Sarah Paine — How Russia sabotaged China's rise

Sarah Paine frames her argument as a long view of Russian–Chinese relations, from the mid-nineteenth century through later reversals in power. She describes continental empires as following a recurring security logic: avoid fighting on two fronts, prevent powerful neighbors from forming on the border, destabilize rising neighbors, and create buffer zones. In her account, Russia repeatedly used moments of Chinese weakness to shape Chinese choices in ways that served Russian interests, even when those choices harmed China. She presents this as a framework for interpreting historical episodes, not as a claim that every Russian action followed one perfectly coordinated plan.

Paine's first cases center on China during internal rebellions and foreign pressure. While Britain and France forced China to trade on their terms during the Opium Wars, major rebellions left the Qing state fighting on multiple fronts. Russia offered to help manage the European powers in exchange for the treaties of Aigun and Peking, which transferred large territories to Russia. Paine suggests that Qing officials underestimated the permanence Europeans attached to written treaties and expected to revisit the losses after restoring order. In a later dispute after Japan defeated China, Russia organized the Triple Intervention to block Japanese claims to the Liaodong Peninsula, then took the territory itself. These episodes illustrate her claim that Russian mediation could present short-term relief while imposing long-term costs on China.

The Karakhan Manifesto added an ideological dimension. In 1919, the Bolsheviks promised to return lands taken under unequal treaties and presented themselves as unlike the old imperial powers. Paine says the Chinese initially saw this as a possible model and source of help. Once the Bolsheviks gained ground in their own civil war, however, the promise narrowed into a willingness to negotiate; Russia did not return its large concessions until the 1950s, later than Western powers returned most of theirs. Paine argues that the early promise helped create a durable myth of Soviet friendship, while the Chinese officials who knew the record were soon displaced and the documents faded from view.