general that fail the people.
I would love to hear and to celebrate
the beautiful Russian people, the Ukrainian people,
and anyone who silences that beautiful voice of the people,
anywhere in the world,
is destroying the thing that I value most about humanity.
Leaders don't matter.
They're supposed to serve the people.
This nationalist idea of a people, of a country,
is only makes any sense when you celebrate,
when you give people the freedom to show themselves,
to celebrate themselves.
The thing I care most about is science
and the silencing of voices in the scientific community,
the silencing of voices, period.
Fuck any leader that silences that human spirit.
There's something about this.
Whenever I look at World War II,
whenever I look at wars,
it does seem very irrational to fight.
But man, does it seem somehow deeply human
when the people stand up and fight.
There's something that if,
you know, we talked about progress.
That feels like how progress is made,
the people that stand and fight.
So, but let me read the Churchill speech.
It's such, I'm so proud that we humans
can stand up to evil when the time is right.
- I guess here's the thing, though.
Think of what's happening in Xinjiang in China.
We have appeased China.
We've basically said, you can just do
really, really, really horrible things in this region
and you're too powerful for us to do anything about it
and it's not worth it.
And there's nobody standing up and making a Churchill speech
or the Braveheart speech about standing up
for people of Xinjiang when what's happening is,
on, you know, in that realm of what was happening in Europe.
And that's happening in a lot of places.
And then when we, when there is a willingness to stand up,
people, there's a lot of opposition to those.
You know, so there were a lot of reasons
for the invasion of Iraq.
For some, it was humanitarian.
I think like, Saddam Hussein was one of the worst tyrants
of the 20th century.
He was just doing some really horrible things.
You know, he'd invaded Kuwait.
He'd, you know, committed domestic,
attempted domestic genocide and all sorts of repression.
And it was probably a mistake to invade in spite.
So it's important not just to select on the cases
where we stood up and to select on the cases
where that ended up working out in the sense of victory.
Right, it's important to sort of try to judge,
not judge, but just try to understand these things
in the context of all the times we didn't give that speech
or when we did and then it just went sideways.
- Well, that's why it's powerful
when you're willing to give your life for your principles
'cause most of the time you get neither the principles
nor the life, you die.
That's what, but that's why it's powerful.
We shall go on to the end.
§07Transcript · 55:04–1:03:45
We shall fight in France.
We shall fight on the seas and the oceans.
We shall fight with growing confidence
and growing strength in the air.
We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be.
We shall fight on the beaches.
We shall fight on the landing grounds.
We shall fight in the field and in the streets.
We shall fight in the hills.
We shall never surrender.
This is before Hitler had any major loss to anybody.
That was a terrifying armada coming your way.
We shall never surrender.
I just wanna give props.
I wanna give my respect as a human being to Churchill,
to the British people for standing up,
to the Ukrainian people for standing up
and to the Russian people.
These are great people that throughout history
have stood up to evil.
Let me ask you this because you quote Sun Tzu
in "The Art of War."
"There's no instance of a country having benefited
from prolonged warfare."
This is the main thesis.
Can we just linger on this?
Since leaders wage war and people pay the price,
when we say that there's no reason to do prolonged war,
is it possible to have a reason for the leaders
if they disregard the price?
Sort of like if they have a different objective function
or utility function that measures the price
that's paid for war.
Is that one explanation of why war happens?
Is the leaders just have a different calculus
than other humans?
- I mean, I think this links us back
to what we were talking about earlier about just war.
Is in some sense just war is saying
that in spite of the costs,
that our enemy has done something,
our opponent has refused to compromise
on something that we find essential
and is demanding that we compromise
in a way that's completely repugnant.
And therefore we're going to go to war
despite these material costs and these human costs.
And then that principle that you go to war on
is in the eye of the beholder.
And I mean, I think liberty and sovereignty,
I think we can understand and sympathize with.
And maybe that's just a universal,
maybe that's the greatest cause of just war,
but other people make that,
could go to war for something considerably less,
a principle that's considerably less noble, right?
Which is what Hitler was doing.
That's an explanation.
So that's a whole class of explanations
that helps us understand that the compromise
that was on the table,
given the relative balance of power
was just repugnant at least to one side,
if not the other.
There's something they're unwilling to part with.
And then you get to the leaders.
Well, what happens when what the leaders want,
what happens when the leaders are detached
from the interests of their groups,
which has been true for basically most of human history.
There's a narrow slice of societies
in the big scheme of things
that have been accountable to their people.
A lot of them exist today.
Where to some degree they're channeling
the interests of their group, right?
So the Ukrainian politicians didn't concede
to these cool Russian demands,
because even if they had,
it would have been political suicide.
Because it seemed, or I think,
it seems that the Ukrainians would have just rejected this.
So they were in some sense channeling
the values of the broader population.
Even if they, I don't know what was going,
even if they didn't share those principles,
they self-interestedly followed them.
Probably they shared them,
but I'm just saying that even if they didn't,
they wouldn't compromise.
Occasionally you get the reverse,
which is where the leaders are not accountable.
And now they have some value, which could be glory.
I mean, this is the story of the kings,
and to some lesser extent, the queens of Europe.
For hundreds of years, it was basically a contest,
and it was, war was the sport of kings.
And to some extent, they were just seeking status
through violent competition.
And they paid a lot, a big price out of the royal purse,
but they didn't bear most of the suffering.
And so they were too quick to go to war.
And so that's, I think that detachment of leaders
combined with, you mingle it with this,
that one bucket, that uncheckedness,
and you mingle that with the fact
that leaders might have one of these values,
noble or otherwise, that carry them to war,
combined to explain a good number of conflicts as well.
And that's a good illustration of why I think,
like autocracy and unaccountable power is,
I could make that story for all of the things,
all five buckets, they're all,
we're all more susceptible to these things,
to all five of these things,
when leaders are not accountable to the people
and their group.
And that's what makes it like the meta,
for me, the meta cause of conflict in all of human history,
and sadly today.
- Does the will to power play into this,
the desire for power?
Like that's a human thing again, in the calculation that,
shall we put that in the misperceptions bucket?
Or is it, is misperceptions essentially
about interaction between humans and power
is more about the thing you feel in your heart
when you're alone as a leader?
- You know, I said there were three strategic reasons,
like the unchecked leaders,
the commitment problems, uncertainty.
There are two sort of more psychological,
and I call them intangible incentives and misperceptions.
The way that like a game theorist,
or the way that a behavioral economist
would think about those two is just to say preferences,
and then erroneous beliefs and mistakes.
It's like, so the preferences are our preferences, right?
And so utility functions, whatever we wanna call it,
like there's not, that's why I wouldn't call them
a misperception or rationality.
We want, we like what we like.
If we like power, if we like relative status,
if we like our racial purity, if we like our liberty,
if we like whatever it is that we
have convinced ourselves we value.
- Maybe you fell in love with a rival queen or king.
- Exactly.
When I said it was a big bucket full of stuff that rhymes,
like that's a pretty messy bucket.
Like there's a lot of different stuff in there.
And I'm just trying to say like,
let's be clear that just about the shared logic
of these things is maybe just, you know,
they're really dissimilar,
but let's be clear about the shared logic.
And if it were true that deep down we were aggressive people
who just liked violence and enjoyed the blood,
or some percentage of us do, that would be there too.
And so I just wanna say that's,
but you know, we're really quick to recognize those, right?
When we diagnose a war as an armchair analyst
or as a journalist or something, we really jump to those.
We don't need a lot of help to like see those happening.
So we probably put a little bit too much emphasis on them,
is maybe the only thing that I would caution.
Because the others are more subtle,
and they're often there, and they contribute.
- So just to look at something you said before,
would it be accurate to say when the leaders become detached
from the opinion of the people,
that's more likely to lead to war?
So--
- In mechanically, it's just,
they're gonna bear fewer costs.
So it's gonna basically narrow the set of deals
that they're gonna be willing to accept instead of violence.
At the same time, most of the time, it's not enough
because the leaders still bear a lot of costs of war.
You could be deposed, you could be killed,
you could be tried, and the public purse
is going to be empty.
That's like the one story throughout history,
is at the end of the day, your regime is broke
as a result of war.
And so you still internalize that a little bit.
If I had to say like, in my three buckets,
or through my buckets so far,
I sort of started with like Ukrainian intransigence,
and then I jumped, and then I said the essential,
then you really have to understand Russian autocracy
for just to understand why they would ask
something so cruel.
But I mean, I think the uncertainty
is really important here as well.
Like if you think of it, like think of all the things,
the way this has played out, and just in some ways,
how many, in how many ways we've been surprised.
We've been surprised by the unity and the coherence
of the West and the sanctions.
§08Transcript · 1:03:46–1:12:54
That sort of, what's happened is it was in the realm
of possibility, but it was sort of like
the best case scenario from the perspective of the West
and the worst case scenario for the Russians.
The second thing is just the pluckiness
and the effectiveness and the intransigence
and the nobility of this Ukrainian resistance.
That's, again, was within the realm of possibility,
but wasn't necessarily the likely thing, right?
It was again, maybe the worst realization for Russia,
the best realization in some sense for,
in terms of revealed strength and resolve.
And then the other thing that's been revealed
is just how, like the corruption and ineptitude
and problems on the Russian military side.
Again, within the realm of possibility,
maybe people who really knew the Russian military
are less surprised than the rest of us,
but also one of the worst possible draws for Russia.
And so Putin asking this terrible price
and expecting Ukraine to roll over,
or the West to roll over at least to a degree,
was based on like a different set of probability.
It was based on just expecting something
in the middle of the probability distribution
and not one of all these different tail events.
And so the fact that the world's so uncertain
and the fact that Putin can come with
a different set of expectations
than the Ukrainians and the West,
and all these players can just have a hard time agreeing
on just what the facts are,
because we live in an uncertain world.
Everyone's quick to say, "Oh, he miscalculated."
Well, I'm not, I don't know if he miscalculated.
I think he just, he got a really bad draw
in terms of what the realized outcomes are here.
And so, I mean, good for everybody else in some sense,
except the fact that it's involving
a lot of violence as the tragedy.
- Well, there's also economic pain,
not just for the Russian people and the Ukrainian people,
but the whole world.
So, you could talk about things
that we are surprised from an analysis perspective
of small victories here or there,
but I think it's universally true
that everybody loses once again in this war.
- Right, and so the question is just like,
when does it, you know, why did Russia choose to invade
when Ukraine didn't give this up?
Well, Russia anticipated that it would be able to seize
what it wanted.
The available bargain that it deserved, quote unquote,
based on its power in the world,
it wasn't getting, and so it thought it could take that.
And the uncertainty around that made it
potentially more likely that he would choose to do this.
But in particular, one of the other things
that I think is probably less important in this context,
but still plays a role, but less important than many wars,
is the fact that it's really hard
to resolve that uncertainty, right?
In theory, Ukraine should be able to say,
"Look, this is exactly how resolved we are.
"We're super resolved.
"And your military is not as strong as you think it is."
- You mean before the conflict even begins?
- Everybody should be like, you know what?
- You lay on the table, here's my cards.
- No one wants, yeah.
- Here's your cards.
- Exactly, like that's, as a competitor in this,
you can use that uncertainty to your advantage.
I can try to convince you, I can bluff, right?
And so anyone who's ever played poker
and bluffed or called a bluff, that's the inefficient,
that's the analogy in some ways to war.
It's not the perfect analogy,
but the uncertainty and the circumstances,
you don't have to miscalculate.
The fact that if you bluff and lose,
it doesn't mean that you miscalculated.
You made an optimal choice,
given the uncertainty of the situation, to take a gamble.
And that was a wiser thing for you to do than to not bluff
and just to fold or to just not pay in that round.
And so the uncertainty of the situation
gives both sides incentives to bluff,
gives neither side an incentive to try to reveal the truth.
And then at some point, the other side says,
"You know what?
"You say you're resolved.
"You say you're going to mount an uncertainty.
"Well, guess what?
"Every other people on my border has folded,
"and you're going to fold too,
"the minute the tanks roll in
"and the minute the Air Force comes in.
"I'm gambling that you're bluffing."
And so that inherent uncertainty of the situation
just causes a lot of short wars actually,
because it's the sort of bluff and call dynamic
that goes on.
And the thing that's worth reckoning is we might end up
at a place in a few months where the thing
that Ukraine concedes is not so far
from what Russia demanded in the first place.
Russia's on it, I want a neutral,
I mean, who knows how,
it's not the ambitious thing the Russians wanted,
but if we end up in a place where Ukraine
is effectively neutral, never joins NATO,
is not being militarily supplied by the West,
and where Russia has de facto control over the East
and Crimea, if not fully recognized,
who knows if they'll get ever internationally
and Ukrainian recognized, but effectively controls,
Russia will have accomplished what it asked
for in the first place,
and both parties had to get there through violence
rather than through negotiation.
And you wouldn't need misperceptions and mistakes,
and you wouldn't need Putin's delusions of glory
or whatever to get there,
you would just need the ingredients I've given so far,
which is like an unwillingness to do that without fighting
on the part of the Ukrainians,
an autocratic leadership in Russia
who would make those demands
because it's in their self-interest
and then uncertainty leading them to fight.
And that sadly is like the best case,
it feels like the best case scenario right now,
which is the war is just five months and not five years.
- Given the current situation.
- Given the current situation.
- Because the suffering has already happened,
and lost homes, people moving,
having to see their home in rubble
and millions of people, refugees,
having to escape the country,
and hate flourishes versus the common humanity
as it does with war.
And on top of all of that,
if we talk from a geopolitical perspective,
the warmongers all over the world are sort of drooling.
They now have got narratives
and they got that whatever narratives,
you can go shopping for the narratives.
The United States has its narratives
for whatever geopolitical thing it wants to do
in that part of the world.
- That's another little malevolent interaction
between two of these buckets,
like those unchecked leaders
and those intangible incentives, those preferences,
is that unchecked leaders spent, autocrats, whatever,
spend enormous amounts of time
trying to manipulate the values and beliefs
of their population, of their group.
Now, sometimes they do it nobly,
but that's what Winston Churchill there was trying to,
it's not clear that Britons were like ready to stand up.
There were a lot of Americans and a lot of Britons
who were like, you know what?
Hitler, not such a bad guy, his ideas, not so terrible.
I never liked those Jews anyways.
Many were thinking, right?
We had political leaders in the US
who were basically not pro-Nazi,
but were just not anti-Nazi.
And Churchill was just trying to instill a different resolve.
He was trying to create that thing.
He was trying to create that value.
And in the American Revolution, it was as well.
The founding fathers, the leaders of the revolution,
it's not that everybody just woke up one morning
in the United States
and had this ideology of liberty and freedom.
Some of that was true, it was out there in the ether,
but they had to manufacture and create it
in a way that I think they believed and was noble.
But there's a lot of manufacturing and creation
of these values and principles that is not noble.
And that is exactly what Hitler did so well.
- Yeah.
The anti-Semitism was present throughout the world,
but the more subtle thing that I feel like
may be more generally applicable
is this kind of pacifism
that I think people in the United States felt like,
"It's not my conflict.
"Why do I need to get involved with it?"
And I think Churchill was fighting that, the general-
- Apathy.
- It's the apathy of rational calculus.
It's like, "What are we going to gain if we fight back?"
Like, Hitler seems to be pretty reasonable.
He's saying he's going to stop the bombing,
§09Transcript · 1:12:57–1:21:56
that you're still going to maintain your sovereignty
as the great people of Britain.
Like, "Why are we fighting again?"
And that's the thing that's hard to break
because you have to say,
"Well, you have to speak to principle.
"You have to speak at some greater
"sort of long-term vision of history."
So like, yes, now it may seem like
it's a way to avoid the fight,
but you're actually just sort of putting shackles
on yourself.
You're destroying the very greatness of our people
if we don't fight back.
- And to think about this with the current case with Russia,
I mean, some people look at Putin's speeches
and papers he's written on Ukraine
historically being a part of Russia
and trying to deny the,
basically create all these nationalist narratives.
And they think, "Well, Putin really believes,"
and he might, "Putin really believes this,
"and that's why he's invading."
And that might also be true,
and that would contribute to just make a peaceful bargain
even harder to find.
But I suspect what's at least a minimum true
is Putin's trying to manufacture support for an invasion
in the population through propaganda.
And so he's doing on some level the same thing
that Winston Churchill was doing in mechanical terms,
which is to try to manipulate people's references,
but doing it in a sinister, malevolent, evil,
self-serving way because it's really in his interest,
whereas this was anything but, right,
in the Churchill example.
- The dark human thing is like,
there's moments in World War II
where Hitler's propaganda,
he began to believe his own propaganda.
- I think he probably always believed,
I think he was a sincere believer.
- Well, no, no, no, but there's a lot of places
where there was uncertainty,
and they decided to do propaganda,
and that propaganda resolved the uncertainty
in his own mind.
So for example, he believed until very late
that America is a weakling militarily
and as an economic power and just the spirit of the people.
And that was part of the propaganda they're producing,
and because of that propaganda,
when he became the head of the army,
he was making military actions,
he nonchalantly started war with America,
with the United States of America,
where he didn't need to at all.
He could've avoided that completely,
but he thought, eh, whatever, they're easy.
So that's, I think that propaganda first, belief second.
And I think as a human being, as a dictator,
when you start to believe the lies
with which you're controlling the populace,
you're not able to, you become detached
from this person that's able to resolve
in a very human way the conflict in the world.
- I mean, when I said the meta,
the big common factor that causes war
and over and over and over again is unaccountable power,
it's not just because it's mechanically,
like one of my five explanations to saying,
well, if you're unaccountable, you don't bear the cost
of war, you might have private incentives.
So yes, bargains are harder to find,
but it leads to all these nasty interactions.
So earlier I said there's this interaction
between the values and the unchecked leaders,
because those idiosyncratic values of your leader
become more important when they're unchecked.
But the uncertainty point you just made
is like a deep point.
It's to say actually that like the fundamental problem
that all autocrats have is an information problem,
because nobody wants to give them the right information.
And they have very few ways to aggregate information
if they're not popular, right?
And so there's a whole cottage industry
of political science sort of talking about
why autocrats love fixed elections
and why they love Twitter and why they actually like it
in a controlled way, it solves an information problem.
Like that's your crucial, if you're like Xi Jinping
or Vladimir Putin, you need to solve an information problem
just to avoid having a rebellion on your hands
in your own country every day.
Because uncertainty kind of gets magnified
and you get all this distorted information
in this apparatus of control.
And so that's like another nasty interaction
between uncertainty and unchecked leaders
is you end up in this situation
where you're getting bad information.
And it's not that you believe your own lies,
it's just that you never, you sort of believe,
you're sort of averaging what you believe
over the available information
and you don't realize that it's such a distorted
and biased information source.
- One of the other things about this time
that was a surprise to me in the fog of uncertainty,
how sort of seemingly likely nuclear war became,
not likely, but how it--
- Less unlikely than before.
- Exactly, that's a better way to say it.
It started to take a random stroll
away from 0% probability into this kind of land
of maybe like, it's hard to know,
but it's like, oh wow, we're actually normally
talking about this as if this is part of the calculus,
part of the options.
But before we talk about nuclear war,
'cause I'm gonna need a drink,
do you need to go to the bathroom?
- Sure, I'll take a break.
- So back to nuclear war.
What do you think about this,
that people were nonchalantly speaking about nuclear wars
if it doesn't lead to the potential annihilation
of the human species?
What are the chances that our world
ascends into nuclear war?
Within your framework, you wear many hats.
One is sort of the analyst, right?
And then one is a human.
What do you think are the chances
we get to see nuclear war in the century?
- Well, you know, the official doomsday clock
for nuclear warfare sits in the lobby of my building.
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
sort of shares a building with us.
So it's always there every day.
- Can you describe what the doomsday clock is?
- The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
it's something that this group of physicists
sort of said to sort of mark just how close we are
to nuclear catastrophe, and they started it decades ago.
And it's a clock, and it's sort of how close
are we to midnight, where midnight is nuclear Armageddon
or the destruction of humanity?
And it's been sitting, I mean, it's actually,
it hasn't moved as close to midnight
in the last few weeks as it probably should have
only because it was already so close.
There's actually limited room for it to move
for a bunch of other reasons.
I think it's, there's a whole political thing
that it's really hard, it's really easy to move it closer.
And it's really hard if you're the person
in charge of that clock to move it away, right?
Because that's always very controversial.
So it always sits there, but it forces you
to think about it a little bit every day.
And I admit I was nonchalant about it until recently
in a way that many, many other people were.
I still think the risk is very low,
but kind of for the reasons we've talked,
it's just so unimaginably costly
that nobody wants to go that route.
So it's like the extreme version of my whole argument
was why we most of the time don't fight
is because it's just so damn costly.
And so this is, that's the incentive not to use this.
And if they do use it, that's the incentive
to use it in a very restrained way.
But that's not a lot of, but because we know
we do go to war and there's all these things
that interfere with it, including miscalculation
and all of these human foibles,
and several of those nuclear powers
are not accountable leaders,
I think we have to be a lot more worried
than many of us were very recently.
I pointed out earlier, like the whole reason
we're in this mess is because the only people
who have this private interest in like having Ukraine
give up its freedom is this Russian cabal and elite
that gets their power and is preserved only
and is threatened by Ukrainian democracy.
What would, how far would they go to hang on to power
when push came to shove is I think the thing
that worries me the most and is plainly
what worries most people about the risk of nuclear war.
Like at what point does that unchecked leadership
decide that this is worth it?
Especially if they can emerge from the rubble still on top.
I don't know.
So, and I don't know that any of us
have really fully thought through all of that calculus
and what's going on.
Very recently around the anniversary of January 6th,
§10Transcript · 1:21:58–1:30:55
there were a lot of questions about
was the United States gonna have another civil war?
On the one hand, I think it's almost unimaginable.
Sort of like in the same way I think that a nuclear war
and a complete Armageddon is unimaginable.
But I remember something that,
when both of those questions get asked,
I remember something, I was in the audience
of listening to some great economists speak about
the 20 years ago, but the risk of an Argentina style
financial meltdown of the United States.
Like what's the total financial collapse?
And they said, you know what?
The risk is vanishingly small,
but that's terrifying because until recently
the answer was zero.
And so the fact that it's not zero
should deeply, deeply scare us all.
And we should devote a lot of energy
to making it zero again.
And that's how I feel about the risk
of a civil war in the US.
And that's how I feel about the risk of nuclear war.
It's higher than it used to be
and that should terrify us all.
- To me what terrifies me is that all this kind of stuff
seems to happen like overnight, like super quick
and it escalates super quick when it happens.
So it's not like, I don't know.
I don't know what I imagine, but it just happens.
Like if a nuclear war happened,
it would be something like a plane,
like in this case with Ukraine,
a NATO plane shut down over some piece of land
by the Russian forces or so the narrative would go,
but it doesn't even matter what's true or not
in order to spark the first moment of escalation.
And then it just goes, goes, goes.
- Well, I think that happens sometimes.
I mean, again, it's this thing that,
what social scientists call it,
selection on the dependent variable.
Like there's all these times when that didn't happen,
when it stopped, when it escalated one step
and then people paused or escalated two steps
and people said, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa.
And so we remember the times when it went boom, boom, boom,
boom, boom, boom, boom.
And then the really terrible thing happened.
But that, fortunately that's not,
I start off the book with an example of a gang war
that didn't happen in Medellin, Colombia,
which is sort of, that's my day job
is actually studying conflict and gangs and violence
and of these other kinds of groups.
Also very sinister.
And most of the time they don't fight
and that escalation doesn't happen.
So the escalation does happen quickly sometimes,
except when it doesn't, which--
- So we remember the ones when it does.
It's really important to think about all that.
I remember talking to, I think Elon Musk on his podcast,
I was sort of like talking about the horrors of war
and so on.
And then he said, well, you know,
like most of human history,
'cause I think I said like most of human history
had been defined by these horrible wars.
He's like, no, most of human history
is just peaceful, like farming life.
We kind of remember the wars,
but most of human history is just, you know, is life.
- Yeah, most of the competition between nations
was like blood, I would say blood thirsty
without drinking that blood
in the sense that it was intense, it would loathe some.
And so a lot of the rivalry and a lot of the competition,
which is also can be problematic in its own ways
is not violent.
And most of human history is about the oppression
of the majority by a few.
And there are moments when they rise up and revolt
and there's a revolution, we remember those,
but most of the time they don't.
And the story of political change and transformation
and freedom is there's a few revolutions that are violent,
but most of it is actually revolutions
without that kind of violent revolt.
Most of it is just the peaceful concession of power
by elites to a wider and wider group of people
in response to their increased economic bargaining power,
their threat that they're gonna march.
So even if we wanna understand something like
the march of freedom over human history,
I think we can draw the same insight
that actually we don't, most of the time we don't fight,
we actually concede power.
Now you don't, the elite doesn't sort of give power
to the masses right away, they just co-opt the few merchants
who could threaten the whole thing
and bring them into the circle.
And then the circle gets a little bit wider
and a little bit wider until the circle is ever widened,
maybe not ever, but encompasses most, if not all.
And that's like a hopeful and optimistic trend.
- Yeah, if you look at the plot,
if you guys could pull it up of the wars throughout history,
this is the rate of wars throughout history
just seem to be decreasing significantly
with a few spikes and the sort of the expansion.
It's like half the world is under authoritarian regimes,
but that's been shrinking and shrinking and shrinking.
- Steven Pinker's one person,
one famous scholar who brings up this hypothesis.
I mean, there's sort of two ways,
there's actually two separate kinds of violence,
that one where I think he's completely right
and one where I think we're not sure, maybe not.
Where he's completely right,
sort of interpersonal violence, homicides,
everyday violence has been going down, down,
down, down, down, down, down.
That's just unambiguously.
And it's mostly because we've created cultures
and states and rules and things that control that violence.
Now the warfare between groups,
is that less frequent?
Well, it's not clear that he's right,
that there's fewer wars.
You might say that wars are more rare
because they're more costly
because our weapons are so brutal.
The costs of war go up, as the costs of war go up,
not entirely, but for the most part,
that gives us an understanding of not to have them.
But then when they do happen, they're doozies.
So is Pinker right?
I hope he's right,
but I don't think that officially that trend is there.
I think that we might have the same kind of levels
of intergroup violence because maybe those five fundamentals
that lead to war have not fundamentally changed
and thus made us, given us a more peaceful world now
than a couple hundred years ago.
- That's something to think about.
So obviously looking at his hypothesis,
looking at his data and others like him.
But I have noticed one thing,
which is the amount of pushback he gets.
That there is this,
this is speaking to the general point that you made,
which is like we overemphasize the anecdotal,
and don't look objectively at the aggregate data as much.
There's a general cynicism about the world.
And not, I don't even mean cynicism.
It's almost like cynicism porn or something like that,
where people just get, for some reason,
they get a little bit excited to talk about the destruction
of human civilization in a weird way.
Like they don't really mean it, I think.
If I were to like psychoanalyze their geopolitical analysis,
is I don't, I think it's a kind of, I don't know,
maybe it relieves the mind to think about death
at a global scale somehow.
And then you can go have lunch with your kids afterwards
and feel a little better about the world.
I don't know what it is.
But that, it's not very scientific.
It's very kind of personal, emotional.
And so we should be careful to look at the world
in that way, 'cause if you look broadly,
there is just like you highlight,
there's a will for peace among people, yeah.
You mentioned Medellin.
By the way, how do you pronounce it, Medellin or Medellin?
- Both are fine.
I think the, there they say Medellin,
because that's kind of the accent,
is the zh on the double L.
But Medellin would be totally fine as well.
- What lessons do you draw from the Medellin cartel,
from the different gang wars in Colombia, Medellin?
What's the economics of peace and war
between drug cartels?
- Here's what was really insightful for me.
So I live in Chicago, and people are aware
that there's a violence problem in Chicago.
It's actually not the worst American city
by any stretch of the imagination for shootings,
but it's pretty bad.
And Medellin has these better, many more,
and probably many better organized gangs than Chicago.
And yet the homicide rate is maybe half.
And now, I mean, there have been moments
when these gangs go to war in the last 30 years
when Medellin has become the most violent place
on the planet.
But for the most part right now, they're peaceful.
And so what's going on there?
§11Transcript · 1:30:58–1:38:41
I mean, one thing that is,
there's a hierarchy of organizations.
So that above these reasonably well-organized
neighborhood gangs, there's a set of more shadowy
organizations that have different names.
Some people call them "rezones."
Some people would call them "bandas criminales,"
criminal bands.
You might just call them "mafias."
And they, there's about 17 of them,
depending on how you want to count.
And they themselves have a little operating board
called, sometimes they call it the "oficina."
Sometimes they call it "la mesa," the table.
- Well, each individual one, or as a group?
- As a group, as a group.
So they meet, and they don't meet personally all the time.
Sometimes they meet, but they consult.
A lot of the leaders of these groups are actually in prison.
And so, and they're in the same wings in prison.
- They have representatives, oh, they meet in prison.
- Well, they're, whatever, if I'm on a cell block with you,
I'm meeting you anyways, right?
So actually, imprisoning leaders and putting them
in the same cell block, but not putting them in,
if you get arrested here in the United States
and you're a criminal leader,
and you get put in a supermax prison,
you cannot run your criminal empire.
It's just too difficult, it's impossible.
There, it's possible.
And you might think, and they do,
they still run their empire.
And you might think that's a bad idea,
but actually, cutting off the head
of a criminal organization, leading it to a bunch,
leaving it to a bunch of like hotheaded young guys
who are disorganized is not always the path to peace.
So having these guys all in the same prison patios
is actually, it reduces imperfect information
and uncertainty, right?
It provides a place for them to bargain, they can talk.
And so La Oficina is like a lot of these informal meetings.
And so, you know, and they have these tools
that they use to control the street gangs.
So instead of there being like 400 gangs,
all sort of in this anarchic situation
of competing for territory and constantly at war,
the Rezones are keeping them in line.
And they will use sanctions.
They will, where the sanction might be,
I will put a bullet in your head if you don't--
- It's a little more honest
than the sanctions between nations.
- Exactly, but they will sit them down.
They'll provide, they'll help them negotiate.
They will provide, I said there are these things
called commitment problems where like there's some,
I have some incentive to like exterminate you,
but that's gonna be costly for everybody.
So I'm gonna, what's the solution?
I'm gonna provide commitment.
I'm gonna like enforce this deal.
And yeah, you don't like this deal now
because you could take advantage of your situation
and wage war, but I'm gonna give you a counter-incentives.
And so they keep the peace.
And so, and it's a little bit,
so they're a little bit like the UN Security Council
and peacekeeping forces and sanctions regimes.
It's like the same kinds of tools, the same parallels.
And they're imperfect.
They don't always work that well.
And they're unequal, right?
'Cause it's not like they're pursuing this
in the interests of like democratic, blah, blah, blah.
But it kind of works until it doesn't.
And 10 years ago in the mid 1990s,
there were wars and this breaks down.
And it kind of gave me this perspective
on the international institutions
and all the tools we've built,
that we do the same things, right?
Sanctions are designed to make unchecked leaders
face the cost of war.
It's a solution to one of the five problems, right?
And mediators are a solution to uncertainty.
And international institutions
that can enforce a peace and agreement
are a solution to commitment problems.
And all of these things can be solutions
to these intangible incentives,
like these preferences for whatever you value
and miscalculations,
because they will punish you for your miscalculation
or they will get a mediator to sort of help you realize
why you're miscalculating.
So they're doing all these things.
And it made me realize that the comparison
to the UN Security Council and all our tools
is actually a pretty good one
'cause those are pretty unequal too.
And those are pretty imperfect.
Like there's these,
we have five nations with a veto on the Security Council
and a lot of unequal power
and they're manipulating this in their own self-interest
or their group's interests.
So anyway, so it's actually the,
some of the things that work in Medellin
and why they work help give me a lot of perspective
on what works in the international arena
and why we have some of the problems we have.
- So there's not,
in some deep way there's not a fundamental difference
between those 17 mafia groups and--
- The UN Security Council.
- The UN Security Council.
(laughing)
We're such funny descendant of apes.
We put on suits.
I'm sure they're wearing different,
they have different cultural garbs that they wear.
What are your thoughts?
I mean, that's the sense I got from Pablo Escobar
and Jorge Ochoa who founded the Medellin cartel
is like having spoken with people on this podcast,
talked to Roger Reeves who was a drug transporter.
It seems like there, it seems like it was,
I don't know the right term,
but it was very kind of professional and calm.
It didn't have a sense of danger to it,
like it's negotiating.
So like the danger is always on the table as a threat
as part of the calculation,
but you're using that threat in order to deescalate,
in order to have peace.
Everybody is interested in peace.
- So something that happened last year,
we were a little bit able to watch in real time
'cause we had a few contacts.
We've been meeting and talking to a lot of these leaders
in prison and a bit outside of prison.
Many of them will talk to us.
And so, the homicide, I mentioned homicide rate
in Medellin's maybe 2/3 or half of the Chicago level.
It had been climbing.
Some of these street level gangs were starting to fight.
Maybe at sort of the, on some level,
it seems that like maybe some of those
Razon leaders were like saying,
"Well, you know, we're actually not sure
"how strong these guys are.
"Let's let them fight just to test it out.
"Let's have these skirmishes."
Right, it wasn't prolonged warfare.
It was like, "Let's just sort of feel out
"how strong everybody is 'cause then we'll be able
"to reapportion the drug corners and stuff accordingly."
So they were kind of feeling each other out
through fighting.
And the homicide rate doubled and then it increased
by the same amount again.
And so it was approaching something
that might get out of control,
which wasn't in anybody's interest.
It wasn't in the government's interest,
it wasn't in their interest.
And so then magically,
all these leaders in these patios, right,
different prisons, they're spread out
around a bunch of prisons.
Everybody gets transferred to a new prison on the same day,
which means they all get to be in the same holding area
for three days before they're all moved elsewhere.
So the government had a role in this.
And then somebody who's like a trusted mediator
on the criminal side gets himself arrested,
happens to be put in the same spot.
And a week later, the homicide rate is 30% of what it was.
It's back to its normal, moderate,
unfortunately not zero, right?
But it's back to where it was
because it didn't make sense to have a war.
And everybody, government, mafia leaders,
everybody's sort of like,
they figured out a way to sort of
bargain their way to peace.
- Can I ask you something almost like a tangent,
but you mentioned you got a chance potentially
to talk to a few folks,
some were in prison, some were not.
Is it productive?
Is it interesting?
Maybe by way of advice,
do you have ideas about talking to people
who are actively criminals?
- Yeah.
It really depends on the situation.
So like the first time I worked in a conflicted place
§12Transcript · 1:38:44–1:47:09
was in Northern Uganda,
in maybe the last couple of years of a long running war.
So this would have been 2004, 2005.
This is a small East African country.
And the north of the country had been engulfed in,
think of it as like a 20 year low level insurgency
run by a self-proclaimed Messiah
who wasn't that popular and no one joined his movement.
So he would kidnap kids.
And so I never,
I could talk to people who'd come back from being there.
I never once, if I'd wanted to,
and I was writing about that armed group.
I never talked to anybody who was an active member
of that armed group, it was quite rare.
It wouldn't have been easy or safe.
And that's sometimes true.
I'm starting to do some work in Mexico probably,
and I'm not gonna be talking to any criminal.
They'll kill people.
- When you say you're not going to talk to them
and they'll kill people, which people?
- So, I mean, journalists are routinely killed
for knowing too much in Mexico.
There's no compunctions about killing them
and there's no consequences.
- Who kills a journalist?
It's not the main people that you spoke with, it's their,
is it their lackeys or is it rival gangs?
- This is true of a Chicago gang
and this is true of a Medellin gang.
It's probably true of a Mexico gang.
It's like, you might have your group of 30 people.
One or two of them might be shooters.
Most people don't shoot.
Most people don't like to do that.
Or you don't even have any of those people in your group
because you're trying to run a business.
You don't need any shooters.
You can just hire a killer when you need them on contract.
And so if somebody's asking questions
and you don't want them to ask questions
or you think they know too much in a way that threatens you
and it's cheap for you
and you have no personal compunctions,
then you can put a contract out on them
and they'll be killed.
That doesn't happen in Colombia.
It doesn't happen in Chicago.
I don't know, there's lots of reasons for that.
I can't say exactly why.
I think one reason is like, they know what'll happen,
is that there'll be consequences,
that the government will crack down and make them pay
and so they don't do it.
That's not what happened in Mexico.
They won't kill a DA agent.
They know that, the US has made it clear,
you kill one of our agents, we will make you pay.
And so they're very careful to minimize
death of American, but you kill journalists
and nobody comes after them or is able to come after them.
And so they've realized they can get away with this
and that seems to be the equilibrium there.
That's my initial sense from,
but we spent a lot of time
before we started talking to criminals.
We spent a year trying to figure out what was safe
before we actually, and failing.
We kept, there are lots of safe things to do.
It was also really hard to figure out
how to talk to people in these organizations
and we failed 40 times before we figured out a way
to actually access people.
- Is it worth it talking to them if you figure out,
'cause it's not never gonna be safe.
It's going to be when you estimate
that there's some low level of risk.
Like what's the benefit as a researcher,
as a scholar of humans?
- Yeah, so I actually don't think,
let's compare it to something,
okay, I'm in Austin for the first time
and I'm walking around and there's all these people
buzzing around on these scooters without helmets.
- We need to definitely interview them
and say what the hell is wrong with you?
- So nothing I have ever done in my entire career
is as risky as that.
- That's a nice way to compare journalism in a war zone.
- Not well, yeah, there's some war zones.
I worked in Northern Uganda and I worked in Liberia
and I work now in Medellin
and I'm starting to work in Mexico
and both those particular places
and then the things I did in those places
where I spent a lot of time making sure
that what I was doing was not unduly risky.
- Todd, could you pull up a picture
of a person on a scooter in Austin
so we can just compare this absurd situation
where I doubt it's the riskiest thing
'cause now we have to look at the data.
I understand the point you're making, but wow.
- So I'm not trying to say there's zero risk.
I think there's like a calculated risk
and I think you become good at,
you work at becoming good at being able to assess
these risks and know who can help you assess these risks.
- Yeah, I think there's another aspect to it too.
When you're riding a scooter,
once you're done with the scooter,
the risk has disappeared.
There's something, the lingering
where you have to look over your shoulder,
potentially for the rest of your life
as you accumulate all of these conversations.
- Yeah, I've chosen, but I've also advised my students
and I wouldn't go and do this with an armed group
that would think I knew too much
and therefore, some people do that.
Some journalists I think are very brave
and take risks and do that and good for them
and I'm happy they do that.
I don't personally do that.
So these guys are very, I mean,
a medicinian is a business.
They're just, they're selling local drugs
and they are laundering money for the big cartels
and they are shaking down businesses for money
or selling services in some cases
and they make a lot of money, it's a business
and they're in prison so they can talk about
most of what they wanna talk about
because there's no double jeopardy.
They've been incarcerated for it
and you're just talking shop
and they're just, you know,
so it's worth it I think because the risk is very low
but if you actually wanna weaken these organizations
and they're extremely powerful,
they're extremely big facet of life in a lot of cities
in the Americas in particular,
including in some of the United, some American cities,
if you wanna understand how to weaken these groups over time
you have to understand how their business works
and we're like, imagine you were made like the,
whatever the oil czars of the United States
or maybe you're in charge of the finance industry, right?
You're the regulator for oil and energy
or for finance and then you get in the job
and someone says, and then you're like,
well, how many firms are there and what do they sell
and what are the prices?
And everyone's like, well, you know, we don't really know.
You would not be a very good regulator, right?
And if you're a policeman or you're someone
who's in charge of counter organized crime,
you're just a regulator.
You're trying to regulate an illicit industry.
You're regulating an industry that happens to be illicit
and you have no information.
And so that's kind of what we do.
We figure out how the system works
and like what are the economic incentives
and what are the political incentives?
- Any interviews and conversations help with that?
- They help a lot, yeah, yeah, yeah.
We do that, so we have, I mean, I don't do,
I do some of those, but I'm on the side,
my Spanish is okay, it's not great and--
- Do you have a translator usually if you ever go directly?
- Well, if only because I can't understand
the street vernacular, like I'm just totally hopeless.
Nor could many people who speak Spanish
as a second language.
It's totally, you go to prison, you talk to these guys
and they're speaking in the local dialect and it's tough.
But more importantly, like I just don't need to be there.
And that's not my, I'm a quantitative scholar.
I'm the guy who collects the data.
So we have people, we have people on our team
and colleagues and employees
who are doing full-time interviews.
So, and then I just sometimes go with them, so.
- What about if we, you mentioned Uganda.
- Yeah.
- Joseph Kony, the Ugandan warlord.
I'm seeing here he kidnapped 591 children
in three years between 2000.
- They must have kidnapped.
I had, they probably kidnapped for at least a short time,
like a few hours to a day, more than 50,000 kids.
- As a terror tactic?
- A little bit, I mean, you know, most of those people,
they just let go after they carried goods.
They held on to, they tried to hold on to thousands.
The short story, listen, if you're not popular,
if you're running in our movement and you need troops,
you can, and nobody wants to fight for you,
§13Transcript · 1:47:13–1:56:03
you can either give up
or you can have a small clandestine terror organization
that tries to, a different set of tactics.
But if you want a conventional army
and you don't want to give up, then you have to conscript.
And if you want to conscript and you don't,
you know, here we conscript and then we say,
if you run away, we'll shoot you.
And we control the whole territory.
So we'll, that's a credible promise.
If you're a small insurgency organization,
people can run away and then you can't promise
to shoot them very easily
because you don't control all the territory.
And so what these movements do is they try to brainwash you.
And I think what they figured out
after years of abducting children, you know,
you talk about evil, they figured out that, you know,
we have to maybe like, I don't know what the,
but say like maybe one in a hundred
will like buy the rhetoric.
So we just have to conscript or abduct
large number of kids.
And then some small number of them will not run away.
And those will be our committed cadres.
And those people can become commanders.
And because they'll buy the propaganda
and they'll buy the messianic messages.
But because most people wise up,
we have to, especially as they get older,
we just have to abduct vast numbers of kids
in order to have a committed cadre.
And so it has the other benefit of sort of being terrifying
for the population and being a weapon in itself.
But I think it was for them was just primarily
a way to solve a recruitment problem
when you're a totally like hopeless
and ideologically empty rebel movement.
So in some sense it's, yeah,
so that's maybe the short story.
It was a real tragedy.
- I heard one interview of a dictator
where the journalist was basically telling them,
like, how could you be doing this?
Basically calling out all the atrocities
the person is committing.
And the dictator was kind of laughing it off
and walked away.
And like he cut off the interview.
That feel like a very unproductive thing to be doing.
You're basically stating the thing
that everyone knows to his face.
Maybe that's pleasant to somebody,
but that feels unproductive.
It feels like the goal should be
some level of understanding.
- Yeah.
He's been super elusive.
- Is it Kony?
- It's Kony, yeah.
I mean, why he's fought this, I don't even know.
It's not a great example of,
that's an, you know what,
the way I look at that situation is,
it's a little bit particular to the way Uganda works,
but most of the political leadership
for most of its post-independence history
came from the north of the country.
That was like the power base.
And that was dictatorial.
And they were,
so you've heard of like people like Idi Amin,
but people have heard of like Milton Abote,
and all these people were all from the north.
And then you get the current president
who came to power in 1986.
So he's been around a long time,
this guy in the 70s.
He was from the south.
And he was fighting against these dictators,
and he was fighting for a freer and better Uganda.
And in many ways, I mean, he's still a dictator himself,
but he did create a freer and better Uganda.
So he's better than these,
he's a thug, but he was better than thugs before him.
And he came to power, and he was like,
and these, some of the northerners were like,
we wanna keep up the fight.
And he was like, you know what, you guys,
I'm strong enough to contain you to the north.
You guys go, you wanna have a crazy insurgency up there,
and some kook believes he's like speaking,
you know, through the Holy Spirit,
you know, speaking through him,
and he's gonna totally disrupt the north.
I don't care, that's great.
You guys just fester and fight,
and that's gonna totally destabilize this power,
this traditional power base,
and then that's just gonna help me consolidate control.
So he was an autocrat, he was an unchecked leader
who allowed a lunatic to run around and cause mayhem
because it was in his political interest to do so.
And there's no puzzle.
In some ways, it's that simple and kind of tragic.
- There's little to understand.
- Yeah, it took me a lot, well, you know what,
it's not so easy.
In the middle of it, I didn't understand that.
I don't think a lot of people did,
and I'm not, I think I could persuade most people
who study or work there now to like see it that way.
I think people, that would make sense to people,
but it didn't make sense in the moment.
And you know, in the moment, this is happening,
it's terrible, and you kind of, you know,
you don't realize how avoidable it was.
That basically, it was the absence
of effective police actions
that kept the lunatic from being contained.
And that lunatic would never, you know,
he's not, it's not that skillful of our movement, right?
They could have, it could have been shut down,
and there was just never any political will
to shut it down.
The opposite, that's what I meant,
like that unchecked leader,
not only do you not pay the cost,
but you might have a private incentive as an autocrat
to like see that violence happen.
And in this case, it was just keeping
a troublesome part of the country busy.
- If it's okay to look at a few other wars,
so we talked about drug wars and Medellin.
Are there other wars that stand out to you
as full of lessons?
We can jump around a little bit.
Maybe if we can return briefly at World War II,
from your framework, could World War II have been avoided?
This, this one of the most traumatic wars, global wars.
- I mean, one obvious driver of that war was these,
the things that Hitler valued,
and then was able to use his autocratic power
to either convince other people or to suppress them.
And so some people stop there and say that,
and then in the West, basically,
and then of course they were able,
because they were such an economic and political powerhouse,
they were able to sort of make demands
of the rest of Europe that you can kind of see the full,
letting Nazis march into Denmark without a fight,
or France folding very quickly,
you can kind of see as like an appeasement
or an acknowledgement of their superiority
and their ability to bargain without much of a fight.
And then you can see the Western response
as a principled stand.
I think that's, and there's a lot of truth to that.
In terms of the strategic forces,
a lot of political scientists see a version
of a commitment problem, basically where Germany says,
you know what, we're strong now, we're temporarily strong,
we're not gonna be this strong forever.
If we can get this terrible bargain
and get everyone to capitulate through violence,
if we strike now and then solidify our power
and keep these, in World War I,
it was prevent the rise of Russia
and prevent the strengthening of Russian alliances as well.
And so we have an incentive to strike now,
and there's a window of opportunity that's closing
and that they thought was closing
as soon as 1917 in World War I.
And I don't know that that story
is as persuasive in World War II.
I think there was an element of a closing window.
- They kept talking about a closing window.
They really thought there was a closing window.
I think it was a nature of that window is different
in that there was a kind of pacifism.
And it seems like if war broke out,
most nations in the vicinity would not be ready.
You could buy the people, the leaders that are in power,
they weren't ready, so the timing is really right now.
But I wonder how often that is the case
with leaders in war, it feels like the timing is now.
- The other commitment problem,
the other shift that was happening that he wanted to avert
that is kind of wrapped up with his ideology
is this idea of a cultural
and a demographic window of opportunity.
That if he wanted, conditional on having these views
of a Germanic people and a pure race,
and that now is, he had to strike now
before any opportunity to sort of establish
that was possible.
I think that's one, it's an incentive
that requires his ideology as well.
- How do, so to avoid it within this framework,
would you say, is there,
§14Transcript · 1:56:05–2:04:58
that you kind of provide an explanation,
but is there a way to avoid it?
Is violence the way to avoid it?
Because people kind of tried rational,
peaceful kind of usual negotiation,
and that led to this war.
Is that unique to this particular,
let's say World War I or World War II?
So there's an extra pressure from Germany
on both wars to act, okay?
So we've highlighted that.
Is there a way to alleviate that extra pressure to act?
- Let me use World War I as an example.
Suppose as many German generals said at that time,
we have a window of opportunity before Russia
where we might not win a war with Russia.
Like, so the probability that we can win a war
is gonna change a lot in the next decade or two,
maybe even in the next few years.
And so if we are in a much better bargaining position now,
both to not use violence, but to,
if necessarily use violence.
Because otherwise,
Russia's going to be extremely powerful in the future,
and they'll be able to use that power
to change the bargaining with us,
and to like hold, keep us down.
And the thing is, is in principle,
Russia could say, look,
we don't wanna get invaded right now.
We know you could invade us.
We know we're weak.
We know we'll be strong in the future.
We promise to like not wield our and abuse our,
or just merely just sort of take what we can get
in the future when we're strong.
We're gonna restrain ourselves in future.
Or we're gonna hand over something that makes us powerful
because that's the bargain
that would make us all better off.
And the reason political economists
call it a commitment problem
is because that's a commitment that would solve the problem.
And they can't make that commitment
'cause there's nobody who will hold them accountable.
So anything, any international legal architecture,
any set of enforceable agreements,
any UN Security Council, any world government,
anything that would help you make that commitment
is a solution, all right, if that's the core problem.
And so that's why in Medellin,
La Oficina can do that.
They can say, listen, yes,
combo that's strong today is gonna be weak tomorrow.
You have an incentive to eliminate this combo over here,
but because they're gonna be strong, but guess what?
You're not gonna do that.
And we're gonna make sure,
we're gonna promise that when these guys do get strong,
we're gonna restrain what they can do.
I mean, most of our constitutions in most stable countries
have done precisely that, right?
There's a lot of complaining right now in the United States
about the way that the constitution
is a portion power between states.
That was a deal, that was a commitment.
The constitution in the United States was a deal
made to a bunch of states
that knew they were going to be weak in future
because of economic and demographic trends,
or guess they might be.
And it said, listen, you cooperate
and we'll commit not to basically ignore your interests
over the long run.
And now, 250 years later,
we're still honoring those commitments.
It was part of the deal that meant
that there actually would be a union.
And so we do this all the time.
So constitution is a good example of how
every country's constitution,
especially a country who's writing a constitution
after a war, that constitution
and all of the other institutions they're building
are an attempt to like provide commitment
to groups who are worried about future shifts in power.
- And then does that help with avoid civil war?
So could you speak to lessons you learned from civil wars,
the American civil war and the others?
- So Lebanon, one of the ways Lebanon had tried
for a long time to preserve the interests
of minority groups, powerful minority groups
who were powerful at the time
and knew that the demographics were working against them
were to guarantee, you know,
this ethnic religious group gets the presidency
and this ethnic religious group
gets the prime ministership and this ethnic,
and a lot of countries will apportion seats
in the parliament to ethnic religious groups.
And that's an attempt to like give a group
that's temporarily powerful some assurances
that when they're weak in the future,
that they'll still have a say, right?
Just like we portioned seats in the Senate
in a way that's not demographically representative
but is like unequal, quote unquote, in a sense
to help people be confident
that there won't be a tyranny of the majority.
And now that just happens to have been
like a really unstable arrangement in Lebanon
because eventually like the de facto power on the ground
just gets so out of line with this really rigid system
of the presidency goes to this ethnic religious group
and this prime ministership goes,
that it didn't last, right?
So, but you can think of every post-conflict agreement
and every constitution is like a little bit of,
humans best effort to find an agreement
that's going to protect the interests of a group
that's temporarily has an interest in violence
in order to not be violent.
- Yeah.
- And so there's a lot of ingenuity
and it doesn't always work, right?
- Which actually from a perspective of the group,
threatening violence or actually doing violence
is one way to make progress for your group.
- We're talking about groups bargaining over stuff, right?
We're talking about Russians versus Ukraine
or Russians versus the West,
or maybe it's managing gangs versus one another.
Like a lot of their bargaining power
comes from their ability to burn the house down, right?
And so if I wanna have more bargaining power,
I can just arm a lot and I can threaten violence.
And so the strategically wise thing to do,
I mean, it's terrible.
It's a terrible equilibrium for us to be forced into,
but the strategically wise thing to do
is to build up lots of arms, to threaten to use them,
to credibly threaten to use them,
but then trust or hope that like your enemy
is gonna see reason and avoid this really terrible,
inefficient thing, which is fighting.
But the thing that's going on the whole time
is both of you arming and spending like 20% of GDP
or whatever on arms, that's pretty inefficient.
- Yes.
- That's the tragedy.
We don't have war and that's good,
but we have really limited abilities
to like incentivize our enemies not to arm
and to keep ourselves from arming.
We'd love to agree to just like both disarm, but we can't.
And so the mess is that we have to arm
and then we have to threaten all the time.
- Yeah, so the threat of violence is costly nevertheless.
You've actually pulled up that now disappeared,
a paper that said the big title called "Civil War"
and your name is on it.
What's that about?
- Well, that was, I mean, when I was finishing
graduate school and this is a paper with my advisor
at Ted Miguel at Berkeley.
- Most nations, the paper opens,
have experienced an internal armed conflict since 1960.
Yet while, were you still in grad school on this or no?
- Maybe last year or just graduated, I think.
- I wish I was in a discipline that wrote papers like this.
This is pretty badass.
Yet while civil war is central to many nations
development, it has stood at the periphery
of economic research and teaching, so on and so forth.
And this is looking at civil war broadly throughout history
or is it just particular civil wars?
- We were mostly looking at like the late 20th century.
I mean, I was trained as a, what's called
development economist, which is somebody who studies
why some places are poor and why some countries are rich.
And I, like a number of people around that time,
stumbled into violence.
I mean, people have been studying the wealth
and poverty of nations basically since the invention
of economics, but there was a big blind spot for violence.
Now there isn't any more, it's like a flourishing area
of study, but in economics, but at the time it wasn't.
And so there were people like me and Ted
who were sort of part political scientists,
'cause political scientists obviously had been
studying this for a long time, who started bringing
economic tools and expertise and like partnerships
with political scientists and adding to it.
And so we wrote this, so after like people had been doing
this for five or 10 years in our field, we wrote
like a review article telling economists
like what was going on.
And so this was like a summary for economists.
So the book in some ways is a lot in the same spirit
of this article.
§15Transcript · 2:04:59–2:14:19
This article, I mean, it's designed to be not written
as like a boring laundry list of studies,
which is what, that's the purpose this article was for.
It was for graduate students and professors
who wanted to think about what to work on
and what we knew.
This book is like now trying to like, not just say
what economists are doing, but sort of say
what economists, political scientists, psychologists,
sociologists, anthropologists, like how do we bring
some sense to this big project and policy makers?
Like, what do we know?
And what do we know about building peace?
Given, you know, because if you don't know what the reason
for wars are, you're probably not gonna design
the right cure.
And so anyway, so that was the, but I started off
studying civil wars and I, because I stumbled into
this place in Northern Uganda basically by accident.
It was a never, no intention of working in civil wars.
I'd never thought about it.
And then, you know, basically I followed a woman there.
- And we'll talk about that.
I gotta ask you first.
And for people who are just watching,
we have an amazing team of folks helping out
pulling pictures and articles and so on,
mostly so that I can pull up pictures on Instagram
of animals fighting, which is what I do on my own time.
And then we could discuss, analyze,
maybe with George St. Pierre.
That's what all he sends me for people who are curious.
But let me ask you, one of the most difficult things
going on in the world today, Israel-Palestine.
Will we ever see peace in this part of the world?
And sort of your book title is "The Roots of War
and the Paths for Peace" or the subtitle, "Why We Fight."
What's the path for peace?
Will we ever see peace?
- Yeah, if we think about this conflict in the sense
of like this dispute, this sort of contest,
this contest that's been going on between Israelis
and Palestinians, it's been going on for a century.
And there were really just 10 or 15 years
of pretty serious violence in that span of time.
Most of it from 2000 to 2009 and stretching up to 2014.
There are sporadic incidents which are really terrible.
I'm not trying to diminish the human cost of these,
by the way, I'm just trying to point out
that whatever's happening, as unpleasant and challenging
and difficult as it is, it's actually not war.
And so it is at peace.
There's sort of an uneasy stalemate.
Israelis and Palestinians are actually pretty good
at just sort of keeping this at a relatively low scale
of violence.
There's a whole bunch of like low scale sporadic violence
that can be repression of civilians.
It can be terror bombings and terror actions.
It can be counter-terror violence.
It can be mass arrests.
It can be repression.
It can be denying people the vote.
It can be rattling sabers, all these things
that are happening, right?
And it can be sporadic three-week wars
or sporadic, very brief episodes of intense violence
before everybody sees sense and then settles down
to this uneasy, that's not like,
we're right not to think of that as like a peace
and there's certainly no stable agreement, right?
So a stable agreement and amity and any ability
to move on from this extreme hostility,
we're not there yet and that's maybe very far away.
But this is a good example of two rivals
who most of the time have avoided really intense violence.
- So you talked about this, like most of the time,
rivals just like avoiding violence
and hating each other in peace.
So is this what peace, so to answer my question--
- Yeah, sometimes.
- Is this what peace looks like?
- Not always, but I mean, it's kind of my worry
to go back to like the Russia-Ukraine example,
like I kind of, it's gonna be really hard
to find an agreement that both sides can feel
they can honor, that they can be explicit about,
that they'll hold to, that will enable them to move on.
- Yeah, feels like a first step in a long journey
towards a greatness for both nations
and a peaceful time, flourishing, that kind of thing.
- I mean, you can think of like what's going on
in Israel-Palestine, there's a stalemate.
Both of them are exhausted from the violence
that has occurred, neither one of them is quite willing to,
for various reasons, to create this sort of stable agreement.
There's a lot of really difficult issues to resolve.
And maybe the sad thing, maybe we'll end up
in the same situation with Russia-Ukraine.
This is where, you know, if they stop fighting one another,
but Russia holds the east of the country and Crimea
and nobody really acknowledges their right to that,
that might, and there's just gonna be a lot of tension
and skirmishing and violence, but that never really
progresses to war for 30 years, that would be a sad,
but maybe possible outcome.
So that's kind of where Israel-Palestine looks to me.
And so someone, if we're gonna talk about why we fight,
then the question we have to ask is like, why,
you know, like the second Intifada,
like that was the most violent episode.
Like, why did that happen and why did that last
several years?
That would be like, we could analyze that
and we could say, what was it about these periods
of violence that led there to be prolonged intense violence?
Because that was in nobody's interest,
that didn't need to happen.
And partly I don't talk about that in the book.
I wanted to avoid really contemporary conflicts
for two reasons.
One is things could change really quickly.
I didn't want the book to be dated.
I wanted this to be a book that had like longevity
and that would be relevant still in 10 years
or 20 years maybe before someone writes a better one.
- Or before the human civilization ends.
- Exactly.
And circumstances can change really quickly.
So I wanted it to be enduring and meant partly
just avoiding changing things and changing these
and avoiding these controversial ones.
But of course I think about them.
And so like a lot of my time, I decided actually
last year to teach a class where I'd take all
these contemporary conflicts that wasn't working
on the book and where I wasn't really an expert,
whether it's India, Pakistan, China, Taiwan,
Israel, Palestine, Mexican cartel state drug wars,
and a few others, and then teach a class on them
with students and we'd work through it.
We'd read the book and then we'd say,
all right, none of us are experts.
How do we make sense of these places?
And we focused in the Israel-Palestine case
of mostly trying to understand why it got so violent
and then spend a little bit of time on what the prospects
are for something that's more enduring.
- It's hard to know that stuff now.
I mean, it's easier to do the full analysis
when looking back when it's over.
- Well, Israel is in like a tough place.
They have this attachment to being part of the West.
They have this attachment to liberal ideals.
They have an attachment to democracy
and they have an attachment to a Jewish state.
And those things are not so easily compatible
because to recognize the rights of non-Jewish citizens
or to have a one state solution to the current conflict
undermines the long-term ability to have a Jewish state.
And to do anything else and to deny that
denies their liberal democratic ideals.
And that's a really hard contest of freedom
of priorities to sort out.
- Yeah, it's complicated.
Of course, everything you just said
probably has multiple perspectives on it from other
that would phrase all the same things
but using different words.
- Well, I try to analyze these things
in like a dispassionate way.
- But unfortunately, just having made enough conversations,
even your dispassionate description would be seen
as one that's already picked aside.
And I'll say this because there's holding these ideals.
I'll give you another example.
United States also has ideals of freedom
and other like human rights.
So it has those ideals and it also sees itself
as a superpower and as a deployer of those,
enforcer of those ideas in the world.
And so the kind of actions from a perspective
of a lot of people in that world,
from children, they get to see drones drop bombs
on their house where their father is now, mother are dead.
They have a very different view of this.
- Well, you're beginning to see why I didn't,
I decided I wanted to write about those things
and think about those things,
but I wanted this book to do something different.
And I didn't want it to fall on one of these polarizations.
On a personal level, because I think I'm kind
of a liberal democratic person at heart,
my sympathies in that sense lie in many ways
with the Palestinians, despite the way I,
I mean, I'm just the fact that people are,
they're not representative and they, you know,
and they got a very raw, real politic kind of deal.
Like most people in history have gotten like this raw,
real politic kind of deal in their past, right?
§16Transcript · 2:14:21–2:22:54
Where somebody took something from.
- It's a good summer of history, by the way.
- That's it, history is just full of raw deals.
- For regular people.
- Right, and both sides are in a principled way
refusing to make the compromise.
And that's not like a both sides are right kind of argument.
I'm just sort of saying, I just think it's a factual
statement that like, neither one wants to compromise
on certain principles and they're both,
they both can construct and in some ways have very reasonable
but I don't want to have self-justifications
for those principles.
And that's why I'm not very hopeful as I'm,
I don't see a way and to, for them to resolve those things.
- Speaking of compromise and war,
let me ask you about one last one,
which may be in the future, China and the United States.
- Yeah.
- How do we avoid an all out hot war
with this other superpower in the next decade,
50 years, a hundred years?
Because sometimes when it's quiet at night,
I can hear in the long distance, the drums of war beating.
- Yeah.
You know, in the second part of the book,
I talk about what I think have been like these persistent,
like paths to peace.
And one of them is increasing interdependence
and interrelationships.
And another one is more checks and balances on power.
I think there's more, but those are two
that are really fundamental here,
because I think those two things reduce the incentives
for war in two ways.
One is like, remember when we were talking
about this really simple strategic game
where I, whether I'm Russia and Ukraine or whatever,
any two rivals, I want more of the pie than you get.
And the costs of war are deterrence,
but only the costs of war that I feel, right?
I don't care.
I do not care about the costs of war to your side,
my rival's side.
I'm not even thinking of that.
That's just worth zero to me.
I just don't care in that simple game.
Now, in reality, many groups do care
about the wellbeing of the other group,
at least a little bit, right?
We are in some sense to the degree we,
first of all, if our interests are intertwined,
like our economies are intertwined,
that's not a surefire way for peace.
And we shouldn't get complacent
'cause we have a globally integrated world,
but that's gonna be a disincentive.
And if we're socially entwined
because we have great social relationships
and linkages and family, or we're intermarriage
or whatever, all these things will help.
And then if we're ideologically intertwined,
maybe we share notions of liberty,
or maybe we just share a common notion of humanity.
So I think the fact that we're more integrated
than we've ever been on all three fronts in the world,
but with China is providing some insulation, which is good.
So I would be more worried if we started to shed
some of that insulation,
which I think has been happening a little bit.
US economic nationalism,
whatever could be the fallout of these sanctions
or a closer Chinese alliance with Russia,
all those things could happen.
Those would make me more worried
because I think we've got a lot of cushion
that comes from all of this economic, social,
cultural interdependence.
- Yeah, the social one with the internet is a big one.
So basically make friends
with the people from different nations,
fall in love, or you don't have to fall in love,
you can just have lots of sex with people from different
nations, but also fall in love.
- The thing that also comforts me about China
is that China's not as centralized
or as personalized a regime as Russia, for example,
and neither one of them is as centralized or personalized
as some tin pot, purely personalized dictatorship,
like you get in some countries.
The fact that China, the power is much more widely shared
is a big insulation, I think, against this war,
well, future war.
The attempts by Xi Jinping to personalize power over time
and to make China a more centralized
and personal ruled place,
which he's successfully moved in that direction,
also worries me.
So anything that moves China in the other direction,
not necessarily being democratic,
but just like a wider and wider group of people
holding power, like all of the business leaders
and all the things that have been happening
over the last few centuries have actually widened power.
But anything that's moving in the other direction
does worry me, because it's gonna accentuate
all these five risks.
- I am worried about a little bit of the demonization.
So one of the things I see with China
as a problem for Americans, maybe I'm projecting,
maybe it's just my own problem,
but there seems to be a bigger cultural gap
than there is with other superpowers throughout history,
where it's almost like this own world happening in China,
its own world in the United States,
and there's this gap of total cultural understanding.
It's not that, we're not competing superpowers,
they're almost like doing their own thing.
There's that feeling, and I think that means
there's a lack of understanding of culture of people,
and we need to kind of bridge that understanding.
I mean, the language barrier,
but also cultural understanding, making movies
that use both and explore both cultures
and all that kind of stuff.
Like it's okay to compete, like Rocky,
where Rocky Balboa fought the Russian.
Fact, historically inaccurate,
'cause obviously the Russian would win,
but we have to, I'm just kidding.
As a Philly person, I was of course rooting for Rocky.
But the thing is, those two superpowers are in the movies.
China's like its own out there thing.
We need more Rocky Seven.
- I do think there's a certain inscrutability
to the politics there, and an insularity to the politics,
such that it's harder for Westerners,
even if they know, even just to learn about it
and understand what's going on,
I think that's a problem, and vice versa.
So I think that's true.
But at the same time, we could point to all sorts of things
on the other side of the ledger,
like the massive amounts of Chinese immigration
into the United States, and the massive number of people
who are now, like how many, so many more Americans,
business people, politicians,
understand so much more about China now
than they did 30, 40 years ago,
because we're so intertwined.
So I don't know where it balances out.
I think it balances out on better understanding
than ever before.
But you're right, there was like a big gulf there
that we haven't totally bridged.
- Yeah, and like I said,
lots of inter-Chinese in the United States,
sexual intercourse, no, and love and marriage
and all that kind of social cohesion.
So once again, returning to love,
I read in your acknowledgement,
and as you mentioned earlier,
the acknowledgement reads, quote,
"I dedicate this book to a slow
"and now defunct internet cafe in Nairobi,
"because it set me on the path to meet,
"work with, and most importantly,
"marry Jenny Anan."
- Jeanne Anan.
- Jeanne Anan.
There's a lot of beautiful letters in this beautiful name.
"This book have been impossible without her
"and that chance encounter."
What's, okay, tell me,
tell me, Chris, how you fell in love
and how that changed the direction of your life.
- I was in that internet cafe, I think it was 2004.
I didn't know what I wanted to do.
I thought I might, I thought,
I was a good development economist
and I cared about growth, economic growth,
and I thought firm, like industrialization
is like the solution to poverty in Africa,
which is, I think, still true.
And therefore, I need to go study firms
and industry in Africa.
And so I went and I ended up,
one of the most dynamic place for firms
and industry at the time, still to some extent now,
was Kenya and all these firms around Nairobi.
And so I went and I got a job with the World Bank
who was running a, they were running a firm survey
and I convinced them to let me help run the firm survey.
And so now I'm in Nairobi and I'm wearing my suit
and with the World Bank for the summer
and my laptop gets stolen by two enterprising con artists,
very charming.
And so I find myself in an internet cafe.
- With no laptop.
- No laptop and just like, you know.
§17Transcript · 2:22:56–2:30:36
- In a suit.
- Kenya didn't, exactly, Kenya didn't get connected
to the sort of the big internet cables
until maybe 10 years later.
And so it was just glacially slow.
So it would take 10 minutes for every email to load.
And so there's this whole customer norm
of you just chat to the next person beside you all the time.
It was true all over,
anywhere I'd worked on the continent.
And so I strategically sat next to the attractive looking
woman that, when I came in,
and it turned out she was a psychologist
and a PhD student, but she was a humanitarian worker.
And she'd been working in South Sudan and Northern Uganda
and this kids affected by this war.
All these kids who were being conscripted were coming back
'cause they're all running away after a day or 10 years
and needed help or to get back into school.
She was working on things like that.
And I think she talked to me in spite of the fact
that I was wearing a suit,
maybe 'cause I knew a little bit about the war,
which most people didn't.
Most people were totally ignorant.
And then we had a fling for that week.
And then we didn't really,
actually then we met up a little short while later
and then it was kind of,
then we kind of drifted apart.
She was studying in Indiana
and spending a lot of time in Uganda.
And then one day I was chatting with someone I knew
who worked on this,
a young professor who was a friend of mine.
And I said, "Oh, you work on similar issues.
"You should meet this woman."
I talked to her 'cause you guys would have
professional research interests overlap.
There's so few sort of people looking at armed groups
in African civil wars, at least at the time.
And he said, "Wow, that's a fascinating research question."
And I thought to my,
and I walked out of the building and I thought,
"That is a fascinating research question."
And I phoned Jeannie and I said,
"Remember me and tell me more."
I was just talking to someone about this.
"Tell me more."
I started asking her more questions
but we ended up talking for two or three hours.
And over the course of those three hours,
we hatched a very ambitious kind of crazy plan.
Basically what it was,
we were gonna find the names and all the kids
who were born 20 or 30 years ago in the region,
and we were gonna track a thousand of them down.
We were gonna randomly sample them
and then we were gonna find them today
and we were gonna track them.
And then we were gonna use some variation
and exposure to violence and where the rebel group was
to actually show what happens to people
when they're exposed to violence and conscription.
We were gonna tell, psychologically, economically,
we were gonna answer questions
and that which would help you design better programs.
And so we hatched this plan, which is totally cockamamie.
So cockamamie that when I pulled
my previous dissertation proposal from my committee
like the next week and gave them a new one,
they unanimously met without me
to decide that this was totally bonkers.
And to advise me not to go.
And they coordinated to read my old proposal
so that when I showed up for my defense,
they said, "You actually think you're defending,
"but we want you to only talk about this other thing
"that you were gonna do because this is like,
"you should not go."
- Oh wow.
I mean, it is incredibly ambitious,
super interesting though.
- It actually worked exactly according to plan.
It's the first and last time in my entire career.
- You actually pulled off an ambitious,
like a gigantically crazy ambitious idea.
- Well, all of my work, that's my shtick.
My day-to-day research job is not writing books
about why we fight.
My thing is like, I go, I collect data on things
that nobody else thought you could collect data on.
And so I always do pull it off,
but it never turns out like I thought it was going to.
Like it's always, there's so many twists and turns
and it always goes sideways in an interesting way
and it works, but it's all,
but this one actually we pulled off in spite of ourselves
and as planned.
And so Ted Miguel, who I wrote that paper with
was actually the one person of my advisors
who was like, "Well, you know what?
He was sympathetic to this."
He was like, "Eh, why don't you just go for a couple months
and like check it out and then come back
and work on the other thing."
And that's, and so I followed Jeannie there and went there
and then, but, and I don't know, what's this?
I always remember, you know, this movie "Speed,"
the Ken Reeves and Sandra, whatever these people are.
And they have this relationship
in these intense circumstances and they like, well,
and I think at the end of the movie,
they're sort of like, "This will never work
because these relationships
and intense circumstances never matter,"
which is what we assumed.
And that turned out not to be true.
So we've been married 15 years and we have two kids and--
- Yeah, and that's when you fell in love with psychology
and learned to appreciate the power of psychology.
- Exactly, so that's the psychology in the book as well
because I, and so we ended up, for most of our work
for the first five or 10 years was together actually.
- What's the hardest piece of data
that you've been chasing, that you've chased?
And you're like, what are some interesting things?
'Cause you mentioned like one of the things
you kind of wanna go somewhere in the world
and find evidence and data for things
that people just haven't really looked
to gain an understanding of human nature,
maybe from an economics perspective.
What kind of stuff, either in your past
or in your future, you've been thinking about?
- Well, I mean, the hardest, there's heart and two cents.
The hardest emotionally was interviewing all those kids
in Northern Uganda.
That was just like a gut punch every day.
And just hearing the stories like that was the hardest,
but it wasn't hard because it was,
you could, the kids were everywhere
and everybody would talk to you about it
and they could talk about it.
You could, no one had gone and interviewed kids
that had gone through war in the middle
of an active war zone.
Nobody was going to displace, all the things we did,
no one had done that before.
So now lots of people do it.
- Could you actually speak to their stories?
What's like the shape of their suffering?
What were common themes?
What, how did those stories change you?
- I remember I said you could,
you have like your dispassionate self
and your passionate self.
I think I had to learn to create the dispassionate self.
I mean, we all have that capacity
when we analyze something that's far away
and happens to people different than us,
but you have to, I think I discovered
and developed an ability to like put those aside
in order to be able to study this.
So you get maybe harder in a way
that you have to be guard against.
So you have to try to remember to put your human head on.
It's really horrible.
Like if I want to conscript you
and I don't want you to run away,
then I want to make you think you can never go back
to your village.
And the best way for me to do that is for,
to make you, force you to do something really, really,
really, really horrible that you could,
you almost incredibly believe you can never really go back.
And it might be like killing a loved one.
And so, and just having, hearing people tell you that story
in all of the different shapes and forms to a point,
what was horrible about it is they did this so routinely
that you'd be sitting there in an interview with somebody
and they'd be telling you the story.
And it's like the most horrible thing
that could happen to you or anyone else.
And, but there's some voice in the back of your mind
saying, okay, we really need to get to the other thing.
You know, we know that, I know how this goes.
Like I've heard, you know, there's this thing like,
okay, okay, I'm not learning anything new here.
Like there's some part, you know, deep, evil,
terrible part of you that's like, yeah, yeah, yeah.
Like, but let's get onto the other thing.
But I know I have to go through this.
But every day you have to go through that to get to the,
'cause you're trying to actually understand
how to help people.
You're trying to understand how that trauma has manifested,
how they either, some people get stronger
as a result of that.
Some people get weaker.
§18Transcript · 2:30:37–2:38:20
And if you want to know how to help people,
then you need to get to that.
I wasn't trying to get to something
for my selfish purposes really.
I was trying to figure out, okay,
we need to know what your symptoms are now.
- That's such a dark thing about us.
So if you're surrounded by trauma,
God, that voice in the back of your head
that you just go, yeah, I know exactly
how this conversation goes.
Let's skip ahead to the solutions, to the next.
- Yeah, yeah, yeah.
So that was, yeah, so that was,
because you then have to deal with yourself.
So it's very helpful if you like come home every night
to someone who's A, gone through the same thing,
and B, is a professional and very, very, very,
very good counseling psychologist.
The hardest thing, I mean, the organized crime stuff
has been the hardest.
Just figuring out how to get that information
took us years of just trial and error,
of mostly error, of like just how to get people
to talk to us or how to collect data
in a way that's safe for me and safe for my team
and safe for people to answer a survey.
Like how do you get the information
on what gangs are doing in the community
or how it's hurting or helping people?
Like you've got to run surveys
and you've got to talk to gang members,
all these things that nobody knows how to do that.
And so we had to sort of really slowly,
not nobody, there's a few other,
I think there's other academics like me
who are doing this, but it's a pretty small group
that's trying to like collect systematic data.
And then there's a slightly bigger
and much more experienced group
that's been talking to different armed groups.
But every time you go to a new city,
and there weren't that many people working on this
in Medellin, there were a few,
you have to like discover a new.
Like it's really unique to that city and place.
- So there's not like a website
for each of the 17 mafia groups.
There's no Facebook group you can DM them.
- Well there is now.
We've created like our own, we have a private wiki
where we document everything
and it's a collaborative enterprise
between lots of researchers and journalists and things.
So they now have, they can't see,
you can't go online and see this.
- That's individual researchers,
so it's not, I mean they're hiding by design.
- Some of them have Facebook pages
and things of this nature.
So they do have public profiles a little bit,
but not so explicitly.
No, so they're clandestine.
Here's an example.
So one of the things that's really endemic in Medellin,
it's true in a lot of cities,
it's true in American prisons,
is gangs govern everybody's everyday life.
So if you have a, in an American prison,
particularly in Illinois or California,
Texas is another big one,
but also in a city in Medellin,
if you have a problem,
a debt to collect or dispute with a neighbor or something,
you could go to the government and they do
and they can help you solve it,
or you go to the police or you can go to the gang.
And so, and that's like a really everyday phenomenon.
But then there's a question of like,
how do you actually figure out
what services they're offering
and how much they pay for them
and do you actually like those services
and how do you comparison shop
between the police and the gang?
And what would get you to go from the gang to the police?
And then how's the gang strategically
gonna respond to that?
And what was the impact of previous policies
to like make state governing better?
And how did the gangs react?
And so that's, we had to sort of figure that out.
And that was, so that was just hard in a different way,
but I don't do the most,
the emotionally punishing stuff I couldn't do any longer.
So that's much easier in that sense.
- By the way, on Jorge Ochoa,
some of these folks are out of prison.
Have you gotten a chance to talk to anybody?
- One of my collaborators on this,
a guy named Gustavo Duncan,
who spent a lot of time interviewing paramilitaries,
has written a book.
He's talked to more of these people than I have.
I haven't talked to those.
We haven't been talking to them about this stuff.
But also, they were there in a different era.
- Yeah, so it doesn't--
- The system was totally different.
- That's super interesting.
Maybe one day we'll do that.
- Almost like history.
- Yeah, that was 30 years ago.
And the system of, I mean, La Oficina,
Pablo Escobar created La Oficina.
He integrated what's, all these 17 Jorazones
and all these street gangs are the fragmented
former remnants of his more unified empire,
which he gave the name La Oficina.
I mean, I think, you know, it's a little bit apocryphal,
but the idea is, you know, I think he said,
every doctor has an office, so should we.
(laughing)
- I still can't imagine, I still love that there's parallels
between these mafia groups and the United Nations
Security Council.
This is just wonderful.
It's so, so, so deeply human.
Let me ask you about yourself.
So you've been thinking about war here,
in part dispassionately, just analyze war
and try to understand the path for peace.
But you as a single individual
that's going to die one day,
maybe talking to the people that have gone through suffering,
do you think about your own mortality?
How has your view of your own finiteness changed
having thought about war?
- Maybe the reason I can do this work
is 'cause I don't think about it a lot.
- Your own mortality or even like mortality?
- Yeah, I mean, well, I have to think about death a lot.
So.
- But there's a way to think about death,
like numbers in a calculation
when you're doing geopolitical negotiations.
And then there's like a dying child or a dying mother.
- Yeah, I guess I know I'm in a place where there's risk.
And so I think a lot about minimizing any risks,
such that I think about mortality enough that I just,
'cause I'm kind of an anxious person.
So like I'm kind of a worry ward, like in a way.
And so I'm really obsessive about making sure
anything that I do is low risk.
You know?
- That gives you something to focus on,
a number is the risk and you're trying to minimize it.
And yet there's still the existential dread.
Your risk minimization doesn't matter.
- Yeah, I've never been in a life-threatening situation.
- Yeah, that's somebody who,
you know what you sound like?
That's Alex Honnold that does the free climbing.
He doesn't see that as like.
- Well, that's, but no, but I, well, that's.
- He sounds exactly the same.
'Cause you just said,
"I've never done anything as dangerous
"as those people riding a scooter."
- I've actually been a rock climber for like 25 years
with a long break in between.
But I'm the same way.
Actually, rock climbing is an extremely safe sport
if you're very careful.
But free climbing is the opposite of that.
But I mean, if you've got a rope that's attached to you
that goes up, is attached to 18 trees and comes back down,
you're fine.
Like this, and you wear a helmet, you're good.
You're totally fine.
- Yeah, but this is super safe too 'cause.
- There's free climbing, no, no, no.
- We're watching free climbing.
I mean, because you're only gonna put your hands
and feet on sturdy rock and then you know the path.
- No, no, no, no, no.
Totally, I know, I have some friends in college,
I've known people who do some of these totally wacky,
extreme sports and have paid the price.
So I think it's totally, totally different.
I think.
- So even in that, by the way, this is still.
- I can't even watch those movies
'cause those freak me out too much
'cause it's just too risky.
Like I can't, I don't even, yeah.
So those things, I've never watched like Free Solo
or anything, there's just too much.
- It's still not as dangerous as riding a scooter
in Austin.
§19Transcript · 2:38:21–2:45:49
- Yeah, totally not.
- I'm not gonna let that go.
But even in that, it's just risk minimization
in the work that you do versus the sort of philosophical,
existentialist view of your mortality.
You know, this thing just ends.
Like what the hell is that about?
- Yeah, I have this amazing capacity not to think about it
which might just be a self-defense mechanism.
You know, my father-in-law, Jeannie's father
is an evangelical pastor actually.
He's now retired.
But, and this he would, we would talk about
when we were getting married,
they weren't terribly thrilled
that she was marrying a agnostic or atheist or something.
We could love each other very much, it's fine now.
But I only started discussing this and some of the,
'cause that was one of his questions for me.
Like, well, how can you possibly believe
that there's nothing afterwards?
Because that's just like too horrible to imagine.
And we really never saw eye to eye on this.
And my view was like, listen, like,
I can't convince myself, I believe what I,
like I can't convince myself otherwise.
Anything else seems completely implausible to me.
And for some reason I can't understand,
I'm at peace with that.
Like it's never bothered me that one day it's over.
And I understand, the fact that people have angst about that
and that they would seek answers makes total sense to me.
And I can't explain why that doesn't consume me
or doesn't bother me.
- And yet you are at peace.
- Yep, maybe if I was worried,
but if I was more worried about it,
maybe I wouldn't be able to do, I don't know.
I don't know, but then again, I don't take the risk.
I'm still like, I don't know.
But I minimize all sorts of risks.
I'm like, yeah, I minimize,
I try to optimize like groceries in the fridge too.
Like, I mean, I put--
- That's a very economist way to live, I would say.
That's probably why you're good at--
- That might be true.
That might be there's some selection in economics
of these cold calculators.
- Chicken or the egg, we'll never know.
Do you have advice for young people
that want to do as ambitious, as crazy,
as amazing of work as you have done in life?
So somebody who's in high school, in college,
either career advice on what to choose,
how to execute on it, or just life advice.
How to meet some random stranger,
or maybe a dating advice.
(laughing)
- That part's easier.
You have to fly coach and go to the internet cafes.
You can't like, yeah, all the development workers
that I know that fly business class,
I'm like, you'll never meet somebody.
No, I actually spent a lot of time writing advice
on my blog, and I've got like pages and pages of advice.
And one of the reasons is 'cause I never got that.
Like when I grew up, I went to like a really good
state school in Canada called Waterloo.
I loved it, but people didn't go on the trajectory
that I went on from there.
And I had some good advisors there,
but I never got the kind of advice I needed
to like pursue this career.
So it's very concentrated in elite colleges,
I think sometimes, in elite high schools.
So I tried to democratize that.
That was one reason I started the blog.
But a lot of that's really particular,
'cause every week I have students coming in my office
wanting to know how to do international development work,
and I just spend a lot of time giving them advice,
and that's what a lot of the posts are about.
- Do you have very specific questions?
Like what, is it like country by country
kind of specific questions, or what?
- The thing that they're all trying to do
that I think is the right, I don't have to give them
a really basic piece of advice,
'cause they're already doing it.
Like they're trying to find a vocation.
They're really interested, and what I mean by that
is it's like a career where they find meaning,
where the work is almost like superfluous,
because they would do it for free.
And they're passionate about it,
and they really find meaning in the work.
And then it becomes a little bit all-consuming.
So scientists do that in their own way,
I think international development, humanitarian workers,
people who are doctors and nurses.
Like we all do our careers for other reasons, right?
But they find meaning in their career.
And so the thing, so I don't have to tell them
whatever you do, find meaning.
And try to make it a vocation,
something that you would do for free
amongst all of these many, many, many options.
That's what I would tell,
but that's what I would tell high school students
and young people in college.
- Sometimes it's hard to find a thing and hold onto it.
- Well, that's the other thing, it took me a long time.
So I actually started off as an accountant.
I was an accountant with Deloitte and Touche for a few years.
So I did not--
- But that, did you wake up in the morning
excited to be alive?
- I was miserable.
I found it by accident, which is another different story.
But I landed in this job and a degree
where I studied accounting, and I was miserable.
I was totally miserable.
And I hated it, and I was becoming a miserable person.
And so I eventually just quit, and I did something new.
But that still, you know,
but then I was working in the private sector.
And I actually just needed trial and error.
I actually had to try on three or four or five careers
before I found this mixture of academia and activism
and research and international development.
- And what did you know that this was love
when you found this kind of international development?
The academic context, too?
- The key lesson was just trial and error,
which we all have to engage in until it feels right.
- So okay, all right, step one is trial and error,
but until it feels right, 'cause like,
it often feels right but not perfect.
- Yeah, well, and if it's true, right enough.
I mean, I was really intellectually engaged.
Like, I just loved learning about it.
I wanted to read more, like, in some sense, like,
like I was doing, I was an accountant,
but I was reading about, like, world history
and international development
in poor countries in my spare time, right?
And so it was like this hobby, and I was like,
wait a second, I could actually do that.
Like, just, I could, like, research this
and even write the neck of those books,
and that's kind of what I did, like, 25 years later.
That didn't occur to me right away.
I didn't even know it was possible.
This is the other thing people do.
People do their nine to five job,
and then they find meaning in everything else they do.
They're volunteering, and they're family,
and they're hobbies and things,
and that was my social milieu,
and that's a great path, too.
Like, I mean, that's, 'cause not all of us
can just have a vocation or we don't find it, I think,
and then you just circumscribe what you do in your work,
and then you go find,
and that's not entirely true,
'cause everyone in my family does like their job
and get a lot of fulfillment out of it,
but I think it's not.
That's a different path in some ways.
- So it's good to take the leap and keep trying stuff,
even when you've found, like, a little local minima.
- Yeah, the hardest part was,
it got easy after a while, it was quitting,
but now I take this to a lot of,
you know, and one of the people,
I think one of the reasons I discovered your podcast
or maybe Tyler Cowen.
- Yeah, he's amazing.
- Tyler takes this approach to everything.
He takes this approach to movie.
He's like, "Walk into the movie theater
"after half an hour if you don't like the movie."
- You know what kind of person he probably is?
I don't know, but now that you say this,
he's probably somebody that goes to a restaurant,
if the meals is not good,
I could see him just walking away,
like, paying for it and just walking away.
- Yeah, and to go eat something better.
That's exactly right, and I thought that was kind of crazy,
and I'd never, I was the person,
I would never just put a book down halfway,
and I would never stop watching a movie,
but then I, and I convinced my wife,
we lived in New York when we were single initially,
sorry, when we were childless,
and we lived in New York,
there's all this culture and theater and stuff,
and I just said, "Let's go to more plays,
§20Transcript · 2:45:51–2:48:20
"but let's just walk out after the first act
"if we don't like it,"
and she thought that was a bit crazy,
and I was like, "No, no, no, here's the logic,
"here's what Tyler says,"
and then we started doing it,
and it was so freeing and glorious.
We'd just go, we'd take so many more chances on things,
and we would, and if we didn't like it,
and we were walking out of stuff all the time,
and so I think I did that,
without realizing it, that's how I took,
I just kept quitting my jobs
and trying to find something else at some risk.
- 'Cause that's how wars start, without the commitment.
(laughing)
I go to time back to, you need the commitment,
otherwise, no.
- That's a different kind of commitment problem.
That's a different commitment problem.
- But some of it, I'm sure there's a balance,
'cause I mean, the same thing is happening
with dating and marriage and all those kinds of things,
and there's some value to sticking it out,
'cause some of the, like, maybe, you know,
don't leave after the first act,
'cause the good stuff might be coming later.
- Yeah, that's a good point.
I mean, that's, yeah. - The balance.
- Well, I don't know.
So when I met Jeannie,
she was very wary of a relationship with me,
because I explained to her,
I hadn't had a relationship longer
than two or three months and 11 years.
And so she thought this person's not serious.
And what I said to her, and she tells the story,
this is how she tells the story,
she says, "I didn't believe him when he said
"that I just, after two or three months,
"you kind of have a good sense
"of whether this is going somewhere,
"and I would just decide if it was over."
And I walk away.
So I took this approach to dating,
like, as soon as I thought it wasn't gonna go somewhere.
And then I decided with her that this was it,
this was gonna work, and then I like,
and then never, and she didn't believe,
now she believes me.
(laughing)
- You finally got to be right.
Okay, so this is an incredible conversation.
Your work is so fascinating,
just in this big picture way,
looking at human conflict and how we can achieve peace,
especially in this time of the Ukraine war.
I really, really, really appreciate
that you would calmly speak to me
about some of these difficult ideas,
and explain them, and that you would sit down with me,
and have this amazing conversation.
Thank you so much. - It was an amazing
conversation, thank you.
- Thanks for listening to this conversation
with Chris Blattman.
To support this podcast,
please check out our sponsors in the description.
And now, let me leave you with some well-known,
simple words from Albert Einstein.
I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought,
but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.
Thank you for listening, and hope to see you next time.
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