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"China is digging out of a crisis. And America’s luck is wearing thin." — Ken Rogoff

Episode 2025-06-122025-06-12EnglishMembers only

Guests: Ken Rogoff

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In-depth read · Key ideas, reasoning, and examples, organized by topic.

§01Leadership, candor, and the shift under Xi

Rogoff distinguishes leaders' willingness to hear outside views from whether they act on them. He recalls an earlier Chinese system that emphasized technocratic competence and allowed unusually candid discussion in Party training settings. In a 2016 speech to senior officials, he warned that housing and infrastructure investment looked excessive, demographics were turning unfavorable, and power was becoming more centralized. He says some leaders thanked him afterward. His retrospective assessment is more pessimistic: he believes Xi Jinping has reduced the role of technocrats and that the average quality of top leadership in both China and the United States has declined. He does not portray the earlier system as free of loyalty requirements, nor does he claim that one outside lecture could have changed policy.

§02From stimulus to an investment-heavy growth model

On the roots of China's current problems, Rogoff traces local-government financing to the 2010 stimulus under Hu Jintao, but says the model continued under Xi. Local governments, lacking stable revenue sources, were allowed to sell land and use the proceeds to establish construction companies. Rogoff recalls that some of his Chinese contacts expected Xi to liberalize markets, but says growth slowed after he took office and that he was reluctant to take risks. He describes China as having overbuilt both infrastructure and housing, particularly in smaller cities whose construction can look impressive while economic activity and jobs remain weak. He also cautions that the scale of the problem is not solely Xi's fault: growth was expected to slow, and changing a policy that appears to work can be politically dangerous.

§03Consumption, household security, and rebalancing

Patel asks whether China's investment boom would have been less damaging under market financing. Rogoff's answer shifts to the underlying imbalance: China saves and invests heavily but consumes relatively little. He contrasts a Chinese consumption share he estimates at about 45 percent with nearly 70 percent in the United States, while noting that many Chinese households have very low incomes. He argues that transfers, more flexible exchange-rate policy, and stronger retirement and health protection could support consumption. In his account, households save partly because they lack social insurance and cannot freely invest abroad; housing then became a major store of wealth, so falling home prices further weaken spending. Rogoff says rebalancing is possible but offers no single fix or precise growth target, and questions the official claim of 5 percent growth.

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