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The Top 10 Acquisitions of All-Time

第2020-03-17期2020-03-17English会员内容
The Top 10 Acquisitions of All-Time
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§01How to Judge an Acquisition

The episode answers a recurring listener question: which acquisitions were the best of all time, and what can be learned from them? The hosts frame the list as an informed but subjective exercise, built from their experience rather than an exhaustive survey of every industry. They exclude deals too recent to judge and minority investments, which they consider investments rather than acquisitions. They also warn that even Berkshire Hathaway's strong deals may not fit their chosen comparison criteria.

Their main question is how much value an acquisition added to the buyer, measured in absolute dollars. They estimate a target's contribution by its share of the parent company's revenue and the parent's revenue multiple, while acknowledging that many companies are valued on free cash flow and that the acquired businesses' cost structures are no longer visible. When a product becomes only one component of a larger product, they apply a subjective discount for how much of the later success can fairly be attributed to the acquired asset. The method is deliberately practical, but it cannot capture every strategic benefit or isolate causality with precision.

WhatsApp illustrates the limits of the revenue-based screen. The hosts call Facebook's acquisition one of the best ever from a defensive perspective, but WhatsApp generated almost no revenue for Facebook at the time of the discussion, so it falls below their top fifteen. They regard this as an incomplete verdict rather than evidence that the purchase failed: six years after the deal, the strategic value of preventing a threat to Facebook's core was clearer than the direct revenue contribution. The caveat is that enough time must pass to evaluate an acquisition, yet some of the most important benefits remain hard to quantify.

The VMware and Pixar examples show how different assumptions can change the ranking. EMC paid $625 million for 80% of VMware, but the later Dell-EMC structure trades at a discount to the value of its VMware stake, making the apparent return hard to read. For Pixar, the hosts estimate that one annual film plus merchandise contributes about $3 billion in revenue to Disney; net of the $7.4 billion purchase price, their estimate of added market value is about $2.3 billion, or roughly a 2% annualized return over fourteen years. They acknowledge that this misses Pixar's role in reviving Disney animation, a strategic contribution they cannot cleanly price.

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