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Noam Brown: AI vs Humans in Poker and Games of Strategic Negotiation

第344期2022-12-06English

嘉宾:Noam Brown

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§01Transcript · 00:00–07:48

00:00A lot of people were saying like,

00:01oh, this whole idea of game theory, it's just nonsense.

00:03And if you really want to make money,

00:05you got to like look into the other person's eyes

00:07and read their soul and figure out what cards they have.

00:10But what happened was where we played our bot

00:13against four top heads up, no limit,

00:15hold them poker players.

00:17And the bot wasn't trying to adapt to them.

00:19It wasn't trying to exploit them.

00:20It wasn't trying to do these mind games.

00:22It was just trying to approximate the Nash equilibrium

00:25and it crushed them.

00:28The following is a conversation with Noah Brown,

00:31research scientist at FAIR,

00:32Facebook AI research group at Meta AI.

00:35He co-created the first AI system

00:38that achieved superhuman level performance

00:40in no limit Texas hold them, both heads up and multiplayer.

00:44And now recently he co-created an AI system

00:48that can strategically out negotiate humans

00:51using natural language

00:52in a popular board game called diplomacy,

00:55which is a war game that emphasizes negotiation.

00:58This is Alex Friedman podcast to support it.

01:02Please check out our sponsors in the description.

01:04And now dear friends, here's Noam Brown.

01:08You've been a lead on three amazing AI projects.

01:12So we've got Libratus that solved

01:15or at least achieved human level performance

01:17on no limit Texas hold them poker

01:19with two players, heads up.

01:22You got Pleribus that solved no limit Texas hold them poker

01:26with six players.

01:28And just now you have Cicero.

01:30These are all names of systems that solved

01:32or achieved human level performance

01:35on the game of diplomacy,

01:37which for people who don't know

01:39is a popular strategy board game.

01:42It was loved by JFK, John F. Kennedy and Henry Kissinger

01:46and many other big famous people in the decades since.

01:52So let's talk about poker and diplomacy today.

01:54First poker, what is the game of no limit Texas hold them?

01:59And how is it different from chess?

02:00- Well, no limit Texas hold them poker

02:02is the most popular variant of poker in the world.

02:05So, you know, you go to a casino,

02:06you play sit down at the poker table.

02:08The game that you're playing is no limit Texas hold them.

02:11If you watch movies about poker,

02:12like casino Royale or rounders,

02:14the game that they're playing

02:15is no limit Texas hold them poker.

02:17Now it's very different from limit hold them

02:20in that you can bet any amount of chips that you want.

02:23And so the stakes escalate really quickly.

02:26You start out with like one or $2 in the pot.

02:28And then by the end of the hand,

02:29you've got like $1,000 in there maybe.

02:32- So the option to increase the number very aggressively

02:34and very quickly is always there.

02:36- Right, the no limit aspect is there's no limits

02:38to how much you can bet.

02:39You know, in limit hold them,

02:42there's like $2 in the pot,

02:43you can only bet like $2.

02:45But if you got $10,000 in front of you,

02:47you're always welcome to put $10,000 into the pot.

02:50- So I've got a chance to hang out with Phil Helmuth

02:52who plays all these different variants of poker.

02:55And correct me if I'm wrong,

02:57but it seems like no limit rewards crazy

03:01versus the other ones rewards

03:02more kind of calculated strategy.

03:05Or no, because you're sort of looking

03:07from an analytic perspective,

03:10is strategy also rewarded in no limit Texas hold them?

03:14- I think both variants reward strategy.

03:17But I think what's different about no limit hold them

03:20is it's much easier to get jumpy.

03:23You know, you go in there thinking you're gonna play

03:26for like $100 or something.

03:28And suddenly there's like, you know, $1,000 in the pot.

03:31A lot of people can't handle that.

03:32- Can you define jumpy?

03:33- When you're playing poker,

03:35you always want to choose the action

03:37that's going to maximize your expected value.

03:39It's kind of like with investing, right?

03:41Like if you're ever in a situation

03:42where the amount of money that's at stake

03:44is going to have a material impact on your life,

03:49then you're gonna play in a more risk averse style.

03:51You know, if somebody makes a huge bet,

03:53you're gonna, if you're playing no limit hold them

03:55and somebody makes a huge bet,

03:57there might come a point where you're like,

03:58this is too much money for me to handle.

04:00Like I can't risk this amount.

04:03And that's what throws a lot of people off.

04:05So that's the big difference I think

04:07between no limit and limit.

04:09- What about on the action side

04:11when you're actually making that big bet?

04:14That's what I mean by crazy.

04:15I was trying to refer to the technical,

04:18the technical term of crazy,

04:20meaning use the big jump in the bet

04:24to completely throw off the other person

04:26in terms of their ability to reason optimally.

04:30- I think that's right.

04:31I think one of the key strategies in poker

04:34is to put the other person into an uncomfortable position.

04:38And if you're doing that, then you're playing poker well.

04:40And there's a lot of opportunities to do that

04:42in no limit hold them.

04:43You know, you can have like $50 in there,

04:45you throw in a thousand dollar bet,

04:47and you know, that's sometimes if you do it right,

04:51it puts the other person in a really tough spot.

04:53Now it's also possible that you make huge mistakes that way.

04:56And so it's really easy to lose a lot of money

04:57in no limit hold them if you don't know what you're doing.

05:00But there's a lot of upside potential too.

05:02- So when you build systems, AI systems

05:04that play these games, we'll talk about poker,

05:06we'll talk about diplomacy.

05:08Are you drawn in in part by the beauty of the game itself,

05:12AI aside, or is it to you primarily a fascinating

05:17problem set for the AI to solve?

05:20- I'm drawn in by the beauty of the game.

05:21When I started playing poker when I was in high school,

05:25and the idea to me that there is a correct,

05:29an objectively correct way of playing poker.

05:32And if you could figure out what that is,

05:34then you're making unlimited money basically.

05:38That's like a really fascinating concept to me.

05:41And so I was fascinated by the strategy of poker,

05:44even when I was like 16 years old.

05:46It wasn't until like much later

05:47that I actually worked on poker AIs.

05:49- So there was a sense that you can solve poker,

05:51like in the way you can solve chess, for example,

05:54or checkers, I believe checkers got solved, right?

05:57- Yeah, checkers is completely solved.

05:59- Optimal strategy. - Optimal strategy.

06:00It's impossible to beat the AI.

06:01- Yeah, and so in that same way,

06:03you could technically solve chess.

06:05- You could solve chess, you could solve poker.

06:07- You could solve poker.

06:08- So this gets into the concept of a Nash equilibrium.

06:12- So it is a Nash equilibrium.

06:14- Okay, so in any finite two-player zero-sum game,

06:19there is an optimal strategy that if you play it,

06:21you are guaranteed to not lose an expectation

06:24no matter what your opponent does.

06:26And this is kind of a radical concept to a lot of people,

06:29but it's true in chess, it's true in poker,

06:31it's true in any finite two-player zero-sum game.

06:34And to give some intuition for this,

06:36you can think of rock, paper, scissors.

06:39In rock, paper, scissors, if you randomly choose

06:41between throwing rock, paper, and scissors

06:43with equal probability,

06:44then no matter what your opponent does,

06:46you are not going to lose an expectation.

06:48You're not going to lose an expectation in the long run.

06:51Now, the same is true for poker.

06:53There exists some strategy,

06:54some really complicated strategy,

06:56that if you play that,

06:57you are guaranteed to not lose money in the long run.

07:00And I should say, this is for two-player poker.

07:01Six-player poker is a different story.

07:03- Yeah, it's a beautiful giant mess.

07:05When you say in expectation,

07:08you're guaranteed not to lose in expectation.

07:10What does in expectation mean?

07:12- Poker's a very high variance game.

07:14So you're going to have hands where you win,

07:15you're going to have hands with your lose.

07:16Even if you're playing the perfect strategy,

07:18you can't guarantee that you're going to win

07:19every single hand.

07:20But if you play for long enough,

07:22then you are guaranteed to at least break even,

07:25and in practice, probably win.

07:27- So that's in expectation,

07:29the size of your stack, generally speaking.

07:32Now, that doesn't include anything

07:33about the fact that you can go broke.

07:36It doesn't include any of those kinds

07:37of normal real-world limitations.

07:39You're talking in a theoretical world.

07:42What about the zero-sum aspect?

07:44How big of a constraint is that?

07:46How big of a constraint is finite?

07:48- So finite's not a huge constraint.

§02Transcript · 07:51–15:31

07:51So I mean, most games that you play are finite in size.

07:54It's also true, actually,

07:55that there exists this perfect strategy

07:57in many infinite games as well.

07:59Technically, the game has to be compact.

08:01There are some edge cases

08:03where you don't have a Nash equilibrium

08:05in a two-player zero-sum game.

08:06So you can think of a game where,

08:08if we're playing a game where whoever names

08:10the bigger number is the winner,

08:11there's no Nash equilibrium to that game.

08:13- 17, okay. - Yeah, exactly.

08:1418, but you beat.

08:16- You win again.

08:17You're good at this.

08:18- I've played a lot of games.

08:20- Okay, so that's, and then the zero-sum aspect.

08:24The zero-sum. - Zero-sum aspect.

08:26So there exists a Nash equilibrium

08:28in non-two-player zero-sum games as well.

08:30And by the way, just to clarify what I mean

08:31by two-player zero-sum, I mean there's two players,

08:34and whatever one player wins, the other player loses.

08:36So if we're playing poker and I win $50,

08:38that means that you're losing $50.

08:41Now, outside of two-player zero-sum games,

08:44there still exists Nash equilibria,

08:46but they're not as meaningful.

08:48Because you can think of a game like Risk.

08:51If everybody else on the board decides

08:54to team up against you and take you out,

08:55there's no perfect strategy you can play

08:57that's gonna guarantee that you win there.

08:59There's just nothing you can do.

09:00So outside of two-player zero-sum games,

09:02there's no guarantee that you're going to win

09:05by playing a Nash equilibrium.

09:07- Have you ever tried to model in

09:08the other aspects of the game,

09:11which is like the pleasure you draw from playing the game?

09:15And then if you're a professional poker player,

09:18if you're exciting, even if you lose,

09:20the money you would get from the attention you get

09:25to the sponsors and all that kind of stuff,

09:27is that, that would be a fun thing to model in.

09:31Or is that make it sort of super complex

09:33to include the human factor in its full complexity?

09:36- I think you bring up a couple of good points there.

09:38So I think a lot of professional poker players,

09:41I mean, they get a huge amount of money,

09:42not from actually playing poker,

09:44but from the sponsorships and having a personality

09:47that people want to tune in and watch.

09:49That's a big way to make a name for yourself in poker.

09:53- I just wonder from an AI perspective,

09:55if you create, and we'll talk about this more,

09:57maybe AI system that also talks trash

10:01and all that kind of stuff,

10:02that that becomes part of the function to maximize.

10:05So it's not just optimal poker play.

10:08Maybe sometimes you want to be chaotic.

10:10Maybe sometimes you want to be suboptimal

10:11and you lose the chaos.

10:15And maybe sometimes you want to be overly aggressive

10:18because the audience loves that.

10:21That'd be fascinating.

10:22- I think what you're getting at here

10:24is that there's a difference between making an AI

10:25that wins a game and an AI that's fun to play with.

10:28- Yeah.

10:28- Yeah.

10:29- Or fun to watch.

10:30So those are all different things,

10:31fun to play with and fun to watch.

10:33- Yeah, and I think, I've heard talks from game designers

10:37and they say people that work on AI

10:39for actual recreational games that people play.

10:42And they say, yeah, there's a big difference

10:44between trying to make an AI that actually wins.

10:46And you look at a game like "Civilization",

10:49the way that the AIs play is not optimal for trying to win.

10:53They're playing a different game.

10:54They're trying to have personalities.

10:55They're trying to be fun and engaging.

10:59And that makes for a better game.

11:00- Yeah.

11:01- And we also talk about NPCs.

11:02We just talked to Todd Howard,

11:03who is the creator of "Fallout" and the "Elder Scrolls" series

11:06and "Starfield", the new game coming out.

11:10And the creator of what I think is the greatest game

11:13of all time, which is "Skyrim" and the NPCs there.

11:15The AI that governs that whole game is very interesting,

11:18but the NPCs also are super interesting.

11:20And considering what language models might do to NPCs

11:25in an open world RPG role-playing game,

11:29it's super exciting.

11:31- Yeah, honestly, I think this is one

11:33of the first applications where we're going to see

11:35real consumer interaction with large language models.

11:38I guess "Elder Scrolls VI" is in development now.

11:42They're probably pretty close to finishing it,

11:44but I would not be surprised at all if "Elder Scrolls VII"

11:48was using large language models for their NPCs.

11:49- No, they're not.

11:51I mean, I'm not saying anything.

11:52I'm not saying anything.

11:53- Okay, this is me speculating, not you.

11:55- No, but they're just releasing the "Starfield" game.

11:59They do one game at a time.

12:00- Yeah.

12:01- And so whatever it is, whenever the date is,

12:04I don't know what the date is, calm down,

12:07but it would be, I don't know, like 2024, '25, '26.

12:11So it's actually very possible

12:12that would include language models.

12:14- I was listening to this talk by a gaming executive

12:19when I was in grad school.

12:20And one of the questions that a person in the audience asked

12:24is why are all these games so focused

12:26on fighting and killing?

12:27And the person responded that it's just so much harder

12:30to make an AI that can talk with you and cooperate with you

12:34than it is to make an AI that can fight you.

12:36And I think once this technology develops further

12:39and you can reach a point where like

12:41not every single line of dialogue has to be scripted,

12:44it unlocks a lot of potential for new kinds of games,

12:46like much more like positive interactions

12:49that are not so focused on fighting.

12:50And I'm really looking forward to that.

12:52- It might not be positive.

12:53It might be just drama.

12:54So you'll be in like a "Call of Duty" game

12:56and instead of doing the shooting,

12:57you'll just be hanging out and like arguing with an AI

13:00about like passive aggressive.

13:03And then you won't be able to sleep that night.

13:05You have to return and continue the argument

13:07that you were emotionally hurt.

13:10I mean, yeah, I think that's actually an exciting world.

13:15Whatever is the drama, the chaos that we love,

13:17the push and pull of human connection,

13:19I think it's possible to do that in the video game world.

13:22And I think you could be messier

13:24and make more mistakes in a video game world,

13:26which is why it would be a nice place.

13:28And also it doesn't have as deep

13:32of a real psychological impact

13:34because inside video games,

13:35it's kind of understood that you're in a not a real world.

13:39So whatever crazy stuff AI does,

13:42we have some flexibility to play.

13:43Just like with a game of diplomacy, it's a game.

13:46This is not real geopolitics, not real war.

13:48It's a game.

13:49So you can have a little bit of fun, a little bit of chaos.

13:53Okay, back to "Nashville Coyote Pair."

13:56How do we find the Nash equilibrium?

13:58- All right, so there's different ways

14:00to find a Nash equilibrium.

14:01So the way that we do it

14:04is with this process called self-play.

14:07Basically, we have this algorithm

14:09that starts by playing totally randomly,

14:11and it learns how to play the game

14:13by playing against itself.

14:15So it will start playing the game totally randomly,

14:19and then if it's playing poker,

14:21it'll eventually get to the end of the game and make $50.

14:26And then it will review all of the decisions

14:28that it made along the way and say,

14:30what would have happened

14:31if I had chosen this other action instead?

14:34If I had raised here instead of called,

14:36what would the other player have done?

14:38And because it's playing against a copy of itself,

14:40it's able to do that counterfactual reasoning.

14:42So it can say, okay, well, if I took this action

14:45and the other person takes this action,

14:46and then I take this action,

14:47and eventually I make $150 instead of 50.

14:51And so it updates the regret value for that action.

14:56Regret is basically like how much does it regret

14:58having not played that action in the past?

15:00And when it encounters that same situation again,

15:03it's going to pick actions that have higher regret

15:05with higher probability.

15:07Now, it'll just keep simulating the games this way.

15:10It'll keep accumulating regrets for different situations.

15:14And in the long run,

15:16if you pick actions that have higher regret

15:18with higher probability in the correct way,

15:20it's proven to converge to a Nash equilibrium.

15:23- Even for super complex games?

15:26Even for imperfect information games?

15:28- It's true for all games.

15:29It's true for chess, it's true for poker.

15:31It's particularly useful for poker.

§03Transcript · 15:33–22:37

15:33- So this is the method

15:34of counterfactual regret minimization?

15:36- This is counterfactual regret minimization.

15:37- That doesn't have to do with self-play,

15:39it has to do with just any,

15:41if you follow this kind of process, self-play or not,

15:44you will be able to arrive at an optimal set of actions.

15:48- So this counterfactual regret minimization

15:50is a kind of self-play.

15:51It's a principled kind of self-play

15:53that's proven to converge to Nash equilibria,

15:55even in imperfect information games.

15:57Now you can have other forms of self-play

15:59and people use other forms of self-play

16:00for perfect information games,

16:02where you have more flexibility,

16:04the algorithm doesn't have to be as theoretically sound

16:07in order to converge to that class of games

16:09because it's a simpler setting.

16:11- Sure, so I kind of, in my brain,

16:14the word self-play has mapped to neural networks,

16:17but we're speaking something bigger

16:19than just neural networks.

16:20It could be anything.

16:21The self-play mechanism is just the mechanism

16:25of a system playing itself.

16:26- Exactly, yeah.

16:26Self-play is not tied specifically to neural nets,

16:28it's a kind of reinforcement learning, basically.

16:32And I would also say this process of trying to reason,

16:35oh, what would the value have been

16:36if I had taken this other action instead?

16:39This is very similar to how humans learn

16:40to play a game like poker.

16:42You probably played poker before

16:44and with your friends, you probably ask,

16:46oh, what do you have called me if I raise there?

16:49That's a person trying to do the same kind of learning

16:52from a counterfactual that the AI is doing.

16:54- Okay, and if you do that at scale,

16:56you're gonna be able to learn an optimal policy.

16:59- Yeah, now where the neural nets come in,

17:01I said, okay, if it's in that situation again,

17:04then it will choose the action that has high regret.

17:07Now, the problem is that poker is such a huge game.

17:10I think No Limit Texas Hold'em,

17:12the version that we were playing,

17:13has 10 to the 161 different decision points,

17:15which is more than the number of atoms

17:17in the universe squared.

17:18- That's heads up?

17:19- That's heads up, yeah.

17:20- 10 to the 161, you said?

17:21- Yeah, I mean, it depends on the number of chips

17:22that you have, the stacks and everything,

17:24but the version that we were playing was 10 to the 161.

17:27- Which I assume would be a somewhat simplified version

17:29anyway, 'cause I bet there's some step function

17:34you had for bets.

17:36- Oh, no, no, no, I'm saying we played the full game.

17:38You can bet whatever amount you want.

17:39Now, the bot maybe was constrained

17:41in what it considered for bet sizes,

17:43but the person on the other side

17:44could bet whatever they wanted.

17:45- Yeah, I mean, 161 plus or minus 10 doesn't matter.

17:49- Yeah, yeah.

17:50And so the way neural nets help out here is,

17:54you know, you don't have to run into the same exact situation

17:57'cause that's never gonna happen again.

17:58The odds of you running into the same exact situation

18:00are pretty slim, but if you run into a similar situation,

18:03then you can generalize from other states

18:05that you've been in that kind of look like that one,

18:07and you can say like, well, these other situations,

18:09I had high regret for this action,

18:10and so maybe I should play that action here as well.

18:12- Which is the more complex game?

18:15Chess or poker or go or poker?

18:18Do you know?

18:19- That is a controversial question.

18:21- Okay.

18:21- I'm gonna-

18:22- It's like somebody's screaming on Reddit right now.

18:24It depends on which subreddit you're on.

18:25Is it chess or is it poker?

18:27- I'm sure like David Silver's

18:28gonna get really angry at me.

18:29- Yeah.

18:30- I'll say, I'm gonna say poker actually,

18:31and I think for a couple of reasons.

18:33- They're not here to defend themselves.

18:36- So first of all,

18:37you have the imperfect information aspect.

18:39And so it's, we can go into that,

18:43but like once you introduce imperfect information,

18:47things get much more complicated.

18:49- So we should say,

18:50maybe you can describe what is seen to the players,

18:54what is not seen in the game of Texas Hold 'Em.

18:57- Yeah, so Texas Hold 'Em,

18:59you get two cards face down that only you see.

19:02And so that's the hidden information of the game.

19:04The other players also all get two cards face down

19:06that only they see.

19:08And so you have to kind of, as you're playing,

19:10reason about like, okay, what do they think I have?

19:12What do they have?

19:13What do they think I think they have?

19:15That kind of stuff.

19:16And that's kind of where bluffing comes into play, right?

19:20Because the fact that you can bluff,

19:22the fact that you can bet with a bad hand and still win,

19:25is because they don't know what your cards are.

19:27- Right.

19:28- And that's the key difference

19:29between a perfect information game like poker,

19:31sorry, like chess and go,

19:34and imperfect information games like poker.

19:36- This is what trash talk looks like.

19:38The implied statement is,

19:41the game I solved is much tougher.

19:44But yeah, so when you're playing,

19:46I'm just gonna do random questions here.

19:48So when you're playing your opponent

19:51under imperfect information,

19:53is there some degree to which you're trying

19:56to estimate the range of hands that they have?

19:58Or is that not part of the algorithm?

20:01So what are the different approaches

20:04to the imperfect information game?

20:06- So the key thing to understand

20:08about why imperfect information makes things difficult,

20:11is that you have to worry not just about

20:13which actions to play,

20:14but the probability that you're gonna play those actions.

20:17So you think about rock, paper, scissors, for example,

20:21rock, paper, scissors is an imperfect information game.

20:24- Right.

20:25- Because you don't know what I'm about to throw.

20:26- I do, but yeah, usually not, yeah.

20:28- Yeah, and so you can't just say like,

20:30I'm just gonna throw a rock every single time,

20:32because the other person's gonna figure that out

20:34and notice a pattern,

20:35and then suddenly you're gonna start losing.

20:37And so you don't just have to figure out

20:38like which action to play,

20:39you have to figure out the probability that you play it.

20:42And really importantly, the value of an action

20:45depends on the probability that you're gonna play it.

20:47So if you're playing rock every single time,

20:50that value is really low.

20:51But if you're never playing rock,

20:54you play rock like 1% of the time,

20:55then suddenly the other person

20:57is probably gonna be throwing scissors.

20:59And when you throw a rock,

21:00the value of that action is gonna be really high.

21:03Now you take that to poker,

21:04what that means is the value of bluffing, for example,

21:09if you're the kind of person that never bluffs

21:10and you have this reputation as somebody that never bluffs,

21:13and suddenly you bluff,

21:14there's a really good chance that that bluff is gonna work

21:16and you're gonna make a lot of money.

21:18On the other hand, if you got a reputation,

21:19like if they seen you play for a long time and they see,

21:21oh, you're the kind of person that's bluffing all the time,

21:24when you bluff, they're not gonna buy it

21:26and they're gonna call you down

21:27and you're gonna lose a lot of money.

21:28And that, finding that balance

21:31of how often you should be bluffing

21:33is the key challenge of a game of poker.

21:37And you contrast that with a game like chess,

21:40it doesn't matter if you're opening with the queen's gambit

21:4310% of the time or 100% of the time,

21:46the value, the expected value is the same.

21:48So that's why we need these algorithms that understand,

21:54not just we have to figure out what actions are good,

21:56but the probabilities,

21:57we need to get the exact probabilities correct.

21:59And that's actually when we created the bot Libratus,

22:02Libratus means balanced

22:03because the algorithm that we designed

22:06was designed to find that right balance

22:08of how often it should play each action.

22:10- The balance of how often in the key sort of branching

22:13is the bluff or not to bluff.

22:15Is that a good crude simplification

22:18of the major decision in poker?

22:21- It's a good simplification,

22:22I think that's like the main tension,

22:23but it's not just how often to bluff or not to bluff,

22:27it's like, how often should you bet in general?

22:29How often should you, what kind of bet should you make?

22:33Should you bet big or should you bet small?

22:35And with which hands?

22:37And so this is where the idea of a range comes from,

§04Transcript · 22:40–29:55

22:40because when you're bluffing with a particular hand

22:43in a particular spot,

22:44you don't want there to be a pattern

22:46for the other person to pick up on.

22:47You don't want them to figure out,

22:48oh, whenever this person is in this spot,

22:50they're always bluffing.

22:51And so you have to reason about,

22:53okay, would I also bet with a good hand in this spot?

22:58You wanna be unpredictable.

22:59So you have to think about what would I do

23:01if I had this different set of cards?

23:04- Is there explicit estimation of like a theory of mind

23:08that the other person has about you,

23:09or is that just a emergent thing that happens?

23:13- The way that the bots handle it,

23:17that are really successful,

23:18they have an explicit theory of mind.

23:19So they're explicitly reasoning about

23:21what's the common knowledge belief?

23:25What do you think I have?

23:27What do I think you have?

23:28What do you think I think you have?

23:31It's explicitly reasoning about that.

23:32- Is there multiple yous there?

23:34So maybe that's jumping ahead to six players,

23:37but is there a stickiness to the person?

23:40So it's an iterative game.

23:42You're playing the same person.

23:43There's a stickiness to that, right?

23:47You're gathering information as you play.

23:49It's not every hand is a new hand.

23:53Is there a continuation in terms of estimating

23:57what kind of player I'm facing here?

23:59- That's a good question.

24:00So you could approach the game that way.

24:02The way that the bots do it,

24:04they don't, and the way that humans approach it also,

24:06expert human players,

24:07the way they approach it is to basically assume

24:10that you know my strategy.

24:13So I'm going to try to pick a strategy

24:16where even if I were to play it for 10,000 hands

24:18and you could figure out exactly what it was,

24:20you still wouldn't be able to beat it.

24:21Basically what that means is I'm trying

24:22to approximate the Nash equilibrium.

24:24I'm trying to be perfectly balanced

24:25because if I'm playing the Nash equilibrium,

24:27even if you know what my strategy is,

24:30like I said, I'm still unbeatable in expectation.

24:33So that's what the bot aims for.

24:35And that's actually what a lot

24:36of expert poker players aim for as well,

24:38to start by playing the Nash equilibrium.

24:41And then maybe if they spot weaknesses

24:42in the way you're playing,

24:43then they can deviate a little bit

24:44to take advantage of that.

24:46- They aim to be unbeatable in expectation.

24:49Okay.

24:50So who's the greatest poker player of all time

24:52and why is it Phil Hellmuth?

24:54So this is for Phil.

24:56So he's known at least in part

25:00for maybe playing suboptimally

25:02and he still wins a lot.

25:04It's a bit chaotic.

25:06So maybe can you speak from an AI perspective

25:09about the genius of his madness

25:12or the madness of his genius?

25:14So playing suboptimally, playing chaotically

25:16as a way to make it hard to pin down

25:21about what your strategy is.

25:23- So, okay.

25:25The thing that I should explain first of all

25:26with like Nash equilibrium,

25:28it doesn't mean that it's predictable.

25:30The whole point of it is that

25:31you're trying to be unpredictable.

25:32Now, I think when somebody like Phil Hellmuth

25:35might be really successful,

25:36is not in being unpredictable,

25:38but in being able to take advantage

25:42of the other player and figure out

25:43where they're being predictable

25:45or guiding the other player into thinking

25:49that you have certain weaknesses

25:51and then understanding how they're going

25:53to change their behavior.

25:54They're going to deviate from a Nash equilibrium style

25:57of play to try to take advantage

25:58of those perceived weaknesses

25:59and then counter exploit them.

26:00So you kind of get into the mind games there.

26:02- So you think about these heads up poker

26:04as a dance between two agents,

26:07I guess, are you playing the cards

26:08or are you playing the player?

26:10- So this gets down to a big argument

26:12in the poker community and the academic community.

26:15For a long time, there was this debate

26:16of like what's called GTO,

26:19game theory optimal poker or exploitative play.

26:22And up until about like 2017,

26:25when we did the Labradors match,

26:27I think actually exploitative play had the advantage.

26:29A lot of people were saying like,

26:31oh, this whole idea of game theory, it's just nonsense.

26:33And if you really want to make money,

26:35you got to like look into the other person's eyes

26:36and read their soul and figure out what cards they have.

26:40But what happened was people started adopting

26:42the game theory optimal strategy

26:44and they were making good money.

26:46And they weren't trying to adapt so much to the other player.

26:50They were just trying to play the Nash equilibrium.

26:52And then what really solidified it, I think,

26:54was the Labradors match,

26:56where we played our bot against four top heads up,

26:59no limit hold 'em poker players.

27:01And the bot wasn't trying to adapt to them.

27:04It wasn't trying to exploit them.

27:05It wasn't trying to do these mind games.

27:07It was just trying to approximate the Nash equilibrium

27:09and it crushed them.

27:11I think, you know, we were playing for $50, $100 blinds.

27:16And over the course of about 120,000 hands,

27:19it made close to $2 million.

27:21- 120,000 hands.

27:22- 120,000 hands.

27:24- Against humans.

27:24- Yeah, and this was fake money to be clear.

27:26So there was real money at stake.

27:27There was $200,000.

27:28- First of all, all money is fake.

27:30But that's a different conversation.

27:33We give it meaning.

27:36It's a phenomena that gets meaning

27:39from our complex psychology as a human civilization.

27:43It's emerging from the collective intelligence

27:45of the human species.

27:46But that's not what you mean.

27:47You mean like there's literally,

27:49you can't buy stuff with it.

27:50Okay, can you actually step back

27:52and take me through that competition?

27:55- Yeah, okay.

27:56So when I was in grad school,

27:59there was this thing called

28:00the annual computer poker competition,

28:02where every year all the different research labs

28:04that were working on AI for poker would get together.

28:06They would make a bot.

28:07They would play them against each other.

28:09And we made a bot that actually won the 2014 competition,

28:14the 2016 competition.

28:16And so we decided we're gonna take this bot, build on it,

28:19and play against real top professional

28:22heads up no limit Texas Hold'em poker players.

28:25So we invited four of the world's best players

28:29in this specialty.

28:30And we challenged them to 120,000 hands of poker

28:33over the course of 20 days.

28:34And we had $200,000 in prize money at stake,

28:40where it would basically be divided among them,

28:42depending on how well they did relative to each other.

28:44So we wanted to have some incentive

28:46for them to play their best.

28:47- Did you have a confidence 2014, 16,

28:50that this is even possible?

28:52How much doubt was there?

28:53- So we did a competition actually in 2015,

28:56where we also played against professional poker players

28:58and the bot lost by a pretty sizable margin actually.

29:02Now there were some big improvements from 2015 to 2017.

29:05And so-

29:06- Can you speak to the improvements?

29:07Is it computational in nature?

29:08Is it the algorithm, the methods?

29:11- It was really an algorithmic approach.

29:12That was the difference.

29:13So 2015, it was much more focused on trying to come up

29:18with a strategy upfront,

29:20like trying to solve the entire game of poker,

29:23like, and then just have a lookup table

29:25where you're saying like, "Oh, I'm in this situation.

29:27"What's the strategy?"

29:29The approach that we took in 2017

29:30was much more search-based.

29:32It was trying to say, "Okay, well, let me in real time

29:36"try to compute a much better strategy

29:38"than what I had pre-computed

29:40"by playing against myself during self-play."

29:42- What is the search space for poker?

29:47What are you searching over?

29:48What's that look like?

29:50There's different actions like raising, calling.

29:53Yeah, what are the actions?

29:55Is it just a search over actions?

§05Transcript · 29:59–37:37

29:59- So in a game like chess, the search is like,

30:02"Okay, I'm in this chess position

30:04"and I can move these different pieces

30:06"and see where things end up."

30:08In poker, what you're searching over

30:09is the actions that you can take for your hand,

30:12the probabilities that you take those actions,

30:14and then also the probabilities that you take other actions

30:17with other hands that you might have.

30:19And that's kind of like hard to wrap your head around.

30:22Like, why are you searching over these other hands

30:26that you might have and trying to figure out

30:28what you would do with those hands?

30:30And the idea is, again, you wanna always be balanced

30:35and unpredictable.

30:36And so if you're a search algorithm that's saying like,

30:39"Oh, I want to raise with this hand."

30:41Well, in order to know whether that's a good action,

30:43like let's say it's a bluff.

30:44Let's say you have a bad hand and you're saying like,

30:46"Oh, I think I should be betting here

30:48"with this really bad hand and bluffing."

30:50Well, that's only a good action

30:52if you're also betting with a strong hand.

30:55Otherwise, it's an obvious bluff.

30:57- So if your action in some sense

30:59maximizes your unpredictability,

31:02so that action could be mapped by your opponent

31:04to a lot of different hands, then that's a good action.

31:07- Basically what you wanna do is put your opponent

31:09into a tough spot.

31:11So you want them to always have some doubt,

31:13like, "Should I call here?

31:14"Should I fold here?"

31:15And if you are raising in the appropriate balance

31:18between bluffs and good hands,

31:20then you're putting them into that tough spot.

31:21And so that's what we're trying to do.

31:22We're always trying to search for a strategy

31:24that would put the opponent into a difficult position.

31:26- Can you give a metric that you're trying to maximize

31:29or minimize?

31:30Does this have to do with the regret thing

31:32that we're talking about in terms of putting your opponent

31:35in a maximally tough spot?

31:37- Yeah, ultimately what you're trying to maximize

31:39is your expected winnings, your expected value,

31:41the amount of money that you're gonna walk away from,

31:43assuming that your opponent was playing optimally

31:46in response.

31:47So you're gonna assume that your opponent

31:49is also playing as well as possible

31:53a Nash equilibrium approach,

31:55because if they're not,

31:56then you're just gonna make more money.

31:59Anything that deviates, by definition,

32:01the Nash equilibrium is the strategy

32:03that does the best in expectation.

32:06And so if you're deviating from that,

32:07then you're just, they're gonna lose money.

32:09And since it's a two player zero sum game,

32:11that means you're gonna make money.

32:12- So there's not an explicit, like objective function

32:15that maximizes the toughness of the spot they're put in.

32:18You're always, this is from like a self play

32:22reinforcement learning perspective.

32:24You're just trying to maximize winnings

32:26and the rest is implicit.

32:27- That's right, yeah.

32:28So what we're actually trying to maximize

32:30is the expected value,

32:31given that the opponent is playing optimally

32:33in response to us.

32:34Now in practice, what that ends up looking like

32:36is it's putting the opponent into difficult situations

32:39where there's no obvious decision to be made.

32:41- So the system doesn't know anything

32:44about the difficulty of the situation.

32:46- Not at all, doesn't care.

32:47- Okay, in my head it was getting excited

32:49whenever I was making the other, the opponent sweat.

32:51Okay, so you're, in 2015, you didn't do as well.

32:55So what's the journey from that to a system

32:57that in your mind could have a chance?

33:00- So 2015, we got, we beat pretty badly

33:04and we actually learned a lot from that competition.

33:06And in particular, what became clear to me

33:09is that the way the humans were approaching the game

33:11was very different from how the bot was approaching the game.

33:15The bot would not be doing search.

33:17It would just be trying to compute,

33:19it would do like months of self play.

33:21It would just be playing against itself for months,

33:23but then when it's actually playing the game,

33:24it would just act instantly.

33:26And the humans, when they're in a tough spot,

33:28they would sit there and think for sometimes

33:31even like five minutes about whether they're gonna call

33:34or fold a hand.

33:35And it became clear to me that that's,

33:39there's a good chance that that's what's missing

33:41from our bot.

33:42So I actually did some initial experiments

33:45to try to figure out how much of a difference

33:46does this actually make?

33:47And the difference was huge.

33:49- As a signal to the human player,

33:50how long you took to think?

33:52- No, no, no, I'm not saying

33:53that there were any timing tells.

33:54I was saying when the human,

33:55like the bot would always act instantly.

33:57It wouldn't try to come up with a better strategy

33:59in real time over what it had pre-computed during training.

34:04Whereas the human, like they have all this intuition

34:06about how to play, but they're also in real time

34:09leveraging their ability to think,

34:12just to search, to plan,

34:14and coming up with an even better strategy

34:16than what their intuition would say.

34:17- So you're saying that there's,

34:18you're doing, that's what you mean by

34:20you're doing search also.

34:22You have an intuition and search on top of that,

34:26looking for a better solution.

34:28- Yeah, that's what I mean by search.

34:30That instead of acting instantly,

34:33a neural net usually gives you a response

34:36in like a hundred milliseconds or something.

34:37It depends on the size of the net.

34:39But if you can leverage extra computational resources,

34:42you can possibly get a much better outcome.

34:46And we did some experiments

34:48in small scale versions of poker.

34:50And what we found was that

34:53if you do a little bit of search, even just a little bit,

34:58it was the equivalent of making your,

35:01you know, your pre-computed strategy.

35:03Like you can kind of think of it as your neural net,

35:05a thousand times bigger.

35:06It was just a little bit of search.

35:08And it just like blew away all of the research

35:10that we had been working on

35:11and trying to like scale up this like pre-computed solution.

35:15It was dwarfed by the benefit that we got from search.

35:19- Can you just linger on what you mean by search here?

35:22You're searching over a space of actions

35:26for your hand and for other hands.

35:29How are you selecting the other hands to search over?

35:32- So yeah. - Randomly?

35:34- No, it's all the other hands that you could have.

35:35So when you're playing no limit Texas hold 'em,

35:37you've got two face down cards.

35:39And so that's 52 choose two, 1,326 different combinations.

35:43Now that's actually a little bit lower

35:45because there's face up cards in the middle.

35:46And so you can eliminate those as well.

35:48But you're looking at like around a thousand

35:50different possible hands that you can have.

35:51And so when we're doing, when the bot's doing search,

35:54it's thinking explicitly,

35:56there are these thousand different hands that I could have.

35:58There are these thousand different hands that you could have.

36:00Let me try to figure out what would be a better strategy

36:03than what I've pre-computed for these hands and your hands.

36:07- Okay, so that search, how do you fuse that

36:12with what the neural net is telling you

36:15or what the train system is telling you?

36:19- Yeah, so you kind of like,

36:22where the train system comes in is the value at the end.

36:25So there's, you only look so far ahead.

36:29You look like maybe one round ahead.

36:31So if you're on the flop,

36:32you're looking to the start of the turn.

36:34And at that point you can use the pre-computed solution

36:38to figure out what's the value here of this strategy.

36:42- Is it of a single action, essentially in that spot?

36:46You're getting a value or is it the value

36:49of the entire series of actions?

36:52- Well, it's kind of both

36:53because you're trying to maximize the value

36:55for the hand that you have,

36:57but in the process, in order to maximize the value

36:59of the hand that you have,

37:01you have to figure out what would I be doing

37:03with all these other hands as well.

37:04- Okay, but are you in the search

37:06or was going to the end of the game?

37:09- In Libratus, we did.

37:11So we only use search starting on the turn.

37:14And then we searched all the way to the end of the game.

37:17- The turn, the river.

37:18Can we take it through the terminology?

37:22- Yeah, there's four rounds of poker.

37:23So there's the pre-flop, the flop, the turn and the river.

37:26And so we would start doing search halfway through the game.

37:30Now the first half of the game, that was all pre-computed.

37:33It would just act instantly.

37:34And then when it got to the halfway point,

37:37then it would always search to the end of the game.

§06Transcript · 37:39–45:32

37:39Now we later improved this

37:40so it wouldn't have to search all the way

37:41to the end of the game.

37:42It would actually search just a few moves ahead.

37:45But that came later and that drastically reduced

37:48the amount of computational resources that we needed.

37:51- But the moves, 'cause you can keep betting

37:53on top of each other.

37:54That's what you mean by moves.

37:55So like that's where you don't just get one bet

37:58per turn of poker.

37:59You can have multiple arbitrary number of bets, right?

38:02- Right, I'm trying to think like,

38:04I'm gonna bet and then what are you gonna do in response?

38:06Are you gonna raise me or are you gonna call?

38:08And then if you raise, what should I do?

38:10So it's reasoning about that whole process

38:12up until the end of the game in the case of Libratus.

38:15- So for Libratus, what's the most number of re-raises

38:18have you ever seen?

38:19- You probably cap out at like five or something

38:23because at that point you're basically all in.

38:26- I mean, is there like interesting patterns like that

38:30that you've seen that the game does?

38:31Like you'll have like alpha zero doing way more sacrifices

38:34than humans usually do.

38:36Is there something like Libratus was constantly re-raising

38:40or something like that that you've noticed?

38:43- There was something really interesting

38:44that we observed with Libratus.

38:46So humans, when they're playing poker,

38:49they usually size their bets relative

38:51to the size of the pot.

38:52So if the pot has $100 in there,

38:55maybe you bet like $75 or somewhere around there,

38:57somewhere between like 50 and $100.

38:59And with Libratus, we gave it the option

39:03to basically bet whatever it wanted.

39:05It was actually really easy for us to say like,

39:07oh, if you want, you can bet like 10 times the pot.

39:09And we didn't think it would actually do that.

39:11It was just like, why not give it the option?

39:13And then during the competition,

39:15it actually started doing this.

39:16And by the way, this was like a very last minute decision

39:18on our part to add this option.

39:19And so we did not think the bot would do this.

39:23And I was actually kind of worried

39:25when it did start to do this, like, oh, is this a problem?

39:27Like humans don't do this.

39:28Like is it screwing up?

39:29But it would put the humans into really difficult spots

39:33when it would do that.

39:34Because you could imagine like you have the second best hand

39:38that's possible given the board.

39:40And you're thinking like,

39:41oh, you're in a really great spot here.

39:42And suddenly the bot bets $20,000 into a $1,000 pot.

39:46And it's basically saying like,

39:48I have the best hand or I'm bluffing.

39:51And you having the second best hand,

39:53like now you get a really tough choice to make.

39:56And so the humans would sometimes think like five

39:59or 10 minutes about like, what do you do?

40:01Should I call? Should I fold?

40:03And when I saw the humans like really struggling

40:06with that decision, like that's when I realized like,

40:07oh, actually this is maybe a good thing to do after all.

40:09- And of course the system is a no that it's making,

40:13again, like we said, that it's putting them in a tough spot.

40:16It's just, that's part of the optimal,

40:19the game theory optimal.

40:21- Right, from the bot's perspective,

40:22it's just doing the thing

40:23that's going to make it the most money.

40:26And the fact that it's putting the humans

40:28in a difficult spot, like that's just, you know,

40:30a side effect of that.

40:32And this was, I think the one thing,

40:35I mean, there were a few things

40:35that the humans walked away from,

40:36but this was the number one thing

40:39that the humans walked away from the competition saying like,

40:41we need to start doing this.

40:43And now these overbets, what are called overbets,

40:46have become really common in high-level poker play.

40:48- Have you ever talked to like somebody like Daniel

40:50DeGranio about this?

40:52He seems to be a student of the game.

40:54- I did actually have a conversation

40:55with Daniel DeGranio once, yeah.

40:56I was visiting the Isle of Man

40:59to talk to poker stars about AI.

41:02And Daniel DeGranio was there

41:04when we had dinner together with some other people.

41:07And yeah, he was really interested in it.

41:10He mentioned that he was like, you know,

41:11excited about like learning from these AIs.

41:14- So he wasn't scared, he was excited.

41:16- He was excited.

41:17And he honestly, he wanted to play against the bot.

41:20He thought he had a decent chance of beating it.

41:23I think, you know, this was like several years ago

41:26when I think it was like not as clear to everybody

41:30that, you know, the AIs were taking over.

41:32I think now people recognize that like

41:34if you're playing against a bot,

41:36there's like no chance that you have in a game like poker.

41:38- So consistently the bots will win.

41:41The bots have heads up and in other variants too.

41:45So multi, six player Texas hold 'em,

41:49no limit Texas hold 'em, the bots win?

41:51- Yeah, that's the case.

41:52So I think there is some debate about like,

41:54is it true for every single variant of poker?

41:56I think for every single variant of poker,

41:59if somebody really put in the effort,

42:00they can make an AI that would beat all humans at it.

42:04We've focused on the most popular variants.

42:06So heads up, no limit Texas hold 'em.

42:08And then we followed that up with six player poker as well,

42:13where we managed to make a bot

42:14that beat expert human players.

42:16And I think even there now,

42:18it's pretty clear that humans don't stand a chance.

42:20- See, I would love to hook up an AI system

42:22that looks at EEG, like how,

42:26like actually tries to optimize the toughness of the spot

42:29it puts a human in.

42:31And I would love to see how different is that

42:34from the game theory optimal.

42:35So you try to maximize the heart rate of the human player,

42:39like the freaking out over a long period of time.

42:42I wonder if there's going to be different strategies

42:46that emerge that are close in terms of effectiveness.

42:49'Cause something tells me you could still be

42:53achieve superhuman level performance

42:56by just making people sweat.

42:58- I feel like that there's a good chance

43:00that that is the case, yeah.

43:01If you're able to see like,

43:03that it's like a decent proxy for score, right?

43:06And this is actually like the common poker wisdom

43:09where they're teaching players, before there were bots,

43:12and they were trying to teach people how to play poker.

43:14They would say like, the key to the game

43:16is to put your opponent into difficult spots.

43:18It's a good estimate for

43:20if you're making the right decision.

43:21- So what else can you say about

43:23the fundamental role of search in poker?

43:27And maybe if you can also relate it to chess and go

43:30in these games,

43:31what's the role of search to solving these games?

43:35- Yeah, I think a lot of people under,

43:39this is true for the general public

43:40and I think it's true for the AI community.

43:42A lot of people underestimate the importance of search

43:45for these kinds of game AI results.

43:48An example of this is TD Gammon that came out in 1992.

43:52This was the first real instance of a neural net

43:55being used in a game AI.

43:57It's a landmark achievement.

43:58It was actually the inspiration for AlphaZero

44:00and it used search.

44:02It used two-ply search to figure out its next move.

44:05You got Deep Blue.

44:06There, it was very heavily focused on search,

44:09looking many, many moves ahead farther than any human could.

44:13And that was key for why it won.

44:15And then even with something like AlphaGo,

44:18I mean, AlphaGo is commonly hailed

44:21as a landmark achievement for neural nets, and it is,

44:24but there's also this huge component of search,

44:26Monte Carlo Tree Search to AlphaGo,

44:29that was key, absolutely essential

44:31for the AI to be able to beat top humans.

44:33I think a good example of this is you look at

44:37the latest versions of AlphaGo,

44:39like it was called AlphaZero,

44:41and there's this metric called Elo rating

44:45where you can compare different humans

44:47and you can compare bots to humans.

44:49Now, a top human player is around 3,600 Elo,

44:53maybe a little bit higher now.

44:55AlphaZero, the strongest version, is around 5,200 Elo.

44:59But if you take out the search that's being done

45:02at test time, and by the way, what I mean by search

45:05is the planning ahead, the thinking of like,

45:07oh, if I move my, if I place this stone here

45:10and then he does this,

45:11and then you look like five moves ahead

45:12and you see like what the board state looks like,

45:15that's what I mean by search.

45:17If you take out the search that's done during the game,

45:19the Elo rating drops to around 3,000.

45:21So even today, what, seven years after AlphaGo,

45:26if you take out the Monte Carlo Tree Search

45:29that's being done at when playing against the human,

45:32the bots are not superhuman.

§07Transcript · 45:34–52:59

45:34Nobody has made a raw neural net that is superhuman in Go.

45:38- That's worth lingering on, that's quite profound.

45:43So without search, that just means

45:45looking at the next move and saying,

45:48this is the best move.

45:49So having a function that estimates accurately

45:52what the best move is without search.

45:55- Yeah, and all these bots, they have the,

45:58what's called a policy network, where it will tell you,

46:00this is what the neural net thinks is the next best move.

46:03And it's kind of like the intuition that a human has.

46:08You know, the human looks at the board

46:09and any Go or chess master will be able to tell you like,

46:14oh, instantly, here's what I think the right move is.

46:17And the bot is able to do the same thing.

46:19But just like how a human, grandmaster,

46:22can make a better decision if they have more time to think,

46:25when you add on this Monte Carlo Tree Search,

46:27the bot is able to make a better decision.

46:30- Yeah, I mean, of course a human is doing something

46:32like search in their brain, but it's not,

46:35I hesitate to draw a hard line,

46:38but it's not like a Monte Carlo Tree Search.

46:41It's more like sequential language model generation.

46:46So it's like a different, it's a,

46:48the neural network is doing the searching.

46:50I wonder what the human brain is doing in terms of searching

46:53'cause you're doing that like computation.

46:55A human is computing.

46:57They have intuition, they have gut,

46:58they have a really strong ability to estimate,

47:02you know, amongst the top players,

47:03of what is good and not position

47:05without calculating all the details.

47:08But they're still doing search in their head,

47:10but it's a different kind of search.

47:11Have you ever thought about like,

47:12what is the difference between the human,

47:15the search that the human is performing

47:17versus what computers are doing?

47:21- I have thought a lot about that,

47:22and I think it's a really important question.

47:24So the AI in Alpha and Alphas in AlphaGo

47:27or any of these Go AIs,

47:29they're all doing Monte Carlo Tree Search,

47:30which is a particular kind of search.

47:32And it's actually a symbolic tabular search.

47:36It uses the neural net to guide its search,

47:38but it isn't actually like full on neural net.

47:42Now, that kind of search is very successful

47:46in these kinds of like perfect information board games

47:48like chess and Go.

47:50But if you take it to a game like poker, for example,

47:52it doesn't work.

47:52It can't understand the concept of hidden information.

47:56It doesn't understand the balance that you have to strike

47:58between like the amount that you're raising

48:00versus the amount that you're calling.

48:02And in every one of these games,

48:04you see a different kind of search.

48:06And the human brain is able to plan

48:08for all these different games in a very general way.

48:11Now, I think that's one thing

48:12that we're missing from AI today.

48:14And I think it's a really important missing piece.

48:16The ability to plan and reason more generally

48:20across a wide variety of different settings.

48:23- In a way where the general reasoning

48:26makes you better at each one of the games, not worse.

48:29- Yeah, so you can kind of think of it

48:30as like neural nets today,

48:32they'll give you like Transformers, for example,

48:34are super general, but they'll give you,

48:37it'll output an answer in like 100 milliseconds.

48:40And if you tell it like,

48:41"Oh, you've got five minutes to give me a decision,

48:43feel free to take more time to make a better decision."

48:45It's not gonna know what to do with that.

48:47But a human, if you're playing a game like chess,

48:50they're gonna give you a very different answer

48:51depending on if you say,

48:53"Oh, you've got 100 milliseconds

48:54or you've got five minutes."

48:55- Yeah, I mean, people have started using

49:00Transformers language models in an iterative way

49:02that does improve the answer

49:04or like showing the work kind of idea.

49:08- Yeah, they got this thing called

49:09chain of thought reasoning.

49:10And that's, I think-

49:11- Super promising, right?

49:12- Yeah, and I think it's a good step in the right direction.

49:15I would kind of like say it's similar

49:17to Monte Carlo rollouts in a game like chess.

49:20There's a kind of search that you can do

49:22where you're saying like,

49:23"I'm gonna roll out my intuition and see like,

49:25without really thinking,

49:27what are the better decisions I can make

49:28farther down the path?

49:30What would I do if I just acted according to intuition

49:32for the next 10 moves?"

49:34And that gets you an improvement,

49:36but I think that there's much richer kinds of planning

49:40that we could do.

49:42- So when Labradors actually beat the poker players,

49:44what did that feel like?

49:45What was that?

49:46I mean, actually on that day,

49:48what were you feeling like?

49:49Were you nervous?

49:51I mean, poker was one of the games that you thought

49:55like is not gonna be solvable

49:56'cause it's the human factor.

49:57So at least in the narratives,

50:00we'll tell ourselves the human factor

50:02is so fundamental to the game of poker.

50:05- Yeah, the Labradors competition

50:06was super stressful for me.

50:07Also, I mean, I was working on this

50:11like basically continuously for a year

50:13leading up to the competition.

50:14I mean, for me, it became like very clear,

50:16like, okay, this is the search technique,

50:18this is the approach that we need.

50:19And then I spent a year working on this

50:21pretty much like nonstop.

50:23- Can we actually get into details?

50:24Like what programming languages is it written in?

50:26What's some interesting implementation details

50:30that are like fun/painful?

50:33- Yeah, so one of the interesting things about Labradors

50:35is that we had no idea what the bar was

50:37to actually beat top humans.

50:39We could play against like our prior bots

50:41and that kind of gives us some sense of like,

50:42are we making progress?

50:44Are we going in the right direction?

50:45But we had no idea like what the bar actually was.

50:48And so we threw a huge amount of resources

50:50at trying to make the strongest bot possible.

50:52So we use C++, it was parallelized.

50:55We were using, I think like a thousand CPUs,

50:58maybe more actually.

51:00And today that sounds like nothing,

51:02but for a grad student back in 2016,

51:04that was a huge amount of resources.

51:06- Well, it's still a lot for even any grad student today.

51:09It's still tough to get,

51:11or even to allow yourself to think in that,

51:15in terms of scale at CMU, at MIT, anything like that.

51:18- Yeah, and talking about terabytes of memory.

51:21So it was a very parallelized,

51:24and it had to be very fast too,

51:25because the more games that you could simulate,

51:28the stronger the bot would be.

51:30- So is there some like John Carmack style,

51:33like efficiencies you had to come up with,

51:35like an efficient way to represent the hand,

51:39all that kind of stuff?

51:40- There were all sorts of optimizations that I had to make

51:42to try to get this thing to run as fast as possible.

51:44They were like, how do you minimize the latency?

51:46How do you like, you know, package things together

51:48so that like you minimize the amount of communication

51:50between the different nodes?

51:52How do you like optimize the algorithms

51:55so that you can, you know,

51:56try to squeeze out more and more

51:58from the game that you're actually playing?

51:59All these kinds of different decisions

52:01that I, you know, had to make.

52:03- Just a fun question.

52:05What IDE did you use?

52:07What for C++ at the time?

52:10- I think I used Visual Studio actually.

52:12- Okay. - Yeah.

52:13- Is that still carried through to today?

52:15- VS Code is what I use today.

52:17It seems like it's pretty popular.

52:17- It's the community, basically converged on.

52:19Okay, cool.

52:20So you got this super optimized C++ system,

52:25and then you show up to the day of competition.

52:28- Yeah.

52:29- Humans versus machine.

52:30How did it feel throughout the day?

52:34- Super stressful.

52:35I mean, I thought going into it

52:38that we had like a 50/50 chance.

52:40Because basically I thought if they play

52:42in a totally normal style, I think we'll squeak out a win.

52:45But there's always a chance

52:47that they can find some weakness in the bot.

52:49And if they do, and we're playing like for 20 days,

52:52120,000 hands of poker.

52:53They have a lot of time to find weaknesses in the system.

52:56And if they do, we're gonna get crushed.

52:58And that's actually what happened

52:59in the previous competition.

§08Transcript · 53:01–1:00:39

53:01The humans, they started out,

53:03it wasn't like they were winning from the start.

53:05But then they found these weaknesses

53:06that they could take advantage of.

53:08And for the next 10 days,

53:09they were just crushing the bot, stealing money from it.

53:12- What were the weaknesses they found?

53:14Like maybe over betting was effective,

53:16that kind of stuff.

53:17So certain betting strategies worked?

53:19- What they found is, yeah, over betting,

53:21like betting certain amounts,

53:23the bot would have a lot of trouble

53:24dealing with those sizes.

53:25And then also, when the bot got

53:29into really difficult all-in situations,

53:31it wasn't able to, because it wasn't doing search,

53:35it had to clump different hands together

53:37and it would treat them identically.

53:40And so it wouldn't be able to distinguish,

53:42you know, like having a king high flush

53:44versus an ace high flush.

53:46And in some situations that really matters a lot.

53:48And so they could put the bot into those situations

53:50and then the bot would just bleed money.

53:52- Clever humans.

53:54Okay, so I didn't realize it was over 20 days.

53:57So what were the humans like over those 20 days?

54:02And what was the bot like?

54:04- So we had set up the competition, you know,

54:06like I said, there was $200,000 in prize money

54:09and they would get paid a fraction of that

54:12depending on how well they did relative to each other.

54:14So I was kind of hoping that they wouldn't work together

54:16to try to find weaknesses in the bot,

54:18but they enter the competition

54:20with their like number one objective being to beat the bot.

54:22And they didn't care about like individual glory.

54:24They were like, we're all gonna work as a team

54:26to try to take down this bot.

54:28And so they immediately started comparing notes.

54:31What they would do is they would coordinate

54:34looking at different parts of the strategy

54:36to try to, you know, find out weaknesses.

54:39And then at the end of the day,

54:41we actually sent them a log of all the hands

54:43that were played and what cards the bot had

54:45on each of those hands.

54:46- Oh wow. - Yeah.

54:48- That's gutsy.

54:49- Yeah, it was honestly,

54:50and I'm not sure why we did that in retrospect,

54:52but I mean, I'm glad we did it

54:53'cause we ended up winning anyway,

54:54but that if you've ever played poker before,

54:57like that is golden information.

54:58I mean, to know, usually when you play poker,

55:01you see about a third of the hands to show down

55:03and to just hand them all the cards

55:06that the bot had on every single hand,

55:08that was just a gold mine for them.

55:11And so then they would review the hands

55:13and try to see like, okay,

55:14could they find patterns in the bot, weaknesses?

55:16And could they, then they would coordinate

55:19and study together and try to figure out,

55:20okay, now this person's gonna explore

55:23this part of the strategy for weaknesses.

55:24This person's gonna explore this part

55:25of the strategy for weaknesses.

55:28- It's a kind of psychological warfare,

55:30showing them the hands.

55:31- Yeah.

55:32- I mean, I'm sure you didn't think of it that way,

55:33but like doing that means you're confident

55:36in the bot's ability to win.

55:38- Well, that's one way of putting it.

55:39I wasn't super confident.

55:41- Yeah.

55:42- So, going in, like I said,

55:44I think I had like 50/50 odds on us winning.

55:46When we actually, when we announced the competition,

55:49the poker community decided to gamble on who would win.

55:52And their initial odds against us were like four to one.

55:55They were really convinced that the humans

55:56were gonna pull out a win.

55:58The bot ended up winning for three days straight.

56:02And even then after three days,

56:04the betting odds were still just 50/50.

56:06And then at that point, it started to look like

56:11the humans were coming back.

56:13They started to like, you know,

56:14but poker is a very high variance game.

56:17And I think what happened is like,

56:19they thought that they spotted some weaknesses

56:21that weren't actually there.

56:22And then around day eight,

56:24it was just very clear

56:25that they were getting absolutely crushed.

56:27And from that point, I mean, for a while there,

56:30I was super stressed out thinking like,

56:32oh my God, the humans are coming back

56:33and they've found weaknesses

56:35and now we're just gonna lose the whole thing.

56:37But no, it ended up going in the other direction

56:39and the bot ended up like crushing them in the long run.

56:42- How did it feel at the end?

56:45Like as a human being,

56:47as a person who loves,

56:49appreciates the beauty of the game of poker

56:51and as a person who appreciates the beauty of AI,

56:55is there, did you feel a certain kind of way about it?

56:58- I felt a lot of things, man.

57:01I mean, at that point in my life,

57:03I had spent five years working on this project

57:05and it was a huge sense of accomplishment.

57:09I mean, to spend five years working on something

57:11and finally see it succeed.

57:12Yeah, I wouldn't trade that for anything in the world.

57:16- Yeah, because that's a real benchmark.

57:18It's not like getting some percent accuracy on a data set.

57:23This is like real, this is real world.

57:26It's just a game, but it's also a game

57:28that means a lot to a lot of people.

57:30And this is humans doing their best to beat the machine.

57:33So this is a real benchmark, unlike anything else.

57:36- Yeah, and I mean, this is what I had been dreaming about

57:39since I was like 16 playing poker,

57:41you know, with my friends in high school.

57:43The idea that you could find a strategy

57:46to approximate the Nash equilibrium,

57:48be able to beat all the poker players in the world with it.

57:51So to actually see that come to fruition and be realized,

57:55that was, it's kind of magical.

57:58- Yeah, especially money is on the line too.

58:00It's different than chess.

58:02And that aspect, like people get,

58:05that's why you want to look at betting markets

58:08if you want to actually understand what people really think.

58:11And in the same sense, poker, it's really high stakes

58:14'cause it's money.

58:15And to solve that game, that's an amazing accomplishment.

58:18So the leap from that to multi-way six player poker,

58:23what's, how difficult is that jump?

58:27And what are some interesting differences

58:28between heads up poker and multi-way poker?

58:32- Yeah, so I mentioned, you know,

58:34Nash equilibrium in two player zero-sum games.

58:37If you play that strategy,

58:38you are guaranteed to not lose an expectation

58:40no matter what your opponent does.

58:41Now, once you go to six player poker,

58:43you're no longer playing a two player zero-sum game.

58:45And so there was a lot of debate

58:46among the academic community and among the poker community

58:49about how well these techniques would extend

58:51beyond just two player heads up poker.

58:54Now, what I had come to realize is that

58:57the techniques actually I thought

59:00really would extend to six player poker

59:03because even though in theory,

59:05they don't give you these guarantees

59:06outside of two player zero-sum games,

59:08in practice, it still gives you a really strong strategy.

59:11Now, there were a lot of complications

59:13that would come up with six player poker

59:16besides like the game theoretic aspect.

59:17I mean, for one, the game is just exponentially larger.

59:21So the main thing that allowed us

59:24to go from two player to six player

59:26was the idea of depth limited search.

59:29So I said before, like, you know, we would do search,

59:31we would plan out, the bot would plan out

59:34like what it's going to do next

59:35and for the next several moves.

59:37And in Libratus, that search was done

59:39extending all the way to the end of the game.

59:41So it would have to start from the turn onwards,

59:46like looking maybe 10 moves ahead,

59:49it would have to figure out

59:51what it was doing for all those moves.

59:53Now, when you get to six player poker,

59:55it can't do that exhaustive search anymore

59:57'cause the game is just way too large.

59:59But by only having to look a few moves ahead

60:03and then stopping there and substituting a value estimate

60:06of like how good is that strategy at that point,

60:08then we're able to do a much more scalable form of search.

60:12- Is there something cool,

60:15looking at the paper right now,

60:17is there something cool in the paper in terms of graphics?

60:20A game tree traversal via Monte Carlo.

60:22- I think if you go down a bit.

60:24- Figure one, an example of equilibrium selection problem.

60:29Ooh, so yeah.

60:30What do we know about equilibria

60:32when there's multiple players?

60:34- So when you go outside of two players, you're a sum.

60:38So a Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies,

60:39like one strategy for each player,

§09Transcript · 1:00:41–1:09:02

60:41where no player has an incentive

60:43to switch to a different strategy.

60:45And so you can kind of think of it as like,

60:48imagine you have a game where there's a ring.

60:51That's actually the visual here.

60:52You got a ring and the object of the game

60:55is to be as far away from the other players as possible.

60:58There's a Nash equilibrium is for all the players

61:01to be spaced equally apart around this ring.

61:04But there's infinitely many different Nash equilibria.

61:06There's infinitely many ways

61:08to space four dots along a ring.

61:11And if every single player independently

61:14computes a Nash equilibrium,

61:16then there's no guarantee that the joint strategy

61:18that they're all playing is going to be a Nash equilibrium.

61:22They're just gonna be like random dots

61:24scattered along this ring,

61:25rather than four coordinated dots

61:27being equally spaced apart.

61:28- Is it possible to sort of optimally

61:30do this kind of selection,

61:32to do the selection of the equilibria you're chasing?

61:37So is there like a meta problem to be solved here?

61:40- So the meta problem is in some sense,

61:42how do you understand the Nash equilibria

61:45that the other players are going to play?

61:47And even if you do that, again,

61:51there's no guarantee that you're going to win.

61:53So, if you're playing risk, like I said,

61:58and all the other players decide to team up against you,

62:00you're gonna lose.

62:01Nash equilibrium doesn't help you there.

62:03And so there is this big debate about

62:06whether Nash equilibrium and all these techniques

62:08that compute it are even useful

62:10once you go outside of two player zero-sum games.

62:13Now, I think for many games,

62:15there is a valid criticism here.

62:17And I think when we talk about,

62:18when we go to something like diplomacy,

62:19we run into this issue that the approach

62:23of trying to approximate a Nash equilibrium

62:25doesn't really work anymore.

62:27But it turns out that in six player poker,

62:30because six player poker is such an adversarial game,

62:33where none of the players

62:35really try to work with each other,

62:38the techniques that were used in two player poker

62:40to try to approximate an equilibrium,

62:41those still end up working in practice

62:43in six player poker as well.

62:45- There's some deep way in which six player poker

62:49is just a bunch of heads up poker, like games in one.

62:53It's like embedded in it.

62:55So the competitiveness is more fundamental to poker

63:00than the cooperation.

63:01- Right, yeah.

63:02Poker is just such an adversarial game.

63:03There's no real cooperation.

63:05In fact, you're not even allowed to cooperate in poker.

63:07It's considered collusion.

63:08It's against the rules.

63:09And so for that reason,

63:12the techniques end up working really well.

63:13And I think that's true more broadly

63:16in extremely adversarial games in general.

63:18- But that's sort of in practice

63:20versus being able to prove something.

63:22- That's right.

63:23Nobody has a proof that that's the case.

63:24And it could be that six player poker

63:26belongs to some class of games

63:28where approximating an equilibrium through self-play

63:33provably works well.

63:34And there are other classes of games

63:37beyond just two players, zero sum,

63:39where this is proven to work well.

63:40So there are these kinds of games called potential games,

63:43which I won't go into.

63:44It's kind of like a complicated concept,

63:45but there are classes of games

63:49where this approach to approximating an equilibrium

63:53is proven to work well.

63:54Now, six player poker is not known to belong

63:57to one of those classes,

63:57but it is possible that there is some classic games

63:59where it either provably performs well

64:01or provably performs not that badly.

64:04- So what are some interesting things about Pleribus

64:08that was able to achieve human level performance

64:10on this or superhuman level performance

64:13on the six player version of poker?

64:16- Personally, I think the most interesting thing

64:18about Pleribus is that it was so much cheaper than Libratus.

64:22I mean, Libratus, if you had to put a price tag

64:25on the computational resources that went into it,

64:27I would say the final training run took about $100,000.

64:31You go to Pleribus, the final training run

64:34would cost like less than $150 on AWS.

64:37- Is this normalized to computational inflation?

64:41So meaning, does this just have to do with the fact

64:46that Pleribus was trained like a year later?

64:49- No, no, no, it's not.

64:50I mean, first of all, like, yeah,

64:51computing resources are getting cheaper every day,

64:55but you're not gonna see a thousand fold decrease

64:57in the computational resources over two years

65:00or even anywhere close to that.

65:02The real improvement was algorithmic improvements

65:04and in particular, the ability to do depth limited search.

65:08- So does depth limited search also work for Libratus?

65:12- Yeah, yes.

65:13So where this depth limited search came from is,

65:15you know, I developed this technique

65:17and ran it on two player poker first

65:21and that reduced the computational resources needed

65:24to make an AI that was superhuman

65:26from, you know, $100,000 for Libratus

65:28to something you could train on your laptop.

65:31- What do you learn from that, from that discovery?

65:35- What I would take away from that

65:38is that algorithmic improvements really do matter.

65:40- How would you describe the more general case

65:43of limited depth search?

65:45So it's basically constraining the scale, temporal,

65:48or in some other way of the computation you're doing,

65:51in some clever way.

65:53So like with, like how else can you significantly

65:56constrain computation, right?

65:59- Well, I think the idea is that we want to be able

66:02to leverage search as much as possible.

66:04And the way that we were doing it in Libratus

66:05required us to search all the way to the end of the game.

66:08Now, if you're playing a game like chess,

66:09the idea that you're gonna search always

66:11to the end of the game is kind of unimaginable, right?

66:14Like there's just so many situations

66:15where you just won't be able to use search in that case

66:17or the cost would be, you know, prohibitive.

66:20And this technique allowed us to leverage search

66:25and without having to pay such a huge

66:27computational cost for it,

66:29and be able to apply it more broadly.

66:31- So to what degree did you use neural nets

66:33for Libratus and Pleribus?

66:36And more generally, what role do neural nets have to play

66:40in superhuman level performance in poker?

66:44- So we actually did not use neural nets at all

66:46for Libratus or Pleribus.

66:49And a lot of people found this surprising back in 2017.

66:52I think they find it surprising today

66:55that we were able to do this without using any neural nets.

66:58And I think the reason for that,

67:01I mean, I think neural nets are incredibly powerful

67:04and the techniques that are used today,

67:06even for poker AIs, do rely quite heavily on neural nets.

67:11But it wasn't the main challenge for poker.

67:14Like I think what neural nets are really good for,

67:17if you're in a situation where finding features

67:20for a value function is really difficult,

67:23then neural nets are really powerful.

67:24And this was the problem in Go, right?

67:26Like the problem in Go was that,

67:28or the final problem in Go at least,

67:30was that nobody had a good way of looking at a board

67:33and figuring out who was winning or losing,

67:35describing through a simple algorithm

67:38who was winning or losing.

67:40And so there neural nets were super helpful

67:42because you could just feed in a ton

67:44of different board positions into this neural net,

67:46and it would be able to predict then

67:48who was winning or losing.

67:49But in poker, the features weren't the challenge.

67:53The challenge was how do you design a scalable algorithm

67:57that would allow you to find this balanced strategy

68:00that would understand that you have to bluff

68:03with the right probability?

68:05- So can that be somehow incorporated

68:08into the value function?

68:10The complexity of poker that you've described?

68:14- Yeah, so the way the value functions work in poker,

68:17like the latest and greatest poker AIs,

68:19they do use neural nets for the value function.

68:22The way it's done is very different

68:24from how it's done in a game like chess or Go,

68:26because in poker, you have to reason about beliefs.

68:31And so the value of a state depends on the beliefs

68:35that players have about what the different cards are.

68:39Like if you have pocket aces,

68:41then whether that's a really, really good hand

68:44or just an okay hand depends on whether you know

68:46I have pocket aces.

68:48Rather, if you know that I have pocket aces,

68:50then if I bet, you're gonna fold immediately.

68:53But if you think that I have a really bad hand,

68:55then I could bet with pocket aces and make a ton of money.

68:58So the value function in poker these days

69:02takes the beliefs as an input,

§10Transcript · 1:09:05–1:17:01

69:05which is very different from how chess and Go AIs work.

69:08- So as a person who appreciates the game,

69:13who do you think is the greatest poker player of all time?

69:16- That's a tough question.

69:19- Can AI help answer that question?

69:20Can you actually analyze the quality of play?

69:24So the chess engines can give estimates

69:28of the quality of play.

69:30I wonder if there's a,

69:34is there an Elo rating type of system for poker?

69:37I suppose you could, but there's just not enough.

69:41You would have to play a lot of games, right?

69:43A very large number of games,

69:45like more than you would in chess.

69:46The deterministic game makes it easier to estimate Elo.

69:49I think.

69:50- I think it is much harder to estimate

69:52something like Elo rating in poker.

69:54I think it's doable.

69:55The problem is that the game is very high variance.

69:57So you could play,

69:59you could be profitable in poker for a year

70:02and you could actually be a bad player

70:03just because the variance is so high.

70:05I mean, you've got top professional poker players

70:07that would lose for a year

70:08just because they're on a really bad streak.

70:12- So for Elo, you have to have a nice clean way of saying

70:16if player A played player B and A beats B,

70:20that says something, that's a signal.

70:22In poker, that's a very noisy signal.

70:24- It's a very noisy signal.

70:25Now there is a signal there.

70:26And so you could do this calculation.

70:29It would just be much harder.

70:31But the same way that AIs have now taken over chess

70:35and all the top professional chess players train with AIs,

70:40the same is true for poker.

70:42The game has become a very computational,

70:46people train with AIs to try to find out

70:48where they're making mistakes,

70:49try to learn from the AIs to improve their strategy.

70:52So now, yeah, so the game has been revolutionized

70:57in the past five years by the development of AI

71:00in this sport.

71:01- The skill with which you avoided the question

71:03of the greatest of all time was impressive.

71:05- So my feeling is that it's a difficult question

71:08because just like in chess,

71:10where you can't really compare Magnus Carlsen today

71:13to Garry Kasparov, because the game has evolved so much.

71:17The poker players today are so far beyond the skills

71:23of people that were playing even 10 or 20 years ago.

71:27So you look at the kinds of all-stars that were on ESPN

71:30at the height of the poker boom,

71:33pretty much all those players are actually not that good

71:35at the game today, at least the strategy aspect.

71:39I mean, they might still be good at reading the player

71:42at the other side of the table and trying to figure out

71:44are they bluffing or not?

71:45But in terms of the actual computational strategy

71:48of the game, a lot of them have really struggled

71:50to keep up with that development.

71:52Now, so for that reason, I'll give an answer

71:55and I'm gonna say Daniel Legranio,

71:58who you actually had on the podcast recently,

71:59I saw it was a great episode.

72:00- I love this so much.

72:02(laughing)

72:03And Phil's gonna hate this so much.

72:05- And I'm gonna give him credit

72:08because he is one of the few old school,

72:11really strong players that have kept up

72:14with the development of AI.

72:15- So he is trying to, he's constantly studying

72:17the game theory optimal way of playing.

72:19- Exactly, yeah.

72:20And I think a lot of the old school poker players

72:23have just kind of given up on that aspect

72:24and I gotta give Daniel Legranio credit

72:26for keeping up with all the developments

72:29that are happening in the sport.

72:31- Yeah, it's fascinating to watch.

72:32It's fascinating to watch where it's headed.

72:34Yeah, so there you go, some love for Daniel.

72:38Quick pause, bath and break?

72:40- Yeah, let's do it.

72:42- Let's go from poker to diplomacy.

72:45What is at a high level the game of diplomacy?

72:48- Yeah, so I talked a lot about two players,

72:51zero sum games.

72:52And what's interesting about diplomacy

72:54is that it's very different from these adversarial games

72:59like chess, go, poker, even Starcraft and Dota.

73:02Diplomacy has a much bigger cooperative element to it.

73:05It's a seven player game.

73:07It was actually created in the fifties

73:10and it takes place before World War I.

73:13It's like a map of Europe with seven great powers

73:16and they're all trying to form alliances with each other.

73:20There's a lot of negotiation going on.

73:22And so the whole focus of the game

73:25is on forming alliances with the other players

73:28to take on the other players.

73:30- England, Germany, Russia, Turkey,

73:32Austria, Hungary, Italy, and France.

73:35- That's right, yeah.

73:36So the way the game works is on each turn,

73:41you spend about five to 15 minutes

73:43talking to the other players in privates

73:46and you make all sorts of deals with them.

73:48You say like, "Hey, let's work together.

73:50Let's team up against this other player."

73:53Because the only way that you can make progress

73:54is by working with somebody else against the others.

73:58And then after that negotiation period is done,

74:01all the players simultaneously submit their moves

74:05and they're all executed at the same time.

74:07And so you can tell people like,

74:09"Hey, I'm gonna support you this turn,"

74:11but then you don't follow through with it.

74:13And they're only gonna figure that out

74:14once they see the moves being read off.

74:16- How much of it is natural language,

74:18like written actual text?

74:21How much is like,

74:22you're actually saying phrases that are structured?

74:25- So there's different ways to play the game.

74:27You can play it in person,

74:29and in that case, it's all natural language.

74:31Free form communication.

74:32There's no constraints on the kinds of deals

74:34that you can make, the kinds of things that you can discuss.

74:37You can also play it online.

74:38So you can send long emails back and forth.

74:41You can play it live online or over voice chat.

74:46But the focus, the important thing to understand

74:49is that this is unstructured communication.

74:51You can say whatever you want.

74:52You can make any sorts of deals that you want

74:54and everything is done privately.

74:56So it's not like you're all around the board together

75:00having a conversation.

75:01You're grabbing somebody going off into a corner

75:03and conspiring behind everybody else's back

75:05about what you're planning.

75:07- And there's no limit in theory to the conversation

75:10you can have directly with one person.

75:12- That's right.

75:13You can make all sorts of,

75:14you can talk about anything.

75:15You can say like,

75:16"Hey, let's have a long-term alliance against this guy."

75:17You can say like,

75:18"Hey, can you support me this turn?

75:20And in return, I'll do this other thing for you next turn."

75:23Or, you know, yeah,

75:24just you can talk about like what you talked about

75:26with somebody else

75:27and gossip about like what they're planning.

75:30The way that I would describe the game

75:32is that it's kind of like a mix between Risk,

75:34poker, and the TV show "Survivor."

75:37There's like this big element of like trying to,

75:40yeah, there's a big social element.

75:43And the best way that I would describe the game

75:45is that it's really a game about people

75:47rather than the pieces.

75:48- So Risk, because it is a map,

75:52it's kind of war game-like.

75:54Poker, because there's a game theory component

75:58that's very kind of strategic.

76:00So you could convert it

76:01into an artificial intelligence problem.

76:04And then Survivor, because of the social component,

76:06strong social component.

76:07I saw that somebody said online

76:09that the internet version of the game

76:12has this quality of that it's easier

76:14to almost to do like role-playing.

76:17As opposed to being yourself,

76:19you can actually like be the,

76:21like really imagine yourself as the leader of France

76:24or Russia and so on.

76:25Like really pretend to be that person.

76:28It's actually fun to really lean into being that leader.

76:32- Yeah, so some players do go this route

76:34where they just like kind of view it as a strategy game,

76:37but also a role-playing game where they can like act out,

76:39like, what would I be like if I was, you know,

76:41a leader of France in 1900?

76:43- I'll forfeit right away.

76:44No, I'm just kidding.

76:45And they sometimes use like the old-timey language

76:50to like, or how they imagined the elites

76:53would talk at that time.

76:54Anyway, so what are the different turns of the game?

76:57Like what are the rounds?

76:59- Yeah, so on every turn,

77:01you got like a bunch of different units

§11Transcript · 1:17:03–1:24:33

77:03that you start out with.

77:04So you start out controlling like just a few units

77:07and the object of the game is to gain control

77:09of a majority of the map.

77:10If you're able to do that, then you've won the game.

77:13But like I said, the only way that you're able to do that

77:15is by working with other players.

77:16So on every turn, you can issue a move order.

77:19So for each of your units,

77:20you can move them to an adjacent territory,

77:23or you can keep them where they are,

77:26or you can support a move or a hold of a different unit.

77:30So--

77:31- What are the territories?

77:32Well, how is the map divided up?

77:34- It's kind of like risk where the map is divided up

77:36into like 50 different territories.

77:38Now you can enter a territory

77:42if you're moving into that territory with more supports

77:45than the person that's in there

77:47or the person that's trying to move in there.

77:48So if you're moving in and there's somebody already there,

77:51then if neither of you have support, it's a one versus one

77:54and you'll bounce back and neither of you will make progress.

77:56If you have a unit that's supporting

77:58that move into the territory, then it's a two versus one

78:01and you'll kick them out

78:02and they'll have to retreat somewhere.

78:03- What does support mean?

78:04- Support is like, it's an action

78:06that you can issue in the game.

78:07So you can say this unit, you write down,

78:10this unit is supporting this other unit into this territory.

78:13- Are these units from opposing forces?

78:16- They could be, they could be.

78:17And this is where the interesting aspect

78:18of the game comes in

78:19because you can support your own units into territory,

78:22but you can also support other people's units

78:24into territories.

78:25And so that's what the negotiations really revolve around.

78:28- But you don't have to do the thing you say

78:30you're going to do, right?

78:32- Yeah, and so this is--

78:33- So you can say, I'm gonna support you,

78:34but then backstab the person.

78:36- Yeah, that's absolutely right.

78:38- And that tension is core to the game?

78:41- That tension is absolutely core to the game.

78:43The fact that you can make all sorts of promises,

78:46but you have to reason about the fact that like,

78:49hey, they might not trust you

78:50if you say you're gonna do something,

78:51or they might be lying to you

78:54when they say that they're gonna support you.

78:56- So maybe just to jump back,

78:59what's the history of the game in general?

79:01Is it true that Henry Kissinger loved the game

79:03and JFK and all those?

79:05I've heard like a bunch of different people that,

79:07or is that just one of those things

79:08that the cool kids say they do,

79:10but they don't actually play?

79:11- So the game was created in the '50s.

79:13- Yeah.

79:14- And from what I understand, it was JFK's,

79:18it was played in like the JFK White House,

79:19Henry Kissinger's favorite game.

79:21I don't know if it's true,

79:22but that's definitely what I've heard.

79:23- It's interesting that they went with World War I

79:27when it was created after World War II.

79:29- So the story that I've heard for the creation of the game

79:32is it was created by somebody that had looked at

79:36the history of the 20th century,

79:39and they saw World War I as a failure of diplomacy.

79:43So-

79:44- Yeah.

79:44- They saw the fact that this war broke out

79:47as like the diplomats of all these countries

79:49really failed to prevent a war.

79:51And he wanted to create a game

79:52that would basically teach people about diplomacy.

79:55And it's really fascinating that in his ideal version

80:00of the game of diplomacy, nobody actually wins the game.

80:03Because the whole point is that if somebody is about to win,

80:05then the other players should be able to work together

80:08to stop that person from winning.

80:10And so the ideal version of the game

80:11is just one where nobody actually wins.

80:13And it's kind of has a nice like wholesome take home message

80:16then that war is ultimately futile.

80:19And-

80:20- And that optimal, that futile optimal

80:25could be achieved through great diplomacy.

80:28- Yeah.

80:28- So is there some asymmetry in terms of

80:32which is more powerful, Russia versus Germany

80:35versus France and so on?

80:38- So I think the general consensus is that France

80:40is the strongest power in the game.

80:42But the beautiful thing about diplomacy

80:44is that it's self-balancing, right?

80:45So the fact that France has an inherited advantage

80:48from the beginning means that the other players

80:51are less likely to work with it.

80:53- I saw that Russia has four units

80:54versus four of something

80:56that the others have three of something.

80:58- That's true, yeah.

80:58So Russia starts off with four units

80:59while all the other players start with three.

81:02But Russia is also in a much more vulnerable position

81:04because they have to like,

81:06they have a lot more neighbors as well.

81:07- Got it.

81:08Larger territory, more, yeah, right.

81:11More border to defend.

81:13Okay, what else is important to know about the rules?

81:17So how many rounds are there?

81:20Like, is this iterative game?

81:22Is it finite?

81:23Do you just keep going indefinitely?

81:25- Usually the game lasts, I would say about 15 or 20 turns.

81:30There's in theory, no limit.

81:32It could last longer, but at some point,

81:34I mean, if you're playing a house game with friends,

81:35at some point you just get tired and you all agree like,

81:37okay, we're gonna end the game here and call it a draw.

81:41If you're playing online, there's usually like set limits

81:43on when the game will actually end.

81:45- And what's the end, what's the termination condition?

81:47Like, does one country have to conquer everything else?

81:52- So if somebody is able to actually gain control

81:55of a majority of the map, then they've won the game.

81:57And that is a solo victory as it's called.

81:59Now that pretty rarely happens,

82:01especially with strong players, because like I said,

82:03the game is designed to incentivize the other players

82:06to put a stop to that and all work together

82:07to stop the superpower.

82:09Usually what ends up happening is that, you know,

82:12all the players agree to a draw and then the score,

82:16the win is divided among the remaining players.

82:20There's a lot of different scoring systems.

82:21The one that we used in our research basically gives

82:26a score relative to how much control you have of the map.

82:29So the more that you control, the higher your score.

82:32- What's the history of using this game

82:35as a benchmark for AI research?

82:37Do people use it?

82:39- Yeah, so people have been working on AI for diplomacy

82:42since about the '80s.

82:44There was some really exciting research back then,

82:47but the approach that was taken was very different

82:50from what we see today.

82:51I mean, the research in the '80s was a very rule-based

82:54approach, kind of a heuristic approach.

82:56It was very in line with the kind of research

82:57that was being done in the '80s.

82:59You know, basically trying to encode human knowledge

83:01into the strategy of the AI.

83:03- Sure.

83:04- And, you know, it's understandable.

83:06I mean, the game is so incredibly different

83:08and so much more complicated than the kinds of games

83:12that people were working on like chess and go and poker

83:15that it was honestly even hard to like start

83:20making any progress in diplomacy.

83:22- Can you just formulate what is the problem

83:24from an AI perspective and why is it hard?

83:27Why is it a challenging game to solve?

83:29- So there's a lot of aspects in diplomacy

83:31that make it a huge challenge.

83:33First of all, you have the natural language components.

83:36And I think this really is what makes it

83:39arguably the most difficult game

83:42among like the major benchmarks.

83:43The fact that you have to,

83:46it's not about moving pieces on the board.

83:49Your action space is basically all the different sentences

83:53that you could communicate to somebody else in this game.

83:56And-

83:57- Is there, can we just like linger on that?

83:59So is part of it like the ambiguity in the language?

84:04If it was like very strict,

84:07if you narrowed the set of possible sentences

84:10you could do it,

84:10would that simplify the game significantly?

84:12- The real difficulty is the breadth of things

84:16that you can talk about.

84:17You can have natural language in other games

84:20like Settlers of Catan, for example,

84:22like you could have a natural language,

84:23Settlers of Catan AI.

84:25But the things that you're gonna talk about

84:26are basically like, am I trading you two sheep for a wood

84:29or three sheep for a wood?

84:30Whereas in a game like Diplomacy,

84:33the breadth of conversations that you're going to have

§12Transcript · 1:24:35–1:32:34

84:35are like, am I going to support you?

84:38Are you gonna support me in return?

84:39Which units are gonna do what?

84:41What did this other person promise you?

84:45They're lying because they told this other person

84:47that they're gonna do this instead.

84:49If you help me out this turn,

84:50then in the future I'll do these things

84:52that will help you out.

84:53The depth and breadth of these conversations

84:58is really complicated.

85:01And it's all being done in natural language.

85:03Now you could approach it,

85:05and we actually considered doing this,

85:06like having a simplified language

85:09to make this complexity smaller.

85:12But ultimately we thought the most impactful way

85:16of doing this research would be to address

85:19the natural language component head on

85:21and just try to go for the full game upfront.

85:24- Just looking at sample games

85:25and what the conversations look like.

85:27Greetings England, this should prove to be a fun game

85:30since all the private press

85:32is going to be made public at the end.

85:35At the least it will be interesting to see

85:37if the press changes because of that.

85:39Anyway, good, okay.

85:40So there's like a--

85:41- Yeah, that's just kind of like the generic greetings

85:43at the beginning of the game.

85:44I think that the meat comes a little bit later

85:46when you're starting to talk about

85:48specific strategy and stuff.

85:50- I agree there are a lot of advantages

85:52to the two of us keeping in touch

85:54and our nations make strong natural allies

85:58in the middle game.

85:58So that kind of stuff, making friends, making enemies.

86:02- Yeah, or like if you look at the next line,

86:03so the person saying like,

86:05I've heard bits about a Lepanto and an octopus opening

86:08and basically telling Austria like,

86:10hey, just a heads up, you know,

86:11I've heard these whispers about like

86:13what might be going on behind your back.

86:14- Yeah, so there's all kinds of complexities

86:18in the language of that, right?

86:22Like to interpret what the heck that means.

86:25It's hard for us humans, but for AI it's even harder

86:27'cause you have to understand like at every level

86:30the semantics of that.

86:31- Right, I mean, there's the complexity in understanding

86:34when somebody is saying this to me, what does that mean?

86:36And then there's also the complexity of like,

86:38should I be telling this person this?

86:40Like I've overheard these whispers,

86:42should I be telling this person that like,

86:43hey, you might be getting attacked by this other power?

86:46- Okay, so how are we supposed to think about?

86:51Okay, so that's the natural language.

86:54How do you even begin trying to solve this game?

86:56It seems like the Turing test on steroids.

87:00- Yeah, and I mean, there's the natural language aspect.

87:02And then even besides the natural language aspect,

87:04you also have the cooperative elements of the game.

87:07And I think this is actually something

87:09that I find really interesting.

87:11If you look at all the previous game AI breakthroughs,

87:15they've all happened in these purely adversarial games

87:17where you don't actually need to understand

87:19how humans play the game.

87:20It's all just AI versus AI, right?

87:23Like you look at checkers, chess, go, poker,

87:27Starcraft, Dota 2, like in some of those cases,

87:31they leveraged human data, but they never needed to.

87:33They were always just trying to have a scalable algorithm

87:38that then they could throw a lot of computational resources

87:41at a lot of memory at, and then eventually it would converge

87:45to an approximation of a Nash equilibrium.

87:47This perfect strategy that in a two player zero-sum game

87:51guarantees that they're going to be able

87:53to not lose to any opponent.

87:55- So you can't leverage self-play to solve this game.

87:58- You can leverage self-play,

87:59but it's no longer sufficient to beat humans.

88:02- So how do you integrate the human into the loop of this?

88:05- So what you have to do is incorporate human data.

88:08And to kind of give you some intuition

88:11for why this is the case,

88:12like imagine you're playing a negotiation game,

88:13like diplomacy, but you're training completely from scratch

88:18without any human data.

88:19The AI is not going to suddenly like figure out

88:23how to communicate in English.

88:24It's going to figure out some weird robot language

88:27that only it will understand.

88:29And then when you stick that in a game

88:30with six other humans,

88:31they're going to think this person's talking gibberish

88:34and they're just going to ally with each other

88:35and team up against the bot,

88:37or not even team up against the bot,

88:38but just not work with the bot.

88:39And so in order to be able to play this game with humans,

88:43it has to understand the human way of playing the game,

88:46not this machine way of playing the game.

88:48- Yeah, yeah, that's fascinating.

88:50So, right.

88:51That's a nuanced thing to understand

88:54'cause a chess playing program

88:58doesn't need to play like a human to beat a human.

89:01- Exactly.

89:01- But here you have to play like a human

89:03in order to beat them.

89:04- Or at least you have to understand

89:06how humans play the game

89:07so that you can understand how to work with them.

89:08If they have certain expectations

89:10about what does it mean to be a good ally?

89:13What does it mean to have like a reciprocal relationship

89:16where we're working together?

89:17You have to abide by those conventions.

89:20And if you don't,

89:20they're just going to work with somebody else instead.

89:23- Do you think of this as a clean,

89:26in some deep sense of the spirit of the Turing test

89:28as formulated by Alan Turing?

89:30Is it, in some sense,

89:32this is what the Turing test actually looks like?

89:35- So, because of open-ended natural language conversation

89:40it seems like very difficult to evaluate.

89:44Like here at a high stakes

89:46where humans are trying to win a game,

89:47that seems like how you actually perform the Turing test.

89:51- I think it's different from the Turing test.

89:53Like the way that the Turing test is formulated,

89:55it's about trying to distinguish a human from a machine

89:59and seeing, oh, could the machine successfully pass

90:02as a human in this adversarial setting

90:04where the player is trying to figure out

90:07whether it's a machine or a human.

90:08Whereas in diplomacy, it's not about trying to figure out

90:11whether this player is a human or a machine.

90:14It's ultimately about whether I can work with this player

90:17regardless of whether they are a human or a machine.

90:19And can the machine do that better than a human can?

90:22- Yeah, I'm going to think about that,

90:26but that just feels like the implied requirement for that

90:31is for the machine to be human-like.

90:33- I think that's true,

90:35that if you're going to play in this human game,

90:39you have to somehow adapt to the human surroundings

90:43and the human play style.

90:44- And to win, you have to adapt.

90:47So you can't, if you're the outsider,

90:50if you're not human-like,

90:51I feel like that's a losing strategy.

90:53- I think that's correct, yeah.

90:55- Yeah, so, okay.

90:57What are the complexities here?

91:00What was your approach to it?

91:02- Before I get to that,

91:03one thing I should explain

91:04why we decided to work on Diplomacy.

91:07So basically what happened is in 2019,

91:10I was wrapping up the work on six-player poker on Pluribus

91:15and was trying to think about what to work on next.

91:17And I had been seeing all these other breakthroughs

91:20happening in AI.

91:21I mean, 2019, you have StarCraft,

91:24you have AlphaStar beating humans in StarCraft,

91:26you've got the Dota 2 stuff happening at OpenAI,

91:30you have GPT-2 or GPT-3 coming,

91:32I think it was GPT-2 at the time.

91:34And it became clear that AI was progressing

91:37really, really rapidly.

91:39And people were throwing out these other games

91:42about what should be the next challenge for multi-agent AI.

91:46And I just felt like we had to aim bigger.

91:50If you look at a game like chess or a game like Go,

91:54they took decades for researchers

91:56to ultimately reach superhuman performance at.

91:59I mean, chess took 40 years of AI research

92:02Go took another 20 years.

92:03And we thought that diplomacy

92:08would be this incredibly difficult challenge

92:10that could easily take a decade

92:12to make an AI that could play competently.

92:14But we felt like that was a goal worth aiming for.

92:18And so honestly, I was kind of reluctant

92:21to work on it at first

92:22because I thought it was like too far

92:24out of the realm of possibility.

92:26But I was talking to a coworker of mine, Adam Lear,

92:28and he was basically saying like,

92:30"Why not aim for it?

92:31"We'll learn some interesting things along the way

92:33"and maybe it'll be possible."

92:34And so we decided to go for it.

§13Transcript · 1:32:36–1:40:28

92:36And I think it was the right choice

92:38considering just how much progress there was in AI

92:43and that progress has continued in the years since.

92:45- So winning in diplomacy, what does that really look like?

92:50It means talking to six other players,

92:54six other entities, agents,

92:57and convincing them of stuff

93:01that you want them to be convinced of.

93:03Like what exactly, I'm trying to get like,

93:06to deeply understand what the problem is.

93:08- Ultimately, the problem is simple to quantify, right?

93:14Like you're going to play this game with humans

93:16and you want your score on average

93:18to be as high as possible.

93:21You know, if you can say like,

93:22"I am winning more than any human alive,"

93:26then you're a champion diplomacy player.

93:30Now, ultimately we didn't reach that.

93:31We got to human level performance.

93:32We actually, so we played about 40 games

93:35with real humans online.

93:38The bot came in second out of all players

93:40that played five or more games.

93:41And so not like number one, but way, way higher than-

93:46- What was the expertise level?

93:48Are they beginners?

93:49Are they intermediate players, advanced players?

93:51Do you have a sense?

93:52- That's a great question.

93:53And so I think this kind of goes into

93:55how do you measure the performance in diplomacy?

93:58And I would argue that when you're measuring performance

94:00in a game like this,

94:01you don't actually want to measure it

94:03in games with all expert players.

94:05It's kind of like if you're developing a self-driving car,

94:08you don't want to measure that car on the road

94:11with a bunch of expert stunt drivers.

94:13You want to put it on a road of like an actual American city

94:16and see is this car crashing less often

94:19than an expert driver would.

94:21So that's the metric that we've used.

94:24We're saying like, we're going to stick this game,

94:26we're going to stick this bot in games

94:27with a wide variety of skill levels.

94:30And then are we doing better than a strong

94:33or expert human player would in the same situation?

94:36- That's quite brilliant.

94:37'Cause I played a lot of sports in my life,

94:39like I did tennis, judo, whatever.

94:42And it's somehow almost easier

94:44to go against experts almost always.

94:46I don't know.

94:47I think they're more predictable in the quality of play.

94:51The space of strategies you're operating under

94:54is narrower against experts.

94:56It's more fun.

94:57It's really frustrating to go against beginners.

94:59Also 'cause beginners talk trash to you

95:01when they somehow do beat you.

95:03So that's a human thing that they add

95:05is not to be worried about that.

95:07But yeah, the variance in strategies is greater,

95:10especially with natural language.

95:12It's just all over the place then.

95:13- Yeah.

95:14And honestly, when you look at

95:17what makes a good human diplomacy player,

95:20obviously they're able to handle themselves

95:22in games with other expert humans,

95:23but where they really shine

95:24is when they're playing with these weak players.

95:26And they know how to take advantage

95:29of the fact that they're a weak player,

95:30that they won't be able to pull off a stab as well,

95:33or that they have certain tendencies

95:35and they can take them under their wing

95:36and persuade them to do things

95:38that might not even be in their interest.

95:41The really good diplomacy players

95:42are able to take advantage of the fact

95:45that there are some weak players in the game.

95:47- Okay, so if you have to incorporate human play data,

95:50how do you do that?

95:51How do you do that in order to train

95:53an AI system to play diplomacy?

95:55- Yeah, so that's really the crux of the problem.

95:58How do we leverage the benefits of self-play

96:02that have been so successful

96:04in all these other previous games,

96:06while keeping the strategy as human compatible as possible?

96:10And so what we did is we first trained a language model,

96:14and then we made that language model controllable

96:17on a set of intents, what we call intents,

96:21which are basically like an action that we want to play

96:24and an action that we would like the other player to play.

96:27And so this gives us a way to generate dialogue

96:29that's not just trying to imitate the human style,

96:31whatever a human would say in this situation,

96:34but to actually give it an intent,

96:36a purpose in its communication.

96:38We can talk about a specific move

96:40or we can make a specific request.

96:42And the determination of what that move is

96:45that we're discussing comes from a strategic reasoning model

96:50that uses reinforcement learning and planning.

96:53- So the computing the intents for all the players,

96:57how is that done?

96:58Just as a starting point,

97:01is that with reinforcement learning

97:03or is that just optimal,

97:04determining what the optimal is for intents?

97:06- It's a combination of reinforcement learning and planning.

97:11Actually very similar to how we approached poker

97:14and how people have approached chess and Go as well.

97:18We're using self-play and search to try to figure out

97:22what is an optimal move for us

97:25and what is a desirable move

97:26that we would like this other player to play.

97:28Now, the difference between the way that we approached

97:32reinforcement learning and search in this game

97:35versus those previous games

97:37is that we have to keep it human compatible.

97:38We have to understand how the other person

97:41is likely to play rather than just assuming

97:43that they're gonna play like a machine.

97:45- And how language gets them to play

97:48in a way that maximize the chance of following the intent

97:52you want them to follow.

97:54Okay, how do you do that?

97:55How do you connect language to intent?

97:58- So the way that RL and planning is done

98:01is actually not using language.

98:03So we're coming up with this plan for the action

98:07that we're gonna play and the other person's gonna play

98:09and then we feed that action into the dialogue model

98:11that will then send a message according to those plans.

98:14- So the language model there is mapping action to...

98:19- To message. - To message.

98:21One word at a time.

98:22- Basically one message at a time.

98:25So we'll feed into the dialogue model,

98:27like here are the actions that you should be discussing.

98:29Here's the message,

98:30here's like the content of the message

98:33that we would like you to send

98:35and then it will actually generate a message

98:37that corresponds to that.

98:37- Okay, does this actually work?

98:39- It works surprisingly well.

98:41- Okay, how...

98:42(laughs)

98:43Oh man, the number of ways it probably goes horribly,

98:47I would have imagined it goes horribly wrong.

98:50So how the heck is it effective at all?

98:54- I mean, there are a lot of ways that this could fail.

98:55So for example, I mean, you could have a situation

98:59where you're basically like,

99:01we don't tell the language model,

99:04like here are the pieces of our action

99:07or the other person's action

99:07that you should be communicating.

99:09And so like, let's say you're about to attack somebody,

99:11you probably don't wanna tell them

99:12that you're going to attack them,

99:14but there's nothing in the language,

99:15like the language model is not very smart

99:17at the end of the day.

99:17So it doesn't really have a way of knowing like,

99:20well, what should I be talking about?

99:21Should I tell this person

99:22that I'm about to attack them or not?

99:24So we have to like develop a lot of other techniques

99:27that deal with that.

99:28Like one of the things we do for example,

99:31is we try to calculate if I'm going to send this message,

99:34what would I expect the other person to do in response?

99:37So if it's a message like,

99:38hey, I'm gonna attack you this turn,

99:40they're probably gonna, you know, attack us

99:42or defend against that attack.

99:44And so we have a way of recognizing like,

99:47hey, sending this message

99:48is a negative expected value action

99:52and we should not send this message.

99:54- So you have for particular kinds of messages,

99:57you have like an extra function

99:59that does the, estimates the value of that message.

100:03- Yeah, so we have these kinds of filters that like-

100:05- So it's a filter.

100:06So there's a good, is that filter in your network

100:10or is it rule-based?

100:11- That's a neural network.

100:13So we're, well, it's a combination.

100:15It's a neural network, but it's also using planning.

100:18It's trying to compute like,

100:20what is the policy that the other players are going to play

100:23given that this message has been sent?

100:26And then is that better than not sending the message?

100:28- I feel like that's how my brain works too.

§14Transcript · 1:40:30–1:48:31

100:30Like there's a language model that generates random crap

100:33and then there's these other neural nets

100:37that are essentially filters.

100:39At least that's what I tweet.

100:41I'll usually, my process of tweeting,

100:43I'll think of something and it's hilarious to me.

100:46And then about five seconds later,

100:48the filter network comes in and says,

100:49no, no, that's not funny at all.

100:52I mean, there's something interesting

100:53to that kind of process.

100:55So you have a set of actions that you want,

100:58you have an intent that you want to achieve,

101:02an intent that you want your opponent to achieve,

101:04then you generate messages.

101:05And then you evaluate if those messages

101:07will achieve the goal you want.

101:12- Yeah, and we're filtering for several things.

101:15We're filtering like, is this a sensible message?

101:17So sometimes language models will send,

101:19will generate messages that are just like totally nonsense.

101:23And we try to filter those out.

101:25We also try to filter out messages that are basically lies.

101:29So diplomacy has this reputation as a game

101:32that's really about deception and lying,

101:35but we try to actually minimize the amount

101:38that the bot would lie.

101:40This was actually mostly a-

101:42- Or are you?

101:43No, I'm just kidding.

101:44All right, go ahead.

101:45(laughing)

101:46- I mean, like part of the reason for this

101:47is that we actually found that lying

101:51would make the bot perform worse in the long run.

101:53It would end up with a lower score.

101:55Because once the bot lies,

101:56people would never trust it again.

101:59And trust is a huge aspect of the game of diplomacy.

102:02- I'm taking notes here,

102:02'cause I think this applies to life lessons too.

102:06- Oh, I think it's a really, yeah, really strong-

102:08- So like lying is a dangerous thing to do.

102:11Like you want to avoid obvious lying.

102:15- Yeah, I mean, I think when people play diplomacy

102:17for the first time,

102:18they approach it as a game of deception and lying.

102:21And they, ultimately, if you talk to top diplomacy players,

102:24what they'll tell you is that diplomacy

102:26is a game about trust

102:28and being able to build trust in an environment

102:30that encourages people to not trust anyone.

102:33So that's the ultimate tension in diplomacy.

102:36How can this AI reason

102:38about whether you are being honest in your communication?

102:41And how can the AI persuade you that it is being honest

102:44when it is telling you that,

102:45"Hey, I'm actually going to support you this turn."

102:48- Is there some sense,

102:49I don't know if you step back and think,

102:50that this process will indirectly

102:55help us study human psychology?

102:59So like if trust is the ultimate goal,

103:01wouldn't that help us understand

103:03what are the fundamental aspects of forming trust

103:07between humans and between humans and AI?

103:10I mean, that's a really, really important question

103:11that's much bigger than strategy games.

103:14It's how can,

103:15that's fundamental to the human-robot interaction problem.

103:19How do we form trust between intelligent entities?

103:23- So one of the things I'm really excited about

103:25with diplomacy,

103:27there's never really been a good domain

103:30to investigate these kinds of questions.

103:32And diplomacy gives us a domain

103:35where trust is really at the center of it.

103:38And it's not just like you've hired

103:40a bunch of mechanical Turkers that are being paid

103:43and trying to get through the task as quickly as possible.

103:47You have these people that are really invested

103:48in the outcome of the game,

103:49and they're really trying to do the best that they can.

103:52And so I'm really excited that we're able to,

103:56we actually have put together this,

103:58we're open sourcing all of our models,

104:00we're open sourcing all of the code,

104:03and we're making the data that we've used

104:05available to researchers

104:07so that they can investigate these kinds of questions.

104:10- So the data of the different,

104:12the human and the AI play of diplomacy,

104:15and the models that you use

104:16for the generation of the messages and the filtering.

104:20- Yeah, not just even the data of the AI

104:22playing with the humans,

104:23but all the training data that we had,

104:26that we use to train the AI

104:28to understand how humans play the game.

104:30We're setting up a system

104:31where researchers will be able to apply

104:34to be able to gain access to that data

104:36and be able to use it in their own research.

104:38- We should say, what is the name of the system?

104:41- We're calling the bot Cicero.

104:42- Cicero.

104:43And what's the name, like you're open sourcing,

104:45what's the name of the repository and the project?

104:49Is it also just called Cicero the big project?

104:51Or is it still coming up with a name?

104:53- The data set comes from this website, webdiplomacy.net,

104:56is this site that's been online for like 20 years now.

104:59And it's one of the main sites

105:00that people use to play diplomacy on it.

105:02We've got like 50,000 games of diplomacy

105:06with natural language communication,

105:09over 10 million messages.

105:11So it's a pretty massive data set that people can use to,

105:14we're hoping that the academic community

105:16and the research community is able to use it

105:18for all sorts of interesting research questions.

105:21- So do you, from having studied this game,

105:23is this a sufficiently rich problem space

105:28to explore this kind of human AI interaction?

105:31- Yeah, absolutely.

105:32And I think it's maybe the best data set

105:36that I can think of out there

105:37to investigate these kinds of questions of negotiation,

105:41trust, persuasion.

105:44I wouldn't say it's the best data set in the world

105:45for human AI interaction, that's a very broad field.

105:49But I think that it's definitely up there as like,

105:52if you're really interested in language models

105:54interacting with humans in a setting

105:57where their incentives are not fully aligned,

105:59this seems like an ideal data set for investigating that.

106:02- So you have a paper with some impressive results

106:07and just an impressive paper that taken this problem on.

106:11What's the most exciting thing to you

106:13in terms of the results from the paper?

106:16- Well, I think there's a few--

106:18- Ideas or results?

106:20- Yeah, I think there's a few aspects of the results

106:23and that I think are really exciting.

106:25So first of all, the fact that we were able to achieve

106:27such strong performance,

106:29I was surprised by and pleasantly surprised by.

106:33So we played 40 games of diplomacy with real humans

106:37and the bot placed second out of all players

106:40that have played five or more games.

106:42So it's about 80 players total,

106:4419 of whom played five or more games

106:46and the bot was ranked second out of those players.

106:49And the bot was really good in two dimensions.

106:53One, being able to establish strong connections

106:56with the other players on the board,

106:58being able to like persuade them to work with it,

107:01being able to coordinate with them

107:02about like how it's going to work with them.

107:04And then also the raw tactical

107:07and strategic aspects of the game,

107:09being able to understand

107:12what the other players are likely to do,

107:13being able to model their behavior

107:15and respond appropriately to that,

107:17the bot also really excelled at.

107:19- What are some interesting things that the bot said?

107:22By the way, are you allowed to swear in the,

107:26like are there rules to what you're allowed to say

107:28and not in diplomacy?

107:29- You can say whatever you want.

107:30I think the site will get very angry at you

107:32if you start like threatening somebody.

107:34And we actually--

107:36- Like if you threaten somebody,

107:37you're supposed to do it politely.

107:39- Yeah, politely, you know, like keep it in character.

107:43We actually had a researcher watching the bot 24/7,

107:46well, whenever we play a game,

107:47we had a bot watching it to make sure

107:49that it wouldn't go off the rails

107:50and start like threatening somebody or something like that.

107:52- I would just love it if the bot started like mocking,

107:55mocking everybody,

107:56like some weird quirky strategies would emerge.

107:59That have you seen anything interesting that you,

108:01huh, that's a weird,

108:02that's a weird behavior,

108:05either the filter or the language model

108:09that was weird to you.

108:10- That was, yeah, there were definitely like

108:12things that the bot would do

108:15that were not in line with like

108:17how humans would approach the game.

108:19And that, in a good way, the humans actually,

108:22you know, we've talked to some expert diplomacy players

108:24about these results and their takeaway is that,

108:27well, maybe humans are approaching this the wrong way.

108:29And this is actually like the right way to play the game.

108:31- So what's required to win?

§15Transcript · 1:48:35–1:56:34

108:35Like what does it mean to mess up

108:37or to exploit the suboptimal behavior of a player?

108:41Like is there optimally rational behavior

108:45and irrational behavior that you need to estimate,

108:48that kind of stuff?

108:49Like what stands out to you?

108:51Like, is there a crack that you can exploit?

108:53Is there like a weakness that you can exploit in the game

108:58that everybody's looking for?

109:00- Well, I think you're asking kind of two questions there.

109:05So one, like modeling the irrationality

109:08and the suboptimality of humans.

109:10You can't, in diplomacy,

109:13you can't treat all the other players like they're machines.

109:15And if you do that,

109:17you're going to end up playing really poorly.

109:19And so we actually ran this experiment.

109:20So we trained a bot in a two player,

109:24zero-sum version of diplomacy,

109:26the same way that you might approach a game

109:27like chess or poker.

109:29And the bot was superhuman.

109:30It would crush any competitor.

109:32And then we took that same training approach

109:35and we trained a bot for the full seven player version

109:37of the game through self-play without any human data.

109:40And we stuck it in a game with six humans

109:42and it got destroyed.

109:43Even in the version of the game

109:44where there's no explicit natural language communication,

109:47it still got destroyed

109:49because it just wouldn't be able to understand

109:50how the other players were approaching the game

109:52and be able to work with that.

109:54- Can you just linger on that,

109:56meaning like there's an individual,

109:58there's an individual personality to each player

110:00and then you're supposed to remember that.

110:01But what do you mean it's not able to understand the players?

110:06- Well, it would, for example,

110:07expect the human to support it in a certain way

110:11when the human would simply like,

110:13think like, no, I'm not supposed to support you here.

110:16It's kind of like, you know,

110:17if you develop a self-driving car

110:19and it's trained completely from scratch

110:21with other self-driving cars,

110:22it might learn to drive on the left side of the road.

110:25And that's a totally reasonable thing to do

110:26if you're with these other self-driving cars

110:28that are also driving on the left side of the road.

110:30But if you put it in an American city, it's gonna crash.

110:33- But I guess the intuition I'm trying to build up

110:34is why does it then crush a human player heads up

110:37versus multiple?

110:40- This is an aspect of two players zero sum

110:42versus games that involve cooperation.

110:45So in a two player zero sum game,

110:47you can do self-play from scratch

110:50and you will arrive at the Nash equilibrium

110:52where you don't have to worry about the other player

110:56playing in a very human suboptimal style.

110:58That's just gonna be,

110:59the only way that deviating from a Nash equilibrium

111:04would change things is if it helped you.

111:06- So what's the dynamic of cooperation

111:09that's effective in diplomacy?

111:11Do you always have to have one friend in the game?

111:14- You always want to maximize your friends

111:18and minimize your enemies.

111:19- Got it.

111:23And boy, and the lying comes into play there.

111:28So the more friends you have, the better.

111:32- Yeah, I mean, I guess you have to attack somebody

111:34or else you're not gonna make progress.

111:35- Right, so that's the tension, but this is too real.

111:39This is too real.

111:40This is too close to geopolitics

111:42of actual military conflict in the world.

111:45Okay, that's fascinating.

111:47So that cooperation element

111:49is what makes the game really, really hard.

111:51- Yeah, and to give you an example

111:53of how this suboptimality and irrationality comes into play,

111:57there's a really common situation in the game of diplomacy

112:01that where one player starts to win

112:04and they're at the point where they're controlling

112:05about half the map.

112:07And the remaining players

112:09who have all been fighting each other the whole game

112:11all have to work together now

112:12to stop this other player from winning

112:14or else everybody's gonna lose.

112:15And it's kind of like "Game of Thrones."

112:18I don't know if you've seen the show

112:19where you got the others coming from the north

112:22and all the people have to work out their differences

112:24and stop them from taking over.

112:26And the bot will do this.

112:30The bot will work with the other players

112:32to stop the superpower from winning.

112:33But if it's trained from scratch

112:36or it doesn't really have a good grounding

112:38in how humans approach it,

112:39it will also at the same time attack the other players

112:43with its extra units.

112:44So all the units that are not necessary

112:46to stop the superpower from winning,

112:47it will use those to grab as many centers as possible

112:50from the other players.

112:51And in totally rational play,

112:55the other players should just live with that.

112:56They have to understand like,

112:57"Hey, a score of one is better than a score of zero.

113:00"So, okay, he's grabbed my centers,

113:04"but I'll just deal with it."

113:06But humans don't act that way, right?

113:08The human gets really angry at the bot

113:10and ends up throwing the game

113:12because I'm gonna screw you over

113:15because you did something that's not fair to me.

113:17- Got it.

113:19And are you supposed to model that?

113:20Is the bot supposed to model that kind of human frustration?

113:24- Yeah, exactly.

113:25So that is something that seems almost impossible to model

113:29purely from scratch without any human data.

113:31It's a very cultural thing.

113:32And so you need human data to be able to understand that,

113:36"Hey, that's how humans behave."

113:38And you have to work around that.

113:40It might be suboptimal, it might be irrational,

113:42but that's an aspect of humanity that you have to deal with.

113:47- So how difficult is it to train on human data

113:49given that human data is very limited

113:51versus what a purely self-play mechanism can generate?

113:55- That's actually one of the major challenges

113:57that we faced in the research,

113:58that we had a good amount of human data.

113:59We had about 50,000 games.

114:01What we try to do is leverage as much self-play as possible

114:05while still leveraging the human data.

114:08So what we do is we do self-play,

114:11very similar to how it's been done in poker and Go,

114:14but we try to regularize the self-play

114:17towards the human data.

114:18Basically, the way to think about it is

114:23we penalize the bot for choosing actions

114:28that are very unlikely under the human data set.

114:32- How do you know?

114:34Is there some kind of function that says,

114:36"This is human-like and not?"

114:38- Yeah, so we train a bot through supervised learning

114:41to model the human play as much as possible.

114:44So we basically train a neural net on those 50,000 games,

114:47and that gives us an approximate,

114:50that gives us a policy that resembles to some extent

114:52how humans actually play the game.

114:54Now, this isn't a perfect model of human play

114:57because we don't have unlimited data.

114:58We don't have unlimited neural net capacity,

115:01but it gives us some approximation.

115:03- Is there some data on the internet

115:05that's useful besides just diplomacy?

115:07So on the language side of things, is there some,

115:09can you go to like Reddit?

115:11And so sort of background model formulation

115:16that's useful for the game of diplomacy.

115:18- Yeah, absolutely.

115:19And so for the language model,

115:20which is kind of like a separate question,

115:22we didn't use the language model during self-play training,

115:25but we pre-trained the language model

115:29on tons of internet data as much as possible.

115:32And then we fine-tuned it specifically

115:34on the diplomacy games.

115:35So we are able to leverage the wider data set

115:38in order to fill in some of the gaps

115:41in how communication happens more broadly

115:44besides just specifically in these diplomacy games.

115:47- Okay, cool.

115:47What are some interesting things that came to life

115:50from this work to you?

115:53Like what are some insights about games

115:58where natural language is involved

116:01and cooperation, deep cooperation is involved?

116:04- Well, I think there's a few insights.

116:06So first of all, the fact that you can't rely purely

116:11or even largely on self-play,

116:12that you really have to have an understanding

116:14of how humans approach the game.

116:17I think that that's one of the major conclusions

116:19that I'm drawing from this work.

116:20And that is, I think, applicable more broadly

116:23to a lot of different games.

116:25So we've actually already taken the approaches

116:26that we've used in diplomacy and tried them

116:28on a cooperative card game called Hanabi.

116:31And we've had a lot of success in that game as well.

116:34On the language side, I think the fact

§16Transcript · 1:56:39–2:05:57

116:39that we were able to control the language model

116:43through this intense approach was very effective.

116:47And it allowed us, instead of just imitating

116:49how humans would communicate, we're able to go beyond that

116:52and able to feed into its superhuman strategies

116:57that it can then generate messages corresponding to.

117:02- Is there something you could say about detecting

117:04whether a person or AI is lying or not?

117:07- The bot doesn't explicitly try to calculate

117:13whether somebody is lying or not.

117:15But what it will do is try to predict

117:18what actions they're going to take,

117:19given the communications, given the messages

117:22that they've sent to us.

117:23So given our conversation,

117:24what do I think you're going to do?

117:26And implicitly, there is a calculation

117:28about whether you're lying to me in that.

117:30Based on your messages, if I think you're going

117:34to attack me this turn, even though your messages say

117:37that you're not, then essentially the bot

117:40is predicting that you're lying.

117:42But it doesn't view it as lying the same way

117:45that we would view it as lying.

117:47- But you could probably reformulate with all the same data

117:51and make a classifier lying or not.

117:54- Yeah, I think you could do that.

117:56That was not something that we were focused on,

117:58but I think that it is possible that,

118:00if you came up with some measurements of like,

118:03what does it mean to tell a lie?

118:04Because there's a spectrum, right?

118:06Like if you're withholding some information, is that a lie?

118:10If you're mostly telling the truth,

118:11but you forgot to mention this one action out of 10,

118:15is that a lie?

118:16It's hard to draw the line, but if you're willing to do that

118:19and then you could possibly use it to--

118:22- This feels like an argument inside a relationship now.

118:25What constitutes a lie?

118:27Depends what you mean by the definition of the word is.

118:32Okay, still it's fascinating because trust and lying

118:37is all intermixed into this and it's language models

118:41that are becoming more and more sophisticated.

118:43It's just a fascinating space to explore.

118:45What do you see as the future of this work

118:52that is inspired by the breakthrough performance

118:56that you're getting here with diplomacy?

118:58- I think there's a few different directions

119:03to take this work.

119:04I think really what it's showing us is the potential

119:09that language models have.

119:10I mean, I think a lot of people didn't think

119:12that this kind of result was possible even today,

119:14despite all the progress that's been made in language models.

119:17And so it shows us how we can leverage the power

119:21of things like self-play on top of language models

119:24to get increasingly better performance.

119:27And the ceiling is really much higher

119:30than what we have right now.

119:32- Is this transferable somehow to chatbots

119:37for the more general task of dialogue?

119:40So there is a kind of negotiation here,

119:43a dance between entities that are trying to cooperate

119:46and at the same time, a little bit adversarial,

119:49which I think maps somewhat to the general,

119:53the entire process of Reddit or like internet communication.

119:59You're cooperating, you're adversarial,

120:02you're having debates, you're having a camaraderie,

120:05all that kind of stuff.

120:06- I think one of the things that's really useful

120:08about diplomacy is that we have a well-defined

120:11value function.

120:12There is a well-defined score that the bot

120:15is trying to optimize.

120:16And in a setting like a general chatbot setting,

120:20it would need that kind of objective

120:24in order to fully leverage the techniques

120:26that we've developed.

120:27- What about like what we talked about earlier

120:30with NPCs inside video games?

120:33Like how can it be used to create

120:36for Elder Scrolls VI more compelling NPCs

120:41that you could talk to instead of committing

120:44all kinds of violence with a sword and fighting dragons,

120:48just sitting in a tavern and drink all day

120:49and talk to the chatbot?

120:51- The way that we've approached AI in diplomacy

120:53is you condition the language on an intent.

120:56Now that intent in diplomacy is an action,

120:59but it doesn't have to be.

121:00And you can imagine, you could have NPCs

121:04in video games or the metaverse or whatever,

121:06where there's some intent or there's some objective

121:09that they're trying to maximize,

121:10and you can specify what that is.

121:12And then the language can correspond to that intent.

121:17Now, I'm not saying that this is happening imminently,

121:19but I'm saying that this is like a future application

121:22potentially of this direction of research.

121:25- So what's the more general formulation of this?

121:27Making self-play be able to scale the way self-play does

121:30and still maintain human-like behavior.

121:33- The way that we've approached self-play in diplomacy

121:37is we're trying to come up with good intents

121:42to condition the language model on.

121:43And the space of intents is actions

121:46that can be played in the game.

121:47Now, there is the potential to have a broader set of intents,

121:51things like long-term cooperation or long-term objectives

121:56or gossip about what another player was saying.

122:01These are things that we're currently not conditioning

122:03the language model on, and so we're not able to control it

122:07to say like, "Oh, you should be talking

122:08"about this thing right now."

122:09But it's quite possible that you could expand

122:12the scope of intents to be able to allow it

122:14to talk about those things.

122:16Now, in the process of doing that,

122:17the self-play would become much more complicated.

122:20And so that is a potential for future work.

122:23- Okay, the increase in the number of intents.

122:25I still am not quite clear how you keep the self-play

122:32integrated into the human world.

122:34- Yeah.

122:35- I'm a little bit loose on understanding how you do that.

122:39- So we train in neural nets to imitate the human data

122:43as closely as possible,

122:44and that's what we call the anchor policy.

122:47And now when we're doing self-play,

122:49the problem with the anchor policy

122:50is that it's not a perfect approximation

122:53of how humans actually play.

122:54Because we don't have infinite data,

122:56because we don't have unlimited neural network capacity,

123:00it's actually a relatively suboptimal approximation

123:03of how humans actually play.

123:04And we can improve that approximation

123:06by adding planning and RL.

123:10And so what we do is we get a better approximation,

123:13a better model of human play by,

123:17during the self-play process,

123:19we say you can deviate from this human anchor policy

123:24if there is an action that has, you know,

123:26particularly high expected value.

123:29But it would have to be a really high expected value

123:32in order to deviate from this human-like policy.

123:36So you basically say,

123:37try to maximize your expected value

123:39while at the same time,

123:40stay as close as possible to the human policy.

123:44And there is a parameter that controls

123:46the relative weighting of those competing objectives.

123:50- So the question I have

123:52is how sophisticated can the anchor policy get?

123:56So I have a policy that approximates human behavior, right?

123:59- Yeah.

124:00- So as you increase the number of intents,

124:03as you generalize the space in which this is applicable,

124:08and given that the human data is limited,

124:11try to anticipate a policy that works

124:14for a much larger number of cases.

124:17Like how difficult is the process

124:19of forming a damn good anchor policy?

124:22- Well, it really comes down

124:23to how much human data you have.

124:25So it's all about scaling the human data.

124:27- I think the more human data you have, the better.

124:30And I think that that's going to be the major bottleneck

124:32in scaling to more complicated domains.

124:37But that said, there might be the potential,

124:39just like in the language model,

124:40where we leveraged tons of data on the internet

124:43and then specialized it for diplomacy.

124:46There is the future potential

124:47that you can leverage huge amounts of data across the board

124:50and then specialize it in the data set

124:53that you have for diplomacy.

124:54And that way you're essentially augmenting

124:56the amount of data that you have.

124:58- To what degree does this apply

125:00to the general, the real world diplomacy, the geopolitics?

125:06You know, there's a game theory has a history

125:11of being applied to understand

125:13and to give us hope about nuclear weapons, for example.

125:16The mutually assured destruction

125:17is a game theoretic concept that you can formulate.

125:21Some people say it's oversimplified,

125:23but nevertheless, here we are

125:24and we somehow haven't blown ourselves up.

125:27Do you see a future where this kind of system

125:32can be used to help us make decisions,

125:35geopolitical decisions in the world?

125:37- Well, like I said, the original motivation

125:40for the game of diplomacy was the failures of World War I,

125:44the diplomatic failures that led to war.

125:46And the real take-home message of diplomacy is that,

125:50you know, if people approach diplomacy,

125:53the right way, then war is ultimately unsuccessful.

125:57The way that I see it, war is

§17Transcript · 2:06:00–2:14:41

126:00an inherently negative sum game, right?

126:02There's always a better outcome than war

126:04for all the parties involved.

126:06And my hope is that, you know, as AI progresses,

126:10then maybe this technology could be used

126:12to help people make better decisions across the board

126:17and, you know, hopefully avoid

126:19negative sum outcomes like war.

126:21- Yeah, I mean, I just came back from Ukraine.

126:24I'm going back there.

126:25On deep personal levels, think a lot about

126:30how peace can be achieved.

126:34And I'm a big believer in conversation,

126:36leaders getting together and having conversations

126:39and trying to understand each other.

126:42Yeah, it's fascinating to think

126:44whether each one of those leaders

126:46can run a simulation ahead of time.

126:48Like if I'm an asshole,

126:50(chuckles)

126:52what are the possible consequences?

126:53If I'm nice, what are the possible consequences?

126:56My guess is that if the president of the United States

127:01got together with Vladimir Zelensky and Vladimir Putin,

127:06that there would be significant benefits

127:10to the president of the United States not having the ego

127:14of kind of playing down, of giving away a lot of chips

127:19for the future success of a world.

127:22So giving a lot of power to the two presidents

127:24of the competing nations to achieve peace.

127:27That's my guess,

127:29but it'd be nice to run a bunch of simulations.

127:31But then you have to have human data, right?

127:33You really, 'cause it's like the game of diplomacy

127:35is fundamentally different than geopolitics.

127:37You need data.

127:39You need like, I guess that's the question I have.

127:42Like how transferable is this to,

127:44like I don't know, any kind of negotiation, right?

127:47Like to any kind of, some local, I don't know,

127:50a bunch of lawyers like arguing,

127:52like a divorce, like divorce lawyers.

127:55Like how transferable is this

127:56to all kinds of human negotiation?

127:58- Well, I feel like this isn't a question

128:00that's unique to diplomacy.

128:01I mean, I think you look at RL breakthroughs,

128:03reinforcement learning breakthroughs

128:05in previous games as well,

128:06like AI for StarCraft, AI for Atari.

128:09You haven't really seen it deployed in the real world

128:11because you have these problems of,

128:13it's really hard to collect a lot of data

128:16and you don't have a well-defined action space.

128:21You don't have a well-defined reward function.

128:23These are all things that you really need

128:25for reinforcement learning

128:27and planning to be really successful today.

128:29Now, there are some domains where you do have that.

128:32Code generation is one example.

128:35Theorem proving mathematics, that's another example

128:37where you have a well-defined action space.

128:39You have a well-defined reward function.

128:40And those are the kinds of domains

128:42where I can see RL in the short term

128:45being incredibly powerful.

128:47But yeah, I think that those are the barriers

128:51to deploying this at scale in the real world.

128:53But the hope is that in the long run,

128:55we'll be able to get there.

128:57- Yeah, but see, diplomacy feels like closer

128:59to the real world than does StarCraft.

129:02Like 'cause it's natural language, right?

129:04You're operating in the space of intents

129:06and in the space of natural language,

129:07that feels very close to the real world.

129:09And it also feels like you could get data on that

129:12from the internet.

129:14- Yeah, and that's why I do think that diplomacy

129:17is taking a big step closer to the real world

129:20than anything that's came before

129:21in terms of game AI breakthroughs.

129:23The fact that we're communicating in natural language,

129:27we're leveraging the fact that we have this

129:30like general data set of dialogue and communication

129:35from a breadth of the internet.

129:37That is a big step in that direction.

129:39We're not 100% there, but we're getting closer at least.

129:44- So if we actually return back to poker and chess,

129:47are some of the ideas that you're learning here

129:48with diplomacy, could you construct AI systems

129:52that play like humans?

129:55Like make for a fun opponent in a game of chess?

130:00- Yeah, absolutely.

130:01We've already started looking into this direction a bit.

130:03So we tried to use the techniques that we've developed

130:05for diplomacy to make chess and go AIs.

130:08And what we found is that it led to much more human-like

130:13strong chess and go players.

130:15The way that AIs like Stockfish today play

130:19is in a very inhuman style.

130:21It's very strong, but it's very different

130:23from how humans play.

130:25And so we can take the techniques

130:27that we've developed for diplomacy.

130:28We do something similar in chess and go,

130:32and we end up with a bot that's both strong and human-like.

130:36To elaborate on this a bit,

130:39like one way to approach making a human-like

130:43AI for chess is to collect a bunch of human games,

130:47like a bunch of human grandmaster games,

130:49and just to supervise learning on those games.

130:52But the problem is that if you do that,

130:53what you end up with is an AI that's substantially weaker

130:57than the human grandmasters that you trained on.

130:59Because the neural net is not able to approximate

131:03the nuance of the strategy.

131:06This goes back to the planning thing that I mentioned,

131:08the search thing that I talked about before,

131:10that these human grandmasters, when they're playing,

131:12they're using search and they're using planning.

131:15And the neural net alone,

131:17unless you have a massive neural net

131:19that's like a thousand times bigger

131:20than what we have right now,

131:22it's not able to approximate those details very effectively.

131:25And on the other hand,

131:28you can leverage search and planning very heavily,

131:32but then what you end up with is an AI

131:34that plays in a very different style

131:35from how humans play the game.

131:37Now, if you strike this intermediate balance

131:40by setting the regularization parameters correctly

131:43and say, you can do planning,

131:44but try to keep it close to the human policy,

131:46then you end up with an AI that plays

131:49in both a very human-like style and a very strong style.

131:54And you can actually even tune it

131:55to have a certain ELO rating.

131:58So you can say, play in the style of like a 2800 ELO human.

132:01- I wonder if you could do specific type of humans

132:04or categories of humans, not just skill, but style.

132:09- Yeah, I think so.

132:10And so this is where the research gets interesting.

132:13Like, one of the things that I was thinking about is,

132:16and this is actually already being done,

132:18there's a researcher at the University of Toronto

132:19that's working on this,

132:21is to make an AI that plays

132:23in the style of a particular player.

132:25Like Magnus Carlsen, for example,

132:26you can make an AI that plays like Magnus Carlsen.

132:29And then where I think this gets interesting is like,

132:31maybe you're up against Magnus Carlsen

132:33in the world championship or something,

132:35you can play against this Magnus Carlsen bot

132:37to prepare against the real Magnus Carlsen.

132:40And you can try to explore strategies

132:42that he might struggle with and try to figure out like,

132:46how do you beat this player in particular?

132:48On the other hand, you can also have Magnus Carlsen

132:51working with this bot to try to figure out where he's weak

132:53and where he needs to improve his strategy.

132:56And so I can envision this future

132:59where data on specific chess and Go players

133:03becomes extremely valuable because you can use that data

133:06to create specific models

133:08of how these particular players play.

133:10- So increasingly human-like behavior in bots, however,

133:13as you've mentioned, makes cheating,

133:17cheat detection much harder.

133:19- It does, yeah.

133:20The way that cheat detection works in a game like poker

133:23and a game like chess and Go, from what I understand,

133:26is trying to see like, is this person making moves

133:30that are very common among chess AIs or AIs in general?

133:36But very uncommon among top human players.

133:40And if you have the development of these AIs

133:43that play in a very strong style,

133:46but also a very human-like style,

133:48then that poses serious challenges for cheat detection.

133:51- And it makes you now ask yourself a hard question

133:54about what is the role of AI systems

133:56as they become more and more integrated in our society?

133:59And this kind of human AI integration

134:03has some deep ethical issues that we should be aware of.

134:08And also it's a kind of cybersecurity challenge, right?

134:13For it to make, you know,

134:14one of the assumptions we have when we play games

134:17is that there's a trust that it's only humans involved.

134:20And the better AI systems we create,

134:24which makes it super exciting,

134:26human-like AI systems with different styles of humans

134:28is really exciting,

134:29but then we have to have the defenses

134:32better and better and better

134:33if we're to trust that we can enjoy

134:36human versus human game in a deeply fair way.

134:40It's fascinating.

134:41It's just, it's humbling.

§18Transcript · 2:14:44–2:22:50

134:44- Yeah, I think there's a lot of like negative potential

134:47for this kind of technology,

134:48but you know, at the same time,

134:49there's a lot of upside for it as well.

134:51So, you know, for example, right now,

134:53it's really hard to learn how to get better

134:55in games like chess and poker and Go

134:57because the way that the AI plays

135:00is so foreign and incomprehensible.

135:02But if you have these AIs that are playing,

135:04you know, you can say like,

135:05oh, I'm a 2000 Elo human, how do I get to 2200?

135:08Now you can have an AI that plays in the style

135:10of a 2200 Elo human, and that will help you get better.

135:14Or, you know, you mentioned this problem of like,

135:16how do you know that you're actually playing with humans

135:19when you're playing like online and in video games?

135:22Well, now we have the potential of populating

135:24these like virtual worlds with agents,

135:28like AI agents that are actually fun to play with,

135:30and you don't have to always be playing with other humans

135:33to, you know, have a fun time.

135:36So yeah, a lot of upside potential too.

135:38And I think, you know, with any sort of tool,

135:40there's the potential for a lot of greatness

135:42and a lot of downsides as well.

135:44- So in the paper that I got a chance to look at,

135:47there's a section on ethical considerations.

135:50What's in that section?

135:51What are some ethical considerations here?

135:53Is it some of the stuff we already talked about?

135:55- There's some things that we've already talked about.

135:57I think specific to diplomacy, you know,

136:01there's also the challenge that the game is,

136:04you know, there is a deception aspect to the game.

136:07And so, you know, developing language models

136:11that are capable of deception is I think a dicey issue

136:14and something that, you know,

136:16makes research on diplomacy particularly challenging.

136:18And, you know, so those kinds of issues of like,

136:24should we even be developing AIs

136:25that are capable of lying to people?

136:27That's something that we have to, you know,

136:28think carefully about.

136:30- That's so cool.

136:31I mean, you have to do that kind of stuff

136:32in order to figure out where the ethical lines are.

136:35But I can see in the future it being illegal

136:37to have a consumer product that lies.

136:41- Yeah, yeah.

136:44- Like your personal assistant AI system

136:46is always have to tell the truth.

136:48But if I ask it, do I look,

136:50did I get fatter over the past month?

136:53I sure as hell want that AI system to lie to me.

136:56So there's a trade off between lying and being nice.

137:01We have to somehow find,

137:02what is the ethics in that?

137:04And we're back to discussions inside relationships.

137:07Anyway, what were you saying?

137:08- Oh, yeah, I was saying like, yeah,

137:09that's kind of going to the question of like,

137:11what is a lie?

137:12You know, is a white lie a bad lie?

137:13Is it an ethical lie?

137:15You know, those kinds of questions.

137:16- Boy, we return time and time again

137:20to deep human questions as we design AI systems.

137:23That's exactly what they do.

137:24They put a mirror to humanity

137:26to help us understand ourselves.

137:29- There's also the issue of like, you know,

137:31in these diplomacy experiments,

137:32in order to do a fair comparison,

137:35you know, what we found is that

137:36there's an inherent anti-AI bias in these kinds of games.

137:40So we actually played a tournament

137:43in a non-language version of the game,

137:45where, you know, we told the participants like,

137:47hey, in every single game, there's going to be an AI.

137:49And what we found is that the humans

137:51would spend basically the entire game,

137:53like trying to figure out who the bot was.

137:55And then as soon as they thought they figured it out,

137:56they would all team up and try to kill it.

137:58And, you know, overcoming that inherent anti-AI bias

138:03is a challenge.

138:05- On the flip side, I think when robots become the enemy,

138:10that's when we get to heal our human divisions,

138:14and then we can become one.

138:16As long as we have one enemy,

138:18it's that Reagan thing when the aliens show up,

138:20that's when we put our side,

138:22our divisions will become one human species.

138:25- Right, we might have our differences,

138:26but we're at least all human.

138:27- At least we all hate the robots.

138:30No, no, no, no.

138:31I think there will be actually in the future

138:33something like a civil rights movement for robots.

138:35I think that's the fascinating thing about AI systems,

138:38and that is they ask, they force us to ask about

138:41ethical questions about what is sentience,

138:44what is, how do we feel about systems

138:47that are capable of suffering,

138:48or capable of displaying suffering?

138:50And how do we design products that show emotion and not?

138:53How do we feel about that?

138:54Lying is another topic.

138:56Are we going to allow bots to lie and not?

139:00And where's the balance between being nice

139:02and telling the truth?

139:04I mean, these are all fascinating human questions,

139:07and it's so exciting to be in a century

139:09where we can create systems that

139:11take these philosophical questions

139:15that have been asked for centuries,

139:17and now we can engineer them inside systems,

139:20where you really have to answer them,

139:22because you'll have transformational impact on human society

139:26depending on what you design inside those systems.

139:30It's fascinating.

139:31And like you said, I feel like diplomacy

139:33is a step towards the direction of the real world,

139:35applying these RL methods towards the real world.

139:38From all the breakthrough performances

139:41in Go and Chess and StarCraft and Dota,

139:44this feels like the real world.

139:46Especially now my mind's been on war,

139:49and military conflict.

139:50This feels like it can give us some deep insights

139:53about human behavior at the large geopolitical scale.

139:56What do you think is the breakthrough

140:03or the directions of work that will take us

140:08towards solving intelligence, towards creating AGI systems?

140:13You've been a part of creating,

140:15by the way, we should say a part of great teams

140:19that do this, of creating systems

140:23that achieve breakthrough performances

140:24on before thought unsolvable problems,

140:28like poker, multiplayer poker, diplomacy.

140:32We're taking steps towards that direction.

140:35What do you think it takes to go all the way

140:37to create superhuman level intelligence?

140:40- You know, there's a lot of people

140:41trying to figure that out right now.

140:43And I should say, the amount of progress that's been made,

140:46especially in the past few years is truly phenomenal.

140:49I mean, you look at where AI was 10 years ago,

140:52and the idea that you can have AIs

140:53that can generate language and generate images

140:56the way they're doing today,

140:57and able to play a game like diplomacy

140:59was just unthinkable, even five years ago,

141:03let alone 10 years ago.

141:04Now, there are aspects of AI that I think are still lacking.

141:11I think there's general agreement

141:15that one of the major issues with AI today

141:17is that it's very data inefficient.

141:19It requires a huge number of samples of training examples

141:24to be able to train.

141:25You know, you look at an AI that plays Go,

141:27and it needs millions of games of Go

141:29to learn how to play the game well.

141:32Whereas a human can pick it up in like, you know,

141:34I don't know, how many games does a human Go player,

141:36Go grandmaster play in their lifetime?

141:38Probably, you know, in the thousands

141:41or tens of thousands, I guess.

141:45So that's one issue.

141:46- Data efficiency.

141:47- Overcoming this challenge of data efficiency.

141:48And this is particularly important

141:50if we want to deploy AI systems in real world settings

141:55where they're interacting with humans,

141:56because, you know, for example, with robotics,

141:58it's really hard to generate a huge number of samples.

142:01It's a different story when you're working in these,

142:04you know, totally virtual games

142:06where you can play a million games and it's no big deal.

142:08- I was planning on just launching like a thousand

142:10of these robots in Austin.

142:12I don't think it's illegal for legged robots

142:14to roam the streets and just collect data.

142:16- That's not a crazy idea.

142:17- Of course, the worst that could happen.

142:18- Yeah, I mean, that's one way

142:20to overcome the data efficiency problem.

142:21It's like scale it, yeah.

142:23- Like I actually tried to see if there's a law

142:26against robots, like legged robots just operating

142:30in the streets of a major city and there isn't,

142:34I couldn't find any.

142:35So I'll take it all the way to the Supreme Court.

142:38Robot rights.

142:40Okay, anyway, sorry, you were saying.

142:42So what are the ideas for getting,

142:45becoming more data efficient?

142:48- I mean, that's the trillion dollar question in AI today.

142:50I mean, if you can figure out how to make AI systems

§19Transcript · 2:22:52–2:29:15

142:52more data efficient, then that's a huge breakthrough.

142:57So nobody really knows right now.

142:58- It could be just a gigantic background model,

143:01language model, and then you do,

143:03the training becomes like prompting that model

143:10to essentially do a kind of querying,

143:11a search into the space of the things it's learned

143:14to customize that to whatever problem you're trying to solve.

143:17So maybe if you form a large enough language model,

143:20you can go quite a long way.

143:21- I think there's some truth to that.

143:24I mean, you look at the way humans approach

143:26a game like poker, they're not coming at it from scratch.

143:29They're coming at it with a huge amount

143:31of background knowledge about how humans work,

143:34how the world works, the idea of money.

143:38So they're able to leverage that kind of information

143:41to pick up the game faster.

143:44So it's not really a fair comparison

143:45to then compare it to an AI

143:47that's like learning from scratch.

143:48And maybe one of the ways that we address

143:49this sample complexity problem is by allowing AIs

143:53to leverage that general knowledge

143:55across a ton of different domains.

143:56- So, like I said, you did a lot of incredible work

144:01in the space of research and actually building systems.

144:04What advice would you give to, let's start with beginners.

144:07What advice would you give to beginners

144:09interested in machine learning?

144:11Just they're at the very start of their journey,

144:13they're in high school and college,

144:15thinking like this seems like a fascinating world.

144:18What advice would you give them?

144:19- I would say that there are a lot of people

144:24working on similar aspects of machine learning

144:27and to not be afraid to try something a bit different.

144:31My own path in AI is pretty atypical

144:35for a machine learning researcher today.

144:37I mean, I started out working on game theory

144:39and then shifting more towards reinforcement learning

144:43as time went on.

144:44And that actually had a lot of benefits, I think,

144:46because it allowed me to look at these problems

144:48in a very different way

144:49from the way a lot of machine learning researchers view it.

144:54And that comes with drawbacks in some respects.

144:58Like I think there's definitely aspects of machine learning

145:00where I'm weaker than most of the researchers out there,

145:04but I think that diversity of perspective,

145:07when I'm working with my teammates,

145:10there's something that I'm bringing to the table

145:11and there's something that they're bringing to the table.

145:12And that kind of collaboration

145:13becomes very fruitful for that reason.

145:15- So there could be problems like poker,

145:18like you've chosen diplomacy,

145:20there could be problems like that still out there

145:23that you can just tackle,

145:24even if it seems extremely difficult.

145:26- I think that there's a lot of challenges left.

145:30And I think having a diversity of viewpoints

145:34and backgrounds is really helpful

145:36for working together to figure out

145:38how to tackle those kinds of challenges.

145:40- So as a beginner, so that,

145:42I would say that's more for like a grad student

145:45where they already built up a base,

145:46like a complete beginner, what's a good journey.

145:49So for you that was doing some more

145:51in the math side of things, doing game theory,

145:53all that, so it's basically build up a foundation

145:56in something, so programming, mathematics,

145:59it could even be physics, but build that foundation.

146:03- Yeah, I would say build a strong foundation

146:05in math and computer science and statistics

146:07and these kinds of areas,

146:08but don't be afraid to try something that's different

146:11and learn something that's different

146:13from the thing that everybody else is doing

146:15to get into machine learning.

146:17There's value in having a different background

146:20than everybody else.

146:22Yeah, so, but certainly having a strong math background,

146:26especially in things like linear algebra

146:28and statistics and probability

146:30are incredibly helpful today for learning about

146:33and understanding machine learning.

146:35- Do you think one day we'll be able to,

146:37since you're taking steps from poker to diplomacy,

146:39one day we'll be able to figure out

146:43how to live life optimally?

146:45- Well, what is it, like in poker and diplomacy,

146:49you need a value function, you need to have a reward system.

146:52And so what does it mean to live a life that's optimal?

146:55- So, okay, so then you can exactly like lay down

146:59a reward function being like, I wanna be rich

147:02or I want to be in a happy relationship.

147:07And then you'll say, well, do X.

147:10- There's a lot of talk today about in AI safety circles

147:15about like misspecification of reward function.

147:19So you say like, okay, my objective is to be rich

147:22and maybe the AI tells you like, okay,

147:24well, if you wanna maximize the probability

147:26that you're rich, go rob a bank.

147:27- Sure.

147:28- And so you wanna, is that really what you want?

147:30Is your objective really to be rich at all costs

147:33or is it more nuanced than that?

147:35- So the unintended consequences, yeah.

147:38Yeah, so maybe life is more about defining

147:44the reward function that minimizes

147:47the unintended consequences than it is about

147:50the actual policy that gets you to the reward function.

147:53Maybe life is just about constantly updating

147:57the reward function.

147:59I think one of the challenges in life

148:01is figuring out exactly what that reward function is.

148:04Sometimes it's pretty hard to specify.

148:06The same way that trying to handcraft the optimal policy

148:09in a game like chess is really difficult.

148:12It's not so clear cut what the reward function is for life.

148:15- I think one day AI will figure it out.

148:18And I wonder what that would be.

148:21Until then, I just really appreciate

148:24the kind of work you're doing.

148:25And it's really fascinating taking a leap

148:28into a more and more real-world-like problem space

148:33and just achieving incredible results

148:38by applying reinforcement learning.

148:40Now, since I saw your work on poker,

148:42you've been a constant inspiration.

148:44It's an honor to get to finally talk to you

148:46and this is really fun.

148:47- Thanks for having me.

148:49- Thanks for listening to this conversation with Noah Brown.

148:52To support this podcast, please check out our sponsors

148:54in the description.

148:56And now, let me leave you with some words from Sun Tzu

148:59in "The Art of War."

149:01"The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy

149:04so that he cannot fathom our real intent."

149:08Thank you for listening and hope to see you next time.

149:12(upbeat music)

149:15(upbeat music)

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